

SCHOOL OF CIVIL ENGINEERING



JOINT HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROJECT

JHRP-75-19

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION AND
METROPOLITICS: DETERMINANTS
CENTRAL TO A NORMATIVE THEORY
OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING

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PURDUE UNIVERSITY
INDIANA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION

Final Report

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION AND METROPOLITICS:
DETERMINANTS CENTRAL TO A NORMATIVE THEORY OF METROPOLITAN
PLANNING

TO: J. F. McLaughlin, Director
Joint Highway Research Project

October 1, 1975

FROM: H. L. Michael, Associate Director
Joint Highway Research Project

Project: C-36-70E

File: 3-8-5

The attached Final Report by Woodrow L. Moore, Jr., and titled "Governmental Reorganization and Metropolitics: Determinants Central to a Normative Theory of Metropolitan Planning" resulted from research performed by Mr. Moore for his Ph.D. degree. During the conduct of this research Mr. Moore served as a Graduate Instructor in the School of Civil Engineering at Purdue University. Professor H. L. Michael provided guidance for the research and preparation of the report.

The Report is presented to the Advisory Board of the JHRP as information on it is in an area of increasing interest and concern to all governmental units, including state highway departments. Planning of metropolitan areas has long been recognized as a desirable scope for planning to have but experience has been minimal and success questioned. The attached Report reviews these problems and postulates a theory of and the determinants for such planning.

Respectfully submitted,

Harold L. Michael


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DETERMINANTS CENTRAL TO A NORMATIVE THEORY OF METROPOLITAN
PLANNING

by

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Project: C-36-70E

File: 3-8-5

This study was conducted by Mr. Moore
in partial fulfillment of the require-
ments for the Ph.D. degree.

Purdue University
West Lafayette, Indiana
October 1, 1975

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

With a deep sense of gratitude, the author wishes to single out several individuals who have contributed suggestions and other types of assistance during the conduct of this research.

Special thanks go to Professor Harold L. Michael, Head of Transportation and Urban Engineering at Purdue University, for his continuous support throughout the past three years, and particularly for his advice and counsel during our entire professional association. All that is worthwhile in this study has been influenced by that association.

For their interest, guidance, and reasoned criticism of this research, the author wishes to thank Dr. David A. Caputo, Professor of Political Science at Purdue, Dr. Gilbert T. Satterly, Professor of Transportation Planning and Engineering, and Dr. James J. Solberg, Professor of Industrial Engineering. Their participation was most welcomed and they constituted a sympathetic audience for the earlier drafts.

For permitting the author to experience the joys and benefits of teaching at Purdue and affording him with financial support throughout the conduct of this research, a debt of appreciation and thanks is acknowledged to Dr. John F. McLaughlin, Head of the School of Civil Engineering at Purdue, and his staff.

Special thanks are due to Mrs. Karen Shireman for her efforts in typing the original drafts and to Mrs. Marian Sipes and Mrs. Jan Smith who put forth a tremendous effort in preparing the final manuscript.

As we are all products of our heritage and environment, the author finally acknowledges the unrepayable debt to his parents and family for their encouragement, support, and sacrifice during these past difficult years. To them I dedicate this work.

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ABSTRACT

Moore, Woodrow Lindsay, Jr. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 1975. Governmental Reorganization and Metropolitcs: Determinants Central to a Normative Theory of Metropolitan Planning. Major Professor: Harold L. Michael.

The precept central to this research is that the current methodologies of urban planning are inappropriate for the proper management and planning of urban change in metropolitan areas even when practiced in an environment composed of reorganized local governmental structures and revamped systems of functional assignment procedures. Specifically, the primary objective was to examine the relationships among metropolitan planning, government reorganization strategies, urban political systems of decision making, and the forces of metropolitanization, in an attempt to uncover better evidence as regards the growing lack of success with metropolitan planning in managing land development and in providing adequate services to the public.

Careful analysis has revealed that the forces of urban centralization and decentralization have created pressures for areawide planning. However, metropolitan planning was found to be largely ineffective for three reasons: (1) planning methodologies and the planning process are fragmented and too narrow in scope to deal with the relatedness of various social, economic, and political factors of metropolitan decision making; (2) metropolitan planning lacks an appropriate areawide governmental basis to effectuate sound planning and management of urban change; and (3) the separation of planning from the politics of metropolitan decision making has relegated the role of planning to the public officials rather than with the planning agencies who

are responsible for the proper conduct of that function.

To correct for the long-term implications of this evidence, this research proposes the immediate creation of Metropolitan Planning and Development Authorities by State legislatures with Federal backing and fiscal incentives. Recommendations as to the specifics of this proposal are fully substantiated by the conclusions of the analysis contained herein. The conceptual and operational basis of these MPDAs would be a normative framework for metropolitan planning. Such a framework is fully described in this study. When viewed from the realistic standpoint as concerns the need for a broad-based strategy that can accommodate the proper planning and management of our metropolises, these proposals and recommendations are deemed as necessary and warranted.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Metropolitan areas of the United States are probably the most affluent and powerful centers of human settlement ever developed by modern man. They contain vast amounts of natural resources which have been utilized to create centers of commerce and industry, fashion and culture, and recreation and thought. Indeed, many metropolitan areas are more prosperous than most developing nations.

Despite these acquired characteristics of wealth, prominence, and power, metropolitan areas are not lacking in complexities that disturb their residents' daily lives and pose a threat to the area's status as a powerful economic and political force that must be dealt with in National decision-making as regards public policy. Problems of crime, pollution, racism, fiscal inequities, unemployment, sub-standard housing, inadequate transportation systems, worsening poverty, economic imbalances, and other diverse and elusive problems are not unique with the advent of metropolitan areas. However, the magnitude and interdependence of these problems has rarely, if ever, been encountered since the earliest reportings of city formations. Further, despite the wealth of research material in existence that deals with the purported "Urban Crisis", there prevails few if any relevant substantive programs that combat directly the causes of these metropolitan "ills", nor are any new programs being voiced from the chambers of government that promise reversals of these post-World War II trends. Moreover, these problems have begun to take on new dimensions which when analyzed appear to indicate that their typology

has changed from compound to complex in substance and from calculable to incalculable in extent. Thus, either improper actions or inaction on the part of government officials for over forty years of unchecked socio-economic proliferation may have rendered the metropolis a blow from which it will never fully recover.

The functions of the metropolis and its physical, socio-economic, and political attributes profoundly influence the role of government. For the metropolis to thrive, large numbers of people must be housed and supplied with necessary amenities, goods and persons must be moved, and land and utilities must be available for new industry and commerce. Growth and its accompanying changes prompt increasing demands upon government to shape the urban environment and to provide the public services required by its families and businesses. As the environment and the human needs within it change, the organizational and administrative requisites for fulfilling these demands also change. The focus of this research is upon these shifting requisites. What modifications of government and planning processes are taking place in response to urban change? How do urban communities organize themselves to plan, decide upon, finance, and carry out developmental functions? By urban government is meant not simply local government, but an array of municipal, regional, State, and Federal agencies interacting to shape and manage the urban giant.*

The characteristics of urban growth and its concomitant problems have important administrative implications.¹ First, to fulfill urban development functions government must cope with constant change—demographic, social, economic and

*General terms for governmental entities are used throughout this report. "State" refers to any one of the fifty major units of the United States. "Municipality" refers to basic local-government units, including those legally designated as districts or cities. "Regional" and "metropolitan" in general refer to various forms of sub-state government that could include various municipalities, cross state boundaries or be comprised of various counties.

political. Second, its resources and activity must increase significantly. Unless major adjustments are made to increase public resources and administrative capacity, urban government is confronted with an overload of demands. Third, it must be equipped to handle these demands of rising complexity and technicality. More and more issues handled by the political system require skilled planning and analysis for resolution. Fourth, its organization must be adapted to new functions and relationships. Strain is placed on existing organizational arrangements by the new tasks and subjects of government concern. Finally, it must take account of future consequences of present actions. This implication is the time dimension of urban problems. As these implications are underlying themes of this research, they warrant a brief summation at the outset.

First, a basic administrative challenge of urbanization is the necessity for coping with change itself. Solutions to urban problems require developmental strategies. Development administration has been defined as an effort to "concentrate attention on the administrative requisites for achieving public policy goals, particularly in (areas) where these goals involve dramatic political, economic and social transformations."² This research views urban administration as development administration, meaning the pursuit of public policy goals requiring major and interrelated transformations of the urban environment through new public functions and new solutions to new and old problems.

Many administrative problems relate to the inability of government to cope with change in a routine manner and to shift its focus to public-service goals. Where little progress is made on urban problems, one tends to find conservative, cautious bureaucracies, an absence of leadership and planning, decision-making centers insulated from demands for innovation and improvement, and elected officials more concerned with contracts and appointments than with policy

and performance.³ Approaches to overcoming those problems are manifold. Political and technical methods for defining priorities and for establishing agreement among the diverse participants are among the most important. Establishing consensus and following through on programs requires capable leadership, clear allocation of responsibility, initiative, and growing commitment to development aims.

Certain governmental factors can be identified that influence the ability of the urban political system to cope continually and rapidly with change and that vary from place to place — the capability of local or metropolitan authorities to formulate regional policies and mobilize regional power; the type of political interests to which officials are responsive; the relative roles of local and central authorities; and, the importance of planning as a style of decision making.⁴

Attempts to provide for rapid action and innovation generate counter pressures for coordination and control in urban government.⁵ Arrangements suited to the first purpose — such as flexible communications, special authorities, and competing jurisdictions — may stimulate experimentation and execution of new proposals, but reduce coordination and control. The tension between these fundamental administrative principles is central to most organizational issues.

A second administrative ramification of urbanization is the pressure for sheer increase in governmental activity, especially increase in per capita public expenditure and capital investment. In most metropolitan areas, fiscal problems have prevented government from expanding public services and executing projects at a rate which it deemed desirable. In many instances, levels and priorities of public expenditure have changed little, while rapid urban growth has radically altered the nature and magnitude of demands for government activity.⁶

To a large extent, the quality of public services varies from city to city, and from one neighborhood to another, depending upon the wealth therein. In addition, however, political and governmental factors limit the utilization of existing fiscal resources. Fears on the part of political leaders regarding popular resistance to tax increases are the most common obstacles to expanding public finance in the city.⁷ Inelastic and fragmented local tax bases, as well as waste-producing fiscal administration, also limit government capabilities. Above all, strong leadership is essential in order to expand tax revenues.

A third administrative implication of urbanization is the need for increased technical capability. Styles of bargaining and influence that resolve group conflict do not alone suffice for determining how to construct housing cheaply or how to expand job opportunities. Many urban governments are entering into new technical services previously nonexistent or privately provided, e.g., mass transportation. Use of highly technical systems approaches to urban planning and budgeting pose additional and new manpower requirements. Technologies of project planning, engineering, and construction for urban public facilities have lagged due to limited commitment of resources for research and development.

There are several administrative requisites for tackling technical problems. The first is that of bringing technical expertise and competent personnel into urban government. Another requisite involves resolving the tensions between bureaucratic specialization and political responsibility, and between planning and bargaining. Still another requisite is that of developing advanced procedures for large-scale government processes, such as programming, forecasting, budgeting, fiscal management, data collection and policy analysis.⁸

The fourth administrative implication of urbanization is the need for new organizational patterns. As public activity expands in urban areas, there is, invariably, an increasing division of work. Where local government alone has been responsible for local services, State and Federal authorities become participants, and vice versa. Where a small, integrated bureaucracy has carried out government duties, new, specialized departments emerge, together with independent authorities and public corporations. Where a single city has been involved in urban functions, several suburban municipalities or field offices of higher levels of government are now drawn into play. How to assign the work of government, yet coordinate the parts and harness the specialized tasks to goals and objectives of development, is a classic problem of organization.⁹ It is especially important in the modern urban context, where every need or demand for government action must run a complex series of administrative channels to become a policy or program output. The structure of these channels influences the speed of the process and the quality of the outcome. As government responds to the changing urban environment, however, the division of work among agencies and tiers of authority is more often influenced by accretions from the past than by the nature of present problems. It is easier to add on to an established system than it is to uproot and reorganize it.¹⁰

In terms of the geographic aspects of government organization, urban problems defy traditional boundaries. The fundamental interdependence of segments of the metropolis and demands for broad urban development programs have stimulated debates about the desirable geographic scale for urban government.¹¹ Organizational responses to these pressures have ranged from intermunicipal negotiation and cooperation to creation of a general metropolitan government. Where these responses do not provide an adequate framework

for metropolitan communication and action, the results are usually failure to take any steps on some mounting problems, together with conflict and stalemate on others and disproportionate levels of service throughout the urban area.¹² In essence, the issue posed is how to adjust the scale of local government and Federal or State administration to the shifting scale of urban problems that confront them.

There is also an increasing division of work by process or role among tiers of government involved in urban affairs. For example, Federal or State authorities may provide capital funds and legal regulation; municipalities may construct facilities and manage public services; and a regional unit may prepare plans — all bearing on the same public program. Thus, the administrative processes for undertaking a single task shift from intragovernmental to intergovernmental. The national importance of large metropolitan areas, their needs for scarce expertise, and their requirements for enormous capital investment give Federal and State authorities increasingly important roles.¹³ As a result, execution of most major urban programs depends on action by several governments.

One approach to coordinating the proliferating participants in urban government has been to intensify administrative hierarchy through centralized control and plans. However, there are points of diminishing returns to centralizing authority for so complex an undertaking as governing the metropolis. Flexibility, responsiveness, and equity are values that are seldom furthered by singleminded concentration of hierarchial neatness. Therefore, it is important that the actors in urban administration recognize their interdependence and cooperate among themselves.¹⁴

A fifth administrative implication of urban problems is their time dimension. Most large public facilities in metropolitan areas have capital plants with a long life. Major investment decisions are being made today that will

have significant ramifications for urban life for years to come, some of them irreversible without monumental costs. Thus, trial and error modes of decision making may entail important social and economic costs. The adequacy of facilities built today depends, in large part, upon the growth in demands for their use over a long period of time. Where the perspectives of sponsoring governments are limited to one or a few fiscal years, the facilities are frequently found to be obsolete upon completion, and targets for program results prove to be unrealistic. Undesired future effects are not anticipated in time for modification of present courses of action. Long- and medium-range planning, research, policy analysis, and capital budgeting are important adaptations to urbanization where large-scale investments are being programmed within a short time span. In short, to cope with metropolitan problems, government must not only deal with existing conditions, but must also anticipate those of the future.¹⁵

These, then, are the administrative challenges inherent in the urban phenomenon. Whether these provide valid criteria for organizational change has been much debated by political scientists and public administration experts.¹⁶ Criteria of economy and efficiency are themselves seldom clear and, in general, are rarely the sole bases for political decisions and organizational choices. Several scholars have argued, on the basis of political studies in the United States, that government control of the urban environment, rational planning, and expansion of public services are values that will be rejected time and again by local political systems.¹⁷ The reasoning behind these conclusions stems largely from the assumption that there are strong vested interests in the status quo, as well as meaningful disagreements as to desirable patterns of human settlement and want-satisfaction. Nevertheless, there is sufficient interest in governmental contributions to urban development to warrant

analysis of government structure and the planning processes in terms of overall capability to resolve urban problems.

Several key questions are important to this effort. How important are form and structure in shaping the output of the political system for metropolitan areas? How likely are governmental reorganization attempts to achieve the purposes for which they were undertaken? More importantly, and central to the intent of this research, how applicable is the planning process, as currently practiced, to integration with reformed structures of metropolitan government? Moreover, what measures of restructured planning theory and practices would enable metropolitan planners to link workable strategies of growth and control to important participants involved in the political arena of decision making, given that some reorganized form of government has occurred? This study will attempt to suggest some changes to the planning process that must be integrated with government reform measures if strategies to combat the challenges of the metropolis are to be responsive and effective for the long-term good of all.

The significance of the hypothesis that the current practice of urban planning is inappropriate for use with reformed structures of government and the revamped political climates of decision making promoted by such reforms will be elaborated on in the chapters to follow. Chapter II traces the evolution and nature of America's metropolises and stresses the socio-economic and political implications imparted to metropolitan planning and attempts to reform government. Chapter III depicts the governmental context of the metropolitan planning function. Existing forms of municipal government, planning agency organization and inter-governmental relations are studied in relation to each other as necessary parts of a conceptual basis for the reform of metropolitan government and the simultaneous reformation of planning principles and practices. In

Chapter IV, theoretical and conceptual issues surrounding the political circumstances leading to involvement in planning are developed. From an analysis of these issues, a model of the urban political environment, of which planning is a part, is postulated in order to uncover the relationship of conflict management to the performance of the metropolitan planning function. Chapter V examines the traditional approach to urban planning in relation to its past performance in combating the challenges posed by the forces of metropolitanization even when coupled with local government reorganization strategies. From this analysis, a normative framework of metropolitan planning is posited as being a necessary adjunct to an improved planning process that could cope with the management of urban change in metropolitan areas. Procedures for the creation of a Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority are forwarded as being an essential interim areawide instrument for carrying out the elements of normative metropolitan planning while the debate over strategies of metropolitan reform continue. A final section summarizes the findings of this research and concludes with several recommendations concerning the roles and responsibilities of State and Federal governments in initiating the proper legislation required for furthering past efforts and present attempts to improve the governance of metropolis.

Although it will not be possible (or even desirable) to formulate general answers applicable to all systems of politics and government, neither is it necessary to abandon all efforts to generalize. Scholars in this young field confront the challenge to design research that will discover patterns or trends in the relationships between government structure, environmental conditions, political considerations and the theory and practice of planning. This research can only suggest some of the more obvious relationships and, by describing existing systems of urban government, provide

additional material for proposition-building. Subsequent studies must discover whether and how strategies for changing or perturbing the function of planning vary with local traditions, political forces and various stages of economic and technological advancement of human society.

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11. ACIR, Performance of Urban Functions, pp. 41-60.
12. Julius Margolis, "Fiscal Issues in the Reform of Metropolitan Governance," in Reform as Reorganization, ed. Lowdon Wingo (Washington: Resources For the Future, Inc., 1974), pp. 43-59.
13. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 10-12, 226-233, and the literature cited therein.
14. Herbert Kaufman has distinguished between two types of coordination — communication and control — pointing out that when disjointed action among agencies results from lack of knowledge or general policy, it may be overcome by communication (exchange of information, joint committees, etc.). When it results more from real conflict of opinions and interests, coordination depends in larger part upon opportunities for hard bargaining or for superior authority to impose solutions. See Herbert Kaufman, "Organization Theory and Political Theory," American Political Science Review, vol. LVIII, no. 1 (March 1964).
15. David Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co., 1969), pp. 167-168.
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CHAPTER II

THE PLANNING FUNCTION AND METROPOLITANISM

The formulation of local planning policy is done for the benefit of individual municipal jurisdictions which generally lie within metropolitan areas. These areas contain a large number of governmental units which are politically independent but physically and economically interdependent. Planning policy which benefits one municipality may be harmful to other parts of the metropolis. Since that policy was formulated by an independent political jurisdiction and because planners must accommodate the desires of the constituency which hired them, aggrieved parties usually have little recourse. Therefore, in order to understand how planning policy is formulated, it is necessary to understand how the development of metropolitan areas produced interdependent municipal jurisdictions with basically different and often conflicting goals and objectives.

The distribution of the population and economic activity among these multiple governmental jurisdictions generates different kinds of planning issues in different parts of the metropolis. Additionally, the functional interdependence of the politically independent municipalities has produced both a need for areawide planning and strong political resistance to the implementation of meaningful metropolitan planning policies. The complexity of the urban environment resulting from metropolitanism has been an important stimulus to the present evolution of planning theory and techniques. Slums, urban violence, fiscal problems, local unemployment and other difficulties all

represent failures of past planning efforts to meet the needs of the developing metropolis. Further, these problems have a feedback effect which planners and students of planning have failed to recognize as catalysts for future failures. Thus, planning policy formulation is a dynamic process where the policies made today have a profound influence on the policies of tomorrow.

The Metropolitan Scene

The emergence of urban planning as a function of the American local governmental system occurred around the turn of the 19th century, at a time when the majority of the problems facing cities were primarily a result of the socio-economic forces associated with rapid urbanization.¹ As has been adequately discussed by many astute scholars, the process of urbanization was quite different from the modern urban phenomenon which has come to be termed metropolitanization.² Explaining and understanding how the latter process is affecting the planning function today requires that a careful distinction between urbanization and metropolitanization be established.

Urbanization can best be described as a process of centralization that results from the interaction of two forces. One of these forces, rural push, was caused by important changes in the technology of agriculture which began in the early 1800's. Improved soil technology and the development of farm machinery made possible significant increases in agricultural productivity at the expense of a substantially reduced labor force. Between 1820 and 1840 the proportion of the labor force employed in agriculture began a continuing sharp decline so that by 1880 less than one-half of the labor force in the United States was employed in agriculture. Consequently, farmers displaced by improved farm technology became the victims of this rural push and had to look to the cities for alternative employment opportunities.

Coinciding with the gaining momentum of rural push was the concept of a new industrial technology termed mass production which enabled firms to specialize in the manufacturing of large quantities of a wide variety of goods and products. Subsequent declines in transportation costs opened wider markets for the goods being produced by the new industrial technology. As a result, industries found it advantageous to concentrate in urban centers where they depended upon one another for materials, services and goods that went into their final product. Quite naturally, the developing economies of concentration created increased employment opportunities in the cities. Thus, changes in industrial technology established an urban pull which attracted people from rural to urban areas.

A relative comparison of the concentration of the United States population in urban areas during the 19th and 20th centuries is depicted in Table II-1.³ In 1800 only 6.1 percent of the population resided in urban areas. By the turn of the century, this figure had risen to nearly 40 percent and presently has stabilized at approximately 74 percent.

Although an increasing proportion of the population is living in urban areas, the distribution of population within these areas has undergone a change. This change has resulted in the formation of metropolitan areas.^{4*} Since the end of World War II, a considerable number of central city residents and industries have been moving out of the city and settling in the surrounding areas. The decentralization of both population and economic activity within metropolitan areas is called metropolitanization and is a different process than that characterized by urbanization. The process of metropolitanization involves a spreading of people and jobs

* For a discussion of some of the problems associated with Census definitions of metropolitan areas, see Appendix B.

Table II-1. The Distribution and Growth of United States Population in Urban Areas, and SMSA Population in Central Cities, 1900-1975

Year	Percent of U.S. Population in Urban Areas	Total SMSA Population (thousands)	Percent of SMSA Population Within Central Cities
1900	39.7	31,836	62.2
1910	45.7	42,012	64.6
1920	51.2	52,508	66.0
1930	54.1	66,712	64.6
1940	56.5	72,576	62.7
1950	59.6	88,964	58.7
1960	63.1	112,385	51.4
1970	69.0	139,482	44.6
1975*	73.5	154,286	41.8

* Estimated

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, Volume I, Characteristics of the Population, Part I, United States Summary, Table 3.

from the city outward. Table II-1 also documents the fact that there has been a redistribution of people. Between 1900 and 1920 the proportion of the metropolitan population residing within the central city increased from 62.2 percent to 66.0 percent. This was largely due to the fact that much of the non-central city portions of metropolitan areas were being used for farming. However, since 1920 the proportion of metropolitan population living in the central city has steadily declined with the greatest decline occurring between 1950 and 1960. Thus, the more recent phenomenon, known as metropolitanization, has been characterized by people moving out of these central cities into the suburbs.

Just as there are a number of substantive reasons for urbanization, there are also explanations for the movement of people from the city to the suburbs. In the case of metropolitanization there was a city push and a suburban pull. The problems of the city created by rapid urbanization fostered an anti-city feeling among many of the city's residents. Noise, dirt, congestion, crime, the growing presence of slums and a growing concentration of Negroes became forces which pushed those who could afford it to move out of the city.⁵ There were a number of economic and technological conditions that enabled people to satisfy their anti-city feelings and move out of the city. In the post-World War II period real incomes were rising. Secondly, home ownership became easier after the Federal government went into the business of guaranteeing mortgages. Another factor which facilitated the move to the suburbs was the growing ownership of automobiles and the subsequent development of highways that connected the cities to the suburbs. People were now able to commute from suburban residences to places of work within the central city.⁶

As the suburbs began to grow, they soon developed desirable features which only reinforced the push from the city. The earliest suburban residents were primarily the most wealthy people in the area. Moving to the suburbs soon became a symbol of having achieved a high social and economic status. Coupled with the aspect of status-seeking was the desire to own a freestanding house with a yard. This desire could be more easily satisfied in the suburbs where land for home building was available at a reasonable price. Furthermore, the good reputation of the suburban schools encouraged people to move from the city where schools were older and on the decline. Finally, the contrast between the large city and the relatively small town atmosphere of many suburbs enhanced the attractiveness of the suburb.

Some students of metropolitanism have argued that suburbia represented a grass root's democracy and a feeling of community that people could not find in the big city.⁷ The idea that smallness in city size is an ideal that many Americans value is consistent with a recent survey which indicated that 64 percent of those surveyed would prefer to live in a place other than the city.⁸ Thirty-four percent of those surveyed said that they preferred to live in open country; thirty percent preferred a "small town or city." A recent survey of Wisconsin residents when asked a question on preferred proximity to a large city responded that they would prefer to live in smaller places but within commuting distance of a metropolitan central city.⁹ In fact, if taken at their word, 70 percent of the Wisconsin survey respondents would prefer to live near a metropolitan area, whereas only 54 percent now do. Thus, if the results of the Wisconsin survey respondents reflect the national attitudes it means that people want the best of both worlds—the serene environment of the suburbs and the opportunity and excitement of the central city and its fringe.

One other point about the movement of people to the suburbs is that the people who moved out of the city were not representative elements of the population. The out-migration to the suburbs was a sorting out process which created suburban communities with relatively homogeneous classes of white middle and upper income families. Thus, the cities were left with a concentration of people that were predominantly non-white, made the least amount of money and had a significantly lower level of education. As Table II-2 illustrates, blacks and whites with similar incomes are not found in the same proportions in the suburbs.¹⁰ However, data for metropolitan areas, such as that in Table II-2, tend to overstate the presence of blacks in individual communities characterized by economic and racial differentiation among suburbs. For example, in Essex County,

Table II-2. Suburban Population by Race and Family Income, 1969

Family Income	Number of Families (in thousands)		Percent of Families	
	White	Black	White	Black
Under \$5,000	1,967	224	89.9	10.1
\$5,000 - \$9,999	5,167	279	94.9	5.1
\$10,000-\$14,999	5,642	140	97.6	2.4
\$15,000-\$19,999	2,742	57	98.0	2.0
\$20,000-\$24,999	1,055	17	98.4	1.6
\$25,000 and over	1,002	9	99.1	0.9
Total	17,575	726	96.0	4.0

New Jersey, 53.1 percent of the residents of East Orange, 35.7 percent of those in Orange, and 27.1 percent of those in Montclair are black, compared with 0.3 percent in Livingston, 1.7 percent in Maplewood, 1.8 percent in Bloomfield, and 3.9 percent in Irvington, all nearby communities in the same county.¹¹

Resistance to blacks is greatest in the lower-income suburbs. The affluent suburbanite can rely on the marketplace—with guidance from the local planning board—to place his community off limits to all but a handful of upper-income blacks.¹² But the situation is quite different in the inexpensive suburbs where housing is economically accessible to a growing number of blacks. Many residents of these suburbs already have fled once or twice from city neighborhoods in the wake of the arrival of the blacks. The efforts by blue-collar suburbanites in Warren, Michigan, over the last six years, best illustrates this point. They have physically attacked a home purchased by a racially mixed couple, vetoed 100 units of public housing, jeered then-Secretary of Housing and Urban Development George Romney in

the wake of newspaper stories indicating that Warren was a prime target in HUD's effort to promote integration in the suburbs, and voted down urban renewal because of local fears that blacks would accompany the Federal dollars.¹³ While racism certainly accounts for part of the hostility of residents of Warren and similar suburbs to blacks, more than racial prejudice is involved in the spatially differentiated metropolis:¹⁴

People in Warren are acting on the most real evidence they have—the evidence of conditions in Detroit where property loses value and schools decline because, they believe, the blacks have moved in. You can't read racist motives into all of these reactions.

Thus blacks are excluded from the suburbs for both economic and racial reasons, and the two reinforce one another. It should not be surprising then, that so many blacks conclude that a segregated neighborhood is the only option available in the racially differentiated metropolis.

The total metropolitan population grew by 26 million in the 1960's.¹⁵ About one-third of this growth was from territorial expansion of existing centers and the emergence of other communities into metropolitan status; two-thirds was the result of population growth within constant boundaries.

Within metropolitan boundaries as defined in 1970, 28 percent of this growth was due to net migration, consisting of immigrants as well as migrants from nonmetropolitan areas of the United States. As the nonmetropolitan population becomes a smaller fraction of the nation's total, its relative importance as a source of migration will decline. These figures tend to emphasize the dominance of natural increase and downplay the importance of the smaller role of migration. The United States is a geographically mobile society, however, and expansion and movement have been central themes in the recent history of metropolitan growth.¹⁶

Migration is basically a process of adjustment. For the individual, it represents a personal adjustment to changing life circumstances and opportunities. Whether across town or across the country, movement provides access to areas of greater opportunity—social, economic, and political. For the nation as a whole, migration helps achieve a balance between social and economic activities on the one hand and population numbers on the other. As people move about the country, their actions create broad social, economic, and political realignments. Balance is achieved through three broad types of movement: (1) the shift from economically depressed regions, often rural, to areas of expanding employment and higher wages, usually metropolitan; (2) the movement of the population within metropolitan areas—the flight from the central city to the suburbs—historically an adjustment to changing housing needs and a desire for more space (as previously discussed); and (3) the system of migration flows among metropolitan areas by which migrants participate in a nationwide job market, moving to areas offering economic advancement and other personal preferences.¹⁷

Nearly 40 million Americans, or one in five, change homes each year. Roughly one in 15—a total of 13 million people—migrate across a county line.¹⁸ These rates have remained virtually unchanged over the forty years for which data are available. In part because of the relative decline in rural population, the majority of people moving to metropolitan areas are now coming from other urban areas.

Whether it is a short or a long haul, those who move are typically the better educated, more skilled young adults, seeking a better life. Nearly a third of all migrants are in their twenties, and they bring with them young children: A tenth of all migrants are between the ages of one and four.¹⁹ Thus, migration represents more than the numbers would suggest. It is a determining factor in terms of the

needs and demands for planning services—where and when heavy demands for housing, transportation and health and educational services will be felt.

Since World War II, metropolitan migrations have included large numbers of blacks. Their transition from rural to metropolitan life has been faster, more recent, and more extensive than that of whites; 74 percent of the black population of the United States is now metropolitan, compared with 68 percent of whites. Blacks, more than whites, tend to live in the larger metropolitan areas, and four-fifths of them live in the central cities.²⁰

Recent streams of migration among regions also have varied substantially by race. In the 1960's there was a net movement of whites out of the north, to the west and south. Blacks moved from the south to the north and west. The net effect was an exchange of population between the north and south, with the west experiencing net in-migration of both whites and blacks. In the south, it was the nonmetropolitan areas that experienced the heaviest outmigration of blacks. The main areas receiving white in-migrants were Florida, the Washington-Baltimore area, and large metropolitan areas in Texas.²¹

The migration effects associated with metropolitanization were reinforced and initiated by both push and pull forces associated with economic movements. Because of the importance of retail establishments to be near the customer, many retail outlets began to locate in the suburbs which resulted in a reduction of sales increases in the city. Lower land values, abundant space, and the development of highway networks promoted the movement of both people and products and consequently made suburban location possible for the retailer. The convenience of suburban shopping centers and the availability of free parking spaces also appealed to the suburbanite.²²

Evidence of the greater relative growth of suburban retail business is documented in a recent study.²³ This study indicates that between 1964 and 1965 the suburbs could claim over half of the value of building permits issued for new retail establishments. In addition, the payroll employment in retail establishments between 1960 and 1965 grew faster in the suburbs than in the city. As sales began to level off in the city, the remaining retail establishments began to feel an economic push to move to greener pastures. It is reasonable to assume that retail decentralization will become greater in the future as the process of metropolitanization continues. Further, there is a growing amount of evidence which supports the fact that major commercial activities, which, in the past, were largely contained within the boundaries of the central city, have left the downtown and are not likely to return.²⁴

Subsequent to the retailers moving out of the city was the occurrence of a similar movement by the wholesalers.²⁵ One basic principle as regards the location of wholesale business is to find a spot of operations where products can be moved with the most ease and the least cost. Because this spot tends to be at the fringe of the most highly congested areas in the metropolis, the size of a given metropolitan area tends to be an important factor in the location requirements of wholesaling establishments. Within the larger metropolitan areas this location tends to be in the suburbs or at the perimeter of the city.²⁶

Many manufacturers have also moved their facilities out of the city.²⁷ Probably the major reason for the outward movement of these industrial plants was the need for increased horizontal space required by mass production. This space was not available in the city, but large expanses of land outside the city were and at a relatively low price. In addition to these push and pull forces, certain technological and demographic changes made the move to the

suburbs more feasible. The already discussed population movement to the suburbs meant that a sufficient labor pool existed. Similarly, this labor pool now had automobiles and could get to work from a variety of places. Therefore the decision-making involved in determining industrial locations was somewhat independent of labor supply proximity. A technological change that added to the feasibility of locating industry in the suburbs was the increased use of trucks to move materials and products. Lower shipping costs by truck and the flexibility of this mode of transportation enabled many industries to locate away from waterways and railroad lines.²⁸

It must be pointed out, however, that not all kinds of manufacturing activity found it advantageous to move to the suburbs. Those industries needing unskilled low-wage workers remained in the city to be near their source of labor. Industries that utilized the products of other manufacturers for the making of their own products continued to find a centralized location more advantageous.²⁹ These industries benefit from the external economies of regional input-output relationships and consequently their profit margins are more heavily dependent upon centralized locations than are the profit margins of more locally-oriented industries. Another type of firm that has tended to stay in the city is the small firm that does not require a large amount of horizontal space. Such firms generally occupy the same quarters with other small industries and share in the use of common facilities made available in the city.³⁰

In sum, it can be stated that metropolitanization has had an impact on the locational and spatial requirements of industries. While some types of industries continue to find the central city a good location, many more do not. Recent statistics indicate that there has been a decline in the central city as regards the amount of manufacturing activities occurring there. Between 1930 and 1970 the value

of goods manufactured in the central city as a percentage of all the goods produced in the metropolis had declined.³¹ As documented by the Bureau of Census, central cities produced 66.1 percent of the total value of the products produced in various metropolitan areas in 1929. By 1947 the proportion had fallen to 60.8 percent; by 1958 it was 48.9 percent, and in 1963 it was 46.4 percent. Furthermore, data on building permits issued and payroll employment for manufacturing establishments indicates that between 1954 and 1971 industries have increasingly been locating in the suburbs of the metropolis.³²

Some Characteristics of the Metropolis

The trends identified previously describe the major elements of metropolitanization. It is important to note that the phenomenon of metropolitanization is an ongoing process and that the trends which have been discussed are continuing. In order to assess the impact of these trends on the profession of planning, it is necessary to examine how far the decentralization process has progressed. The distribution of people, economic activity, and political jurisdiction within metropolitan areas greatly affect the nature and scope of the planning issues which arise in different parts of the metropolis. Therefore, a close look at some current selected social, economic, and political characteristics of metropolitan areas is a necessary step toward understanding the relationship between metropolitanism and the planning function.

As noted, metropolitanization has involved a breakdown of the population into categories according to ethnic traits and socio-economic status. Those persons of the highest socio-economic status are predominantly suburban dwellers. For this reason the people at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder are highly concentrated in the central city.³³ The following table compares central cities to suburbs with

Table II-3. Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of Cities and Suburbs

Characteristic	Central City	Suburb*
Median Family Income (1969)	\$6,067	\$9,590
Percentage of Persons 25 Years or Older With 4 or More Years of High School (1960)	40.9%	59.9%
% Non-White (1960)	17.8%	5.2%
% Non-White (1970)	24.9%	6.3%

*The definition of suburb used here is what the Census calls "urban fringe" or the urbanized area surrounding the central city and within the Census' "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area."

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

Table II-4. Proportion of Metropolitan Population in Suburbs, by Race and Income, 1969

Income	Percent In Suburbs		
	All Races	White	Black
Under \$5,000	41.8	48.9	19.0
\$5,000 - \$9,999	51.6	56.3	20.2
\$10,000 - \$14,999	61.0	63.7	23.0
\$15,000 - \$19,999	63.2	65.5	25.7
\$20,000 - \$24,999	64.4	66.1	29.3
\$25,000 and over	65.5	66.0	34.5

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

respect to three socio-economic characteristics: income, race, and education. The differences between city and suburb shown in this table illustrate the impact of metropolitanization on the distribution of population within metropolitan areas. Central city residents tend to have a lower level of income and education than suburbanites. These differences in income and education are largely a reflection of the fact that the central city is increasingly becoming the home of minority groups (particularly Negroes) who tend to have less education, less income and higher levels of unemployment. The increase in the percentage of non-whites in central cities between 1960 and 1970 is clearly demonstrated by the table. In addition, the data in Table II-3 indicate that the presence of non-whites in the suburbs is low and relatively stable. Table II-4 further indicates that blacks and whites with similar incomes are not found in the same proportions in the central city or suburb.³⁴ In 1970, almost half of all white families with incomes under \$5,000 lived in the suburbs, compared with less than 20 percent of the black families with a similar economic situation. In addition, over 60 percent of all whites earning between \$10,000 and \$15,000 live in the suburbs, while less than a quarter of the blacks in the same income bracket reside in the outer city. Even among those with incomes of more than \$25,000, the proportion of whites in the suburbs is nearly double that of blacks. Nor do the economic levels of most black families explain their concentration in a small number of suburban jurisdictions and their exclusion from many lower income suburbs as was previously discussed.

The average percentage of non-whites in all central cities undoubtedly understates the situation. In a few large cities, Negroes already comprise a majority of the population.³⁵ Projections of population by race have been made in a number of central cities for the year 1985.³⁶ These projections indicate that Negro isolation could become

even more serious than it is today. As seen in Figure II-1, projections show that, between 1960 and 1985, central cities could lose 2.5 million or 5 percent of their whites, but gain 10 million non-whites, a 94 percent increase. This means that non-whites would move up from 18 to 31 percent of the population of the Nation's central cities. The suburbs, on the other hand, will continue to maintain their white population and enjoy higher incomes and educational levels. Thus, if the Negroes continue moving into the suburbs at the current rate, their projected number will jump from 2.8 to 6.8 million. However, the number of suburban whites will also more than double, from 52 to 106 million. Therefore, the additional Negroes will be all but lost in a sea of whites, as their proportional increase will move from only 5 to 6 percent of the total suburban population by 1985. While these are projections, and not predictions, they do indicate the direction in which the nation is heading—a shift toward greater racial stratification.

The movement of economic activity away from the city has resulted in some significant differences between city and suburb with respect to the location of jobs.³⁷ An increasing proportion of jobs within the metropolis are to be found in the suburbs. As noted earlier, the suburbs have been gaining a large share of the value of building permits for nearly all kinds of non-residential buildings and a share of total payroll employment for retail and industrial establishments. Approximately three-quarters of all new industrial plants in metropolitan areas were located in the suburbs during the 1960's. Of the 571,000 new jobs created in the Chicago area since 1960, more than 75 percent—437,000—were located outside the city.³⁸ As indicated in Table II-5, the suburban share of new employment has been even greater in many other major metropolitan areas over the past twenty years.




Figure II-1. Metropolitan Population by Race Showing Growth of Nonwhite Proportion in Central Cities and of Whites in Suburbs

Source: Patricia L. Hodge and Philip M. Hauser, The Challenge of America's Metropolitan Population Outlook—1960 to 1985, National Commission on Urban Problems, Research Report No. 3 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

Additionally, retail sales have been growing at least 10 times faster in the suburbs than in the cities—between 1958 and 1967, sales in the suburbs of the 40 largest metropolitan areas increased 47 percent compared to an increase of 4.3 percent in the cities.³⁹ The only component of the local economy that continues to experience significant growth

Table II-5. Central City and Suburban Jobs in Six Metropolitan Areas, 1951 and 1968

Metropolitan Area	Number of Jobs		Percent Change
	1951	1968	
Baltimore			
Central City	344,446	363,431	6
Suburbs	86,333	225,728	161
St. Louis			
Central City	419,814	380,570	-9
Suburbs	154,852	378,590	144
Philadelphia			
Central City	773,622	770,852	*
Suburbs	372,759	694,924	86
San Francisco			
Central City	342,289	386,977	13
Suburbs	283,759	533,811	88
Washington, D.C.			
Central City	233,795	322,702	38
Suburbs	73,508	322,420	352
New York			
Central City	3,008,364	3,309,851	10
Suburbs	1,676,668	2,528,285	51

* Indicates a percent change of less than 1 percent.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

within the large cities is office jobs in the central business district, and even in this category, city gains in employment and office building construction tend to be outstripped by growth in the suburbs.

The social and economic disparities between the city and suburbs produce significant variations in the demands placed on local governments, as well as in the resources available to them. At the heart of the crisis of the older cities is the fact that every major city bears a disproportionate share of the burden of caring for the poor and black citizens of the metropolis. Typical is the situation

of Louisville, which encompasses less than half of the population of its metropolitan area, but has more than 90 percent of its public assistance recipients.⁴⁰ The concentration of low-income, high public cost families in the older neighborhoods is the result of regional and national forces over which an individual city has little or no control.⁴¹

Fiscal problems in the cities are intensified by other problems which grow out of the social, economic, and governmental differences between city and suburb. Size itself imposes certain costs, since cities over 250,000—with their larger infrastructures and unionized employees—typically experience higher unit costs than medium-size municipalities.⁴² Greater expense also results from higher population densities and the concentration of economic activity, which are closely related to higher costs for police and fire protection, as well as for public transportation. City governments also usually provide a wider range of public services than the average suburb. As a result, the per capita costs of local governmental services other than education are significantly higher—\$232 in the cities in 1964-65 compared with \$132 in the suburbs. Yet, for these higher outlays, the middle-income city resident typically does not receive what he perceives to be better or even equivalent local services compared with his counterpart in the suburb.⁴³

More than fiscal disparities between the city and suburbs result from the concentration of the poor, the elderly, blacks, and other disadvantaged groups in the urban core. The fiscal crisis has created a politics of scarcity in most cities which, in turn, has intensified conflicts among the diverse interests of the inner city. The concentration of blacks in the core means that most racial confrontation in the metropolis occurs in the central city. Competition for housing between blacks and "moderate" and lower income whites takes place almost entirely within the

cities, which intensifies racial tensions between blacks and the remaining clusters of working-class ethnic groups, the largest single group of whites left in many older cities.⁴⁴

What the city has become in the divided metropolis strongly reinforces the suburban desire to maintain the political separation of city and suburb. For the resident of the outer city, political autonomy is the key to insulating his family, his neighborhood, and his community from the inner city and its blacks, racial tensions, changing neighborhoods, rising welfare population, and mounting crime rate.⁴⁵

Up to this point, suburbia has been collectively treated in order to facilitate comparison with the central city. In most metropolitan areas, however, the outer city is subdivided into a number of suburban jurisdictions, which vary in size, age, population density, tax resources, major land uses, and the socio-economic composition of the population. A majority of suburban jurisdictions are residential communities, but some are primarily industrial or commercial, and a growing number of the larger units have a mixture of land uses which provide them with a more balanced local political economy than the typical bedroom community.⁴⁶

Differentiation among suburbs results primarily from superimposing the small scale of the typical suburban governmental jurisdiction on the spatial differentiation of land uses and population in the metropolitan area. Suburbia as a whole has become increasingly heterogeneous as more people settle in the outer city and a growing range of activities locate there. But this diversity rarely is reflected in the typical suburb, whose limited area tends to encompass a more homogeneous population and a less varied economic base than is found in the entire suburban area.⁴⁷

Spatial differentiation and political fragmentation combine to produce disparities among suburbs which often are greater than those between the suburbs and the central city.

In the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, for example, the greatest extremes in local resources and services are not between the suburbs and the two central cities—both of which retain a fair amount of middle-class residential settlement—but between the wealthy residential and balanced suburbs to the south and the working-class bedroom communities in the north.⁴⁸

The ranks of the disadvantaged suburbs are growing as urban development pushes far beyond the aging inner ring of suburbs and as low-income families and blacks spill over from the urban core. Local governments in these aging suburbs often are in a more desperate position than the large central cities which they come to resemble because their tax bases usually are far more limited. The forces which change an older suburb's population—which in turn generate demands for new or increased housing, health, welfare, and education programs—also are likely to be undercutting the local tax base as more affluent residents and local businesses depart for greener pastures further out in the spreading metropolis.⁴⁹

Other variations in local political systems also result from social and economic differences among suburbs. Upper-income and middle-class residential communities tend to provide higher levels of support for local governmental services, especially education, than blue-collar suburbs, even when the latter have relatively high per capita fiscal resources as a result of the location of industrial or commercial ratables within their borders.⁵⁰ Suburbs with similar populations are more likely to cooperate with one another than those with contrasting constituencies, especially in policy areas, such as education, which have important class and status implications.⁵¹ And the programs of the municipal reform movement—particularly nonpartisan local elections and the city manager plan—have found their most fertile soil in suburbs whose socio-economic composition resembles

the outer neighborhoods of the industrial city which gave rise to the reform movement.⁵²

Metropolitanization has also affected the structure of local government. In 1972, 18,517 municipal governments, or over one-fourth of the national total were found in the 267 officially designated SMSA's. Only about one-ninth of the metropolitan local governments had a population over 25,000, and less than one percent had at least 25 square miles of territory.⁵³ At one time the increase in governments was the result of the incorporation of new suburbs. Today this growth is largely due to the formation of special purpose districts which are responsible for one or more governmental functions such as fire protection, water supply, street lighting, etc.⁵⁴ In general, local government within metropolitan areas is fragmented with many overlapping jurisdictions. Governmental units such as counties, cities, townships and special districts possess a wide variety of powers. In many instances a given resident must depend on each of these kinds of governments for the services which all local governments should provide for his benefit. This means that the responsibility for local urban services is divided among a variety of governmental jurisdictions most of which are operating independently of each other.

Fragmented governmental authority and the diversity of social and economic characteristics possessed by different governmental jurisdictions lead to varied problems being faced by the many political units which make up the metropolis. Local governments can be characterized as typically small, overlapping, and duplicating. Perhaps the most forceful assessment of the problem in recent years was done by the highly respected Committee for Economic Development. The CED's six-point assessment of the problems that result from the proliferation and layering of local government may be paraphrased as follows:⁵⁵

1. Most local government units are too small to provide effective and economical solutions to their problems;

2. Extensive overlapping layers of government cause confusion and waste the taxpayers' money;

3. Popular control over local government is ineffective because of the excessively long ballots and the confusion caused by the many-layered system of government;

4. Policy leadership is typically weak, if not nonexistent;

5. Archaic administrative organizations are totally inadequate to the functional demands made upon them; and

6. The professional services of highly qualified personnel are typically not attracted to local government.

The same study generalized from these six points, with special reference to metropolitan areas, by stating the following:⁵⁶

The most pressing problem of local government in metropolitan areas may be stated quite simply. The bewildering multiplicity of small, piecemeal, duplicative, overlapping local jurisdictions cannot cope with the staggering difficulties encountered in managing modern urban affairs. The fiscal effects of duplicative suburban separatism create great difficulty in provision of costly central city services benefiting the whole urbanized area. If local governments are to function effectively in metropolitan areas, they must have sufficient size and authority to plan, administer, and provide significant financial support for solutions to areawide problems.

The 1968 Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems in expanding on the findings of the CED study and after reviewing vast amounts of evidence and data, determined that the fragmentation of local government common in metropolitan areas has numerous bad effects:⁵⁷

1. Many of the governmental units involved are far too small in population and financial base to deal efficiently with public-service needs, and too small geographically to exercise control over the problems they are intended to

address. Their very existence, however, often bars the geographic or functional enlargement of other jurisdictions that, thus altered, might be viable and effective.

2. There are no adequate means to reconcile the competing budgetary needs of activities conducted by separate overlying units, or to hold their total financing within the capability of the particular areas they jointly serve.

3. The existence of numerous separate jurisdictions makes it difficult or impossible to prevent contradiction of public policies and programs among particular parts of the metropolitan area and among various functions.

4. The layering of governments and the existence of numerous elective officials confront the voter with confusing ballots, and make it hard for even the most interested citizen to exercise his local franchise intelligently and selectively.

5. The geographic splintering of the metropolitan area's economic base frequently results in a serious mismatch between tappable resources and service needs. This condition has been cited as the root of the "urban crisis" afflicting many metropolitan central cities; but it is likely, in the future, to cause even greater difficulty for some outlying parts of metropolitan areas.

6. The boundaries of local jurisdictions have only limited relevance to the day-to-day activities of many metropolitan residents. With governmental fragmentation and much intra-area mobility, many of the people served, regulated, and at least indirectly taxed by various governmental units in the modern metropolis lack any voice in choosing the officials or influencing the policies of the jurisdictions that affect them.

The concept of metropolitan government reform has, of recent, been receiving serious attention from planners, political scientists, and public administrators alike. Urban planning has, in general, been the spearhead of the reform

movement by virtue of its obvious need for an areawide governmental and political basis to achieve and coordinate areawide goals, objectives and development. This relationship and the intricacies and alternatives associated with attempted government reform measures will be discussed and analyzed more closely in Chapters III and V. At this point in the research, however, the intention is only to surface the undeniable need for restructuring the present archaic pattern of local governments as but one facet in dealing with the problems of the metropolis. In sum, the arguments cited herein depict a situation involving a lack of fit between policy-making units and those units of jurisdiction charged with the responsibilities of ameliorating problems of crime, pollution, poverty, transportation, and so forth. A recent study conducted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations identified four basic aspects of lingering government fragmentation in metropolitan areas that, when taken together, constitute an agenda of challenges that must be faced and successfully resolved if "mild chaos is to be preserved and extreme disorder is to be avoided."⁵⁸ The four aspects are:

1. Externalities. Because the metropolis is an interdependent system, policies undertaken by "independent" municipal corporations or special districts may produce changes, often unintended, in other parts of the total region. Economists call such consequences "externalities", or, more descriptively, "spillover effects." Land-use and zoning policies are examples. The intricate manipulation of zoning requirements is regularly used to produce the most desirable mix of residents and commerce, while shifting burdens to other areas in the metropolis, particularly to the central city. The "zoning game" may thus be used to maximize the benefits to one's own community while shifting the costs to another community, particularly the less fortunate ones.⁵⁹

2. Fiscal Inequities. As was previously discussed, serious fiscal problems also arise from the minute splintering of metropolitan local government. As a whole, the typical SMSA has great resources—usually a higher level of personal income than is found in the rural countryside or smaller urban centers—and large private holdings of taxable property. However, these resources are not subject to tapping by local government as a whole, because they are diversely distributed within the metropolitan area, often in a way quite different from the location of needs for local public services. The resulting mismatch between needs and tappable resources is often discussed in terms of disparities between the central city and suburbia—various studies have shown that metropolitan centers have a heavier tax load than do their respective suburban counterparts.⁶⁰

3. Absence of Political Responsibility. When there is a plethora of government units, citizen control of decision-makers is diffuse. A citizen of Fridley, Minnesota, for example, is expected to exercise informed control over eleven local governments, in addition to the State and national governments. In the absence of an overarching metropolitan government there is no policy-making body to hold accountable for broad metropolitan problems or for failures arising from government action or inaction. Such fragmentation of the citizens' attention can hardly contribute to responsible democratic government.⁶¹

4. Lack of Coordination and Administrative Effectiveness. A final aspect of the challenges confronting the government reformers is the coordination and effective performance of urban service functions. To perform a function effectively, a government must have the requisite legal authority to perform the tasks inherent in that service. The lack of legal authority is probably a main factor in the proliferation of special purpose governments which has hindered local flexibility in dealing with areawide service problems.

Another component of the effectiveness aspect concerns geographic adequacy. This concept calls for a government to have a service area large enough to encompass the service problems that it has to deal with. A basic component of coordination and administrative effectiveness is management capability. To be functionally effective, local governments must successfully identify functional problems, set service goals, design and effectively operate service delivery systems, and openly evaluate their performance. These procedures would enable a government to better understand the resource requirements for urban services, appraise the value of alternative methods of service delivery, and determine when functional performance has been successful. Finally, constructive intergovernmental relations are essential. To coordinate their functional responsibilities, different levels of government would be aided by an intergovernmental relations policy that promotes functional cooperation and ameliorates functional conflict. This component guarantees that local and areawide governments, singly or jointly, will have appropriate intergovernmental procedures and mechanisms at their disposal by which to facilitate the provision of public services to their citizenry.⁶²

The tasks of guiding and coordinating urban development decisions in metropolitan areas has grown beyond the ability of municipal planning agencies. Factors affecting development have gone beyond municipal boundaries such that area-wide approaches for restructuring local governments need to be created in order to provide urban services among a number of municipalities in accordance with specific criteria that would combat the aspects of continuing governmental fragmentation, ambivalence and incrementalism.⁶³

To be effective, metropolitan planning must be comprehensive so that it can provide a forum for the resolution of conflicting interests and needs in providing specific urban services. In short, it is important that the consistent

delivery and performance of many urban services be coordinated with areawide planning administered by an areawide government. Metropolitan planning can be the mechanism by which such consistency among functions is achieved. For the principal role of metropolitan planning is to develop recommendations for areawide goals for physical development, and to propose plans for coordinating public and private actions toward attainment of these goals.⁶⁴ Thus metropolitan planning can go a long way, short of government reorganization toward helping achieve some of the benefits of areawide performance of functions affecting physical development.

The effectiveness of metropolitan planning also depends to a crucial degree on the extent its output is of real use to governmental policy-makers in the area. Therefore, it is vital that the metropolitan planning process be integrated into the decision making process. However, the marriage of planning with decision-making is political in nature and thus involves varying degrees of conflict generation. The management of conflict is a political function of government and, in general, will vary in extent depending on the problems, issues, and stakes involved with the outcome. The foregoing review of the prerequisites of effective planning administration confirms that the existing fragmented local government structure hinders the political resolution of the issues and problems associated with the development of the different parts of the metropolis. However, the achievement of an improved system of areawide goal formulation and coordinated governmental action is likely to be a long process simply because of the wide variation and conflicting nature of the planning issues that exist within a metropolis.

Planning Issues in the Metropolis

As stated in the introductory remarks, the central theme of this research is to critically examine the metropolitan planning function in relation to its political and

governmental basis. Specifically pointed out in these remarks was the fact that substantive problems of the metropolis would be elucidated upon when an understanding of their relationship to the intent of this research is warranted. Within the current context of describing and evaluating the influence of metropolitanism on planning and its cousin, the governmental arrangements needed to effectuate professional provision of services, it is necessary to summarize the already alluded to problems and planning issues as they exist within the metropolitan mosaic. This will now be done within the general framework of the two major jurisdictional components of the metropolis as used in the preceding discussions.⁶⁵

The Central City. Within the central city there are a number of social problems. These are related to the fact that the cities have a disproportionately larger number of people with low incomes, high unemployment, and a low level of education and skills than do the suburbs. Many of these people are Negro and suffer from racial discrimination, higher rates of disease, and a host of other manifestations of poverty. Among the more serious problems for these low-income families is housing. Discrimination and a low supply of decent low-cost housing places many central city residents in substandard dwellings.⁶⁶

Compounding the problem of low-cost housing is the difficult economic problem of matching the growing number of jobs in the suburbs with the labor force in the city. According to several analyses, there are many unemployed city dwellers who possess the necessary skills for jobs which are available in the suburbs.⁶⁷ Unfortunately, many of these people are low-income Negroes who cannot afford to live in the suburbs. Furthermore, the cost of commuting from the city to the suburbs, in terms of money and time, is beyond the reach of this segment of the labor force. Therefore, the decentralization of economic activity from

the city to the suburb has largely been a contributing factor in the rising unemployment of central city residents and has, in turn, prevented these residents from upgrading their socio-economic status as regards their living conditions.⁶⁸

Another problem facing the central city is the financial condition of the city governments. Metropolitanism has left the city with a shrinking revenue base. Deteriorating neighborhoods and fleeing businesses do not produce much tax money. Complicating the revenue problem is the fact that the demand for governmental services in the city is growing. The costs of police, fire, water, sewer, street maintenance and other public services are much higher in the city than in the suburbs.⁶⁹ Further, the educating of children from culturally deprived areas requires more effort and money which places great pressures on central city school systems to allocate higher expenditures for education. Finally, the demand for public services in cities is increased by the concentration of a dependent population which requires a variety of different welfare programs. Aid from States to meet revenue needs for these public expenditure demands has not been forthcoming. A heritage of malapportioned state legislatures has resulted in the cities receiving less financial aid from the States than have the suburbs.⁷⁰ Recent Federal aid programs have not offset this disparity. Thus, the cities are facing a mounting fiscal crisis where the demands for local public services are far greater than the ability of these cities to pay.

Another set of problems facing the city as a result of metropolitanism involves the downtown businessman. The same forces which pushed many downtown businesses to the suburbs continue to plague those businessmen who remain in the city. Traffic congestion, lack of parking facilities, and the presence of slum properties around business establishments make shopping and other activities in the city relatively

unattractive to the suburbanite who already has the relatively easy access of suburban shopping centers. The fact that considerable financial investments have gone into these establishments causes the downtown merchant to desire to counteract the forces of metropolitanism which have contributed to his plight.⁷¹

The problems which beset the city help shape many of the issues confronting the central city planner. To the extent that these problems are associated with metropolitanization, one can say that many of the planning issues in the city represent the impact of metropolitanism on the planning function. Also, the fact that problems in central cities are different than those in the suburbs would indicate that the process of metropolitanization has influenced the type of planning being done in the various parts of the metropolis.

One distinct planning issue which is primarily associated with central cities has been precipitated by the problems of the city's poor. Generally speaking, a broad goal of most planning efforts is to plan and develop a pleasant and well-ordered environment. Such an objective mandates the central city planner to combat the problems of the city's poor. Further, the plight of the poor has generated a need for the provision of decent housing for a population which is largely residing in slums.⁷² Efforts to deal with this problem have triggered a number of other planning issues.

In the process of developing various plans for the cities, planners frequently must evaluate the housing of low-income people. The procedures for determining what is and what is not a slum are not clear cut by any means. As such, the classification of low-income housing is a key issue confronting the professional planner. One reason why it has become an important issue is that low-income families tend to be fearful of being moved out of their homes and into some unknown environment. Some critics have argued that planners use arbitrary standards when they designate a

neighborhood as a slum.⁷³ They accuse planners of being over-zealous in their attempts to rid the city of what is considered to be poor housing by using biased standards that overlook certain aspects of the physical and social community that are highly desirable from the residents' point of view. This criticism has often been exhibited in conflicts between the planners and neighborhood residents.

Many planners would agree that the treatment of sub-standard housing varies depending on the physical condition of that housing. There is in reality a continuum of housing conditions which would call for treatment ranging from code enforcement to redevelopment.⁷⁴ Code enforcement has always been a sticky planning issue. In order to maintain privately owned low-income housing at a decent level, cities must enforce minimal standards for housing unit maintenance. The enforcement of these codes is not always rigorous since landlords are usually more politically potent than their tenants. Nevertheless, code enforcement has been a major avocation of tenants associations and civil rights groups.⁷⁵ As a result, it has become one of the more significant planning issues associated with low-income housing.

Once a planner has recommended the demolition of certain low-income housing units, he is faced with the question of what to do with the people who occupy them. Relocation has been a difficult issue in planning since the inception of urban redevelopment. Long periods of time between the "official" announcement of future demolition and the establishment of relocation procedures has caused residents to panic and move to another area of the city.⁷⁶ In many cases this new location is scheduled for later demolition. Even when displaced residents are willing to let the city relocate them, difficulties arise in finding a suitable place for them to live. The amount of housing available for low-income Negroes is limited because of the small amount of rent they can pay and because of housing discrimination.

The alternative of public housing has been criticized on the grounds that it does not satisfy the housing needs of the low-income residents and that it further reinforces segregated housing patterns. Thus, the problems of relocation are difficult ones requiring not just planning expertise, but also the interactions of political decision-making within a governmental context.⁷⁷

Another planning issue in the central city involves decisions on how best to use redeveloped land once the slums have been removed. Because of the shortage of low-cost housing, low-income groups have demanded that planners use the land for homes which they can afford. However, there are other kinds of pressures exerted on planners which tend to tilt the scales against the residents' demands. Aside from public housing, it is difficult to find private developers that can and will produce suitable housing units at a rent that low-income families can afford. Consequently, the only way to provide housing for a poverty budget is through governmental subsidy. In addition, extensive pressures are placed upon the planner by city governments and businessmen to consider some alternative other than low-cost housing. The reasoning behind this is fairly simple: the resolution of the conflict is not. City governments are constantly looking for a way out of their fiscal crises. Property taxes are a major source of city revenues. Public housing pays the city no property taxes and low-cost private housing pays less taxes than other land uses. Furthermore, low-income residents generate considerable costs for public services. Therefore, the luxury high-rise apartment, with its corresponding upper and middle-income inhabitants, is not only a more attractive use from the fiscal point of view as it pays higher property taxes, but it brings those classes of society with larger incomes back to the cities thus helping boost their slumping economies.⁷⁸ Cities also favor large business establishments as a replacement for

slum property for much the same revenue-inspired reasons.⁷⁹

The difficulties faced by businesses in the city give rise to another planning issue. Cities can only undertake a limited number of redevelopment projects at one time. The question is which projects should have the highest priority. The business community favors an emphasis on renewal projects that will remove some of their difficulties. Thus, projects which will help relieve congestion, provide parking for customers and remove the blight of the slums are of highest priority to these business groups. As these projects are often the most productive fiscally, the city government will also tend to favor them. Low-income people, on the other hand, would like to see planning policy geared more directly to their housing needs. The end result is that the establishment of priorities among redevelopment schemes becomes an important planning issue.

The Suburbs. The planning issues which are predominant in the suburbs are different from those issues found in the central city. The main problems associated with suburbia generally arise from the desires of suburban residents to maintain the character of their community. As decentralization in the metropolis continues, forces are set in motion which push some suburbs toward the central city end of the city-suburb continuum.⁸⁰ Industries and lower income groups are constantly pushing outward from the city. Since they moved out of the city (or a suburb with city characteristics), suburbanites tend to view these pressures as a threat to change their new community into one that resembles the city as a problem. Specifically, many suburbanites do not want Negroes or other low-income groups to live in their community and they wish to avoid the noise, dirt, and congestion which they associate with the central city.

Suburbs also feel a fiscal squeeze similar to that encountered by the city but for slightly different reasons than the city. Rapid population expansion in the newer

suburbs has created a need for extensive capital investment in school buildings, streets, sewers, and water supply systems. Further, suburban residents often demand a high caliber of local public services, particularly in their schools. Many suburban parents have college ambitions for their children and place a high value on education. At the same time they own their own homes and pay property taxes directly. In general they are not happy about the amount of taxes they pay and do everything possible to fight attempts to increase their tax bill. Thus, a high demand for services and a stubborn reluctance to finance these services through taxing are major factors behind suburban fiscal problems.⁸¹

The desire of suburban residents to preserve the character of their community gives rise to a major kind of planning issue. Though general agreement on the preservation concept can be found among the suburbanites, they do not always agree on specific formulations of this general objective. In actuality, there are two aspects of the preservation issue which must be considered.⁸² One involves the basic question of what kind of community is being preserved. This point will normally create conflict over the question of whether planning policy should attempt to restrict specific kinds of people and economic activity from settling in the community. The other aspect involves the determination of how to apply a restrictive policy to different parts of the community. The major tool used by planners to implement a preservation policy is zoning, since ordinances are used by suburbanites as a restrictive policy.⁸³ Requirements such as large minimum lot size for houses, or minimum floor space requirements for housing effectively control the income levels of those people who can move into a community. Some zoning ordinances have excluded certain land uses such as trailer parks, multi-family dwellings and heavy industry in order to preserve the character of the community.

Planning issues are often aimed at resolving fiscal problems. Many suburban communities have been engaged in a fiscal zoning game with a major objective of their planning policies being to attract land uses which will pay more in taxes than they cost in municipal services.⁸⁴ Many planners consider fiscal zoning a hindrance to the application of planning principles. However, they recognize that such considerations have become an important part of local planning policy.⁸⁵ These fiscal objectives are not always in agreement with a desire to preserve the character of the community. Nevertheless, promotion of light industrial complexes or administrative industrial campuses in the suburbs provide planners and the respective constituencies with a compromise. Additionally, commercial establishments combined with luxury multi-family dwellings can also find favorable acceptance in many suburbs for obvious fiscal reasons.

The suburban-based planner finds himself with a set of development issues which are different from those faced by his colleague in the city, but which have no less potential for conflict. The objectives of preservation and fiscal productivity are not always consistent with one another, nor with the planner's own professional assessment of appropriate planning policy. Additionally, the suburban planner and the central city planner are both faced with difficult problems of application of planning in various parts of the metropolis. The practice of planning principles relies heavily on an understanding of the previously discussed central-city and suburban planning issues. However, when analyzed these issues and the problems of planning administration and practice tend to merge into a group of interrelated philosophical, political and operational factors that have serious ramifications on the formulation and implementation of metropolitan planning policies in relation to the intended outcomes of those policies as regards urban growth and development.

One important aspect is the extent to which a metropolitan plan should try to be comprehensive, in the sense of including all aspects of city and suburban activities, or be concerned with specific aspects of urban living such as transportation, waste disposal, or schools. Closely connected is the question of whether the planner should work for the interests of the general public or those of some particular segment of it. Although it might be argued that the comprehensive-specialized and the general-particular interest issues are separable, in fact they tend to be associated. One rationale for the general urban planner is that he can or should take into consideration a far wider range of subject matter and of social consequences than the specialized planner can or does. But this is far easier said than done. Time and again, the general planner may realize that building a sewer line will do much to direct suburban growth, while the specialized sewer planner either does not realize it or does not care. But the specialized sewer planner can raise a host of real or imagined engineering problems to which he has answers and the general planner does not. Unless the general planner can establish a close working relationship with the mayor or the city council or can build powerful citizen support, he is likely to be frustrated by the specialized planner. So he is wise to establish a working partnership with the specialist.⁸⁶

On both the comprehensive-specialized and the general-particular interest issues, the problem of the general planner is more difficult because of a serious lack of objective criteria, standards, and measures. It is all very well to say that the general plan must be based upon "sound land use principles," but this is about equivalent to the old advice, "in doubt, do what Caesar would have done." Is it sound land use to establish an industrial district in one location or not in another, or to permit high-rise apartments in one district but not in another? There has been much support

for separation of land uses; carried to the extreme, this means very long journeys to work that may be extremely burdensome to lower-income workers who cannot afford their own cars.⁸⁷ The general city planner may argue that his land use plan is best, but he often cannot produce any quantitative estimate of the values it produces as compared with any other plan. There is nothing in city planning comparable to the benefit-cost calculations that have become standard in many types of public investments.

Given these situations, the general city planner is often forced to rely on personal judgment, upon assertion rather than upon proof, upon rhetoric or personal persuasion. Frequently he is unable to win sufficient support for his plan or can do so only by use of tactics which are more political than professional. In any case, he often faces a difficult personal situation.

A second major aspect which the general city planner faces is his relationship to the political power structure of his city or suburb. Shall he seek to serve the dominant political figures and forces, helping them to solve their problems as they see them, quite possibly being useful and well-appreciated in the process? Or should he seek to play a more nearly independent role, developing plans which in his professional judgment are in the general public interest, trying or hoping to persuade the political leaders to accept or support such plans? If he works on matters of direct concern to political figures, this is likely to mean work on matters of small size and immediate urgency, while the broader, longer-range general planning issues go by default for simple lack of time and manpower. But general plans may not arouse much interest, unless it is opposition, from political figures. Such plans seem too remote, too general, to be understood and valued.⁸⁸

Banfield and Wilson have emphasized how little political muscle most city planners have, and how little political "sex appeal" a general city plan is likely to have with the whole electorate.⁸⁹ On the other hand, a broad-gauge political leader at the urban level (who might or might not be the mayor or a councilman) could well use the city plan as the source of ideas and even of guidance for dealing with current issues as they arise and for initiating new programs. Many planners have sought to keep their offices somewhat aloof from the political machine, fearing, often rightly, that close involvement would leave them no time or opportunity for genuine planning. Kent, on the other hand—speaking, probably, as a practical politician as much as a professor of planning—has emphasized that the planner's chief client is the city council and the mayor, rather than the general public.⁹⁰ In any case, the city planner has often found himself in situations where his professional training offered few answers and may have raised some serious obstacles to his accommodation to the political scene or his ability to modify the latter to his needs.

A third major aspect facing planners has been their relationship with the general public. Typically, indeed almost universally, planners have developed land use or other plans to what they considered a final and defensible stage and only then sought public understanding and support.⁹¹ Rarely have they sought to involve the public in the actual development of the plan; possibly because it would have been difficult to interest an uninformed or indifferent citizenry. Planners of suburban developments have rarely sought consultation with land speculators, developers, and merchant builders in land use planning, perhaps because these groups might well have sought to take advantage of anything they learned by consultation with planners. Yet, in the end, the planner's land use plan must run the gauntlet of landowners' criticism, usually without the help of those who might possibly have

supported it if they had been involved in its development. Relationships with the general public during the planning process is an issue which many planners have not recognized as a problem. They have resolved it in terms of their operations as professional planners without public interference until the plan was "ready" and often have been disappointed at the public reaction.⁹²

The metropolitan planning process could be used, much more than it typically has been, to emphasize the positive values that could be created by joint or cooperative action, as compared with those likely to arise under unguided private enterprise. Planning has often been used in a more restrictive or defensive sense—to limit what could be done, to impede new and nonconforming land uses, to preserve values in established areas. Its use to emphasize the creation of positive values would involve a consideration of positive externalities. In any event, a plan has, or should have, economic implications greater than are generally realized. The potentialities of rigorous and dependable economic analysis for testing alternative plans are great, although the difficulties are great too. Planners are taking some initial steps to include economics, law, and other disciplines in their planning, and economists and other professional groups need to modify and extend their analyses to cope adequately with central-city and suburban planning problems.

The Emergence of Metropolitan Planning

Not only has metropolitanism been a determinant of planning issues in different parts of the metropolis, it has also created pressures for metropolitan-wide planning policy. It clearly appears that present planning policy in metropolitan areas is as fragmented as the structure of local government. Planning policy is formulated on a municipal basis. From a development point of view, however, the governmental

units within a metropolitan area are only politically independent. Physically, socially and economically they are highly interdependent. When zoning policy is used in some municipalities to exclude certain kinds of people and land uses, some other municipal units within the metropolis must absorb them. It is possible for a single political jurisdiction to attract an industry and zone its residential areas so that the industry's labor force will have to live somewhere else. Therefore, the cost of providing services to low-income workers is exported to another political jurisdiction with a less restrictive zoning policy. Further, the industrial development in question might be located adjacent to a residential section of a neighboring municipality. In short, provincial planning policy may have repercussions beyond the political boundaries of the community which establishes that policy.

Aside from the interrelationships among local planning policies, there are certain types of developmental projects and problems that cannot be confined within the borders of a single municipality. The location of highways and mass transit lines has a significant influence on the location of other kinds of land uses and consequently on the growth patterns within a metropolitan area.⁹³ The efficient, safe and economical movement of people and goods within the metropolis on the highways and mass transit systems must involve a continuous, comprehensive and coordinated transportation policy.

From a developmental point of view, the high interdependence among metropolitan communities when taken in combination with the high degree of political independence of individual municipalities generates conflict and fierce competition for fiscal resources. The desire of some Negroes to move out of their ghettos and the equally strong desire of suburbanites to prevent the Negroes from achieving their desires creates another kind of conflict. In addition, two

decades of court cases over the practice of municipalities zoning out low-income people and undesirable land uses only reinforces the mounting evidence that the problems of cities and the preservative planning policies of suburbs are not in harmony.⁹⁴

Inconsistent planning policies and a provincial approach to certain kinds of planning projects and issues that require metropolitan-wide strategies are reinforced by the highly fragmented governmental structure in our metropolitan areas. This state of affairs has brought about strong demands from planners and government officials for metropolitan-wide planning.⁹⁵ Presently a large number of metropolitan planning agencies are in existence. As of 1964 a survey done by the U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency indicated that 150 out of 218 metropolitan areas in the United States had some form of metropolitan planning activity under way.⁹⁶ If the continued Federal requirements for metropolitan planning under The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 are enforced, all metropolitan areas may have some form of a metropolitan planning agency in the near future.⁹⁷ State governments have been cooperative in allowing local governments in metropolitan areas to engage in area-wide planning efforts. Further, by 1972, 40 of the States had officially delineated statewide systems of substate regional planning and development districts. Four other States had made tentative delineations, while the remaining six had taken no action.⁹⁸

Although there are a large number of metropolitan planning agencies, they have not been able to establish metropolitan planning policies which are followed by the governments comprising the metropolitan areas. Charles Haar and his associates made the following observation on the basis of careful analysis of what the existing metropolitan planning agencies were doing:⁹⁹

While metropolitan planning has been of value in most of these areas, the present agencies generally have been severely handicapped by small and uncertain budgets, insufficient legal power to permit active participation in development decisions and lack of clear statutory direction.... Although metropolitan planning agencies may wish to perform functions keyed to managing regional development, neither their funds nor existing statutory prescriptions have encouraged many of them to depart from population studies, economic analyses, and residential, commercial, and industrial land use planning.

From Haar's report it is clear that metropolitan planning has not been an effective force in shaping metropolitan planning policy.

There are a variety of reasons for why effective metropolitan planning is not forthcoming. Ironically the very forces that have created a demand for areawide planning constrain its effectiveness. Local governments within the metropolis have differing objectives. Hence a truly effective regional planning policy would somehow have to iron out the conflicts which arise because of inconsistent planning goals. The fiscal pressures that produce policies aimed at maximizing revenues and exporting the costs of land uses, the housing and physical location of low-income groups and the question of where to put those urban activities that generate congestion, noise and dirt, are among the most conflict-laden issues which beset metropolitan planning.

Apart from the issues of conflict within metropolitan areas, a strong American belief in the virtues of localism also acts as a constraint on metropolitan planning. Robert Wood has argued that the wide-spread belief in small government and small society has discouraged regional governmental institutions and has strengthened the fragmented structure of local government in metropolitan areas.¹⁰⁰ Preferences for small places and small government have been expressed in discussions bearing on legislation that would require

regional planning as a prerequisite for Federal grants. The following opinion was expressed by a representative of a New Jersey citizens' group:¹⁰¹

Local government closest to the people, the bulwark of American freedom, will automatically be eliminated by regional planning agencies, whose scope of power goes beyond government power, absorbing even those of the private sector.... The question is not whether there shall be planning, but who shall do the planning. At the municipal level it is controlled by the citizens; at the county level, the people become less important; at the State or Federal level, people are totally unimportant and become masses of humanity to be shifted about or pushed together in clusters for the sake of planners playing God.

Successful metropolitan planning would have to overcome provincial planning policy that is rooted in individual municipal goals and a preference for localism. For this reason an effective metropolitan planning agency needs to be tied to a potent political base. This base would have to be a government that is responsive to local needs and attitudes. Such a base is difficult to conceptualize, much less find. Outside of a very few metropolitan areas there are no regional governments in the United States.¹⁰² Single counties cover some metropolitan areas but in time the boundaries of such areas will be pushed outward. Furthermore, county governments are weak structurally.¹⁰³ Many of them have no executive head and have a multiplicity of elected administrative officials. In addition, there are very weak links between the county and its municipalities.

Thus, a county or multi-county planning agency is really not tied to an effective political system. Some regional planning agencies are forming using the council of governments plan (COG).¹⁰⁴ Under this arrangement the planning agency is not tied to any one political jurisdiction but rather is composed of a governing body consisting of representatives from each of the major governments included in the region. The Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)

in the San Francisco Bay area has an arrangement of this type. The East-West Gateway Coordinating Council in the St. Louis area is another example.¹⁰⁵ The major difficulty with the council of governments scheme is that its members still must ultimately answer to local constituencies who have very definite stakes in localism.¹⁰⁶ In short, such a planning agency can only make metropolitan-wide policy that does not interfere with local planning objectives. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has noted that regional councils are successful when the problems they attempt to solve are non-controversial, when their solutions are not damaging in any way to any member of the council, when the execution of a policy does not require implementation by any local governments, and when the action required costs little or nothing in terms of additional tax revenues.¹⁰⁷ Unfortunately, these conditions are rarely present in the formulation of meaningful metropolitan-wide policy.

Even with the stimulus of Federal programs, future metropolitan planning is likely to remain ineffective. This is not to say that research and a clear analysis of the metropolitan implications of local policies has not been and will not be useful. Indeed such activities are very much needed. But in the absence of finding a means to deal with those constraints on metropolitan planning which have been enumerated, comprehensive metropolitan planning policy is not likely to be forthcoming.

Metropolitan Planning Functions

Experience with metropolitan planning is relatively new and varied, making it difficult to generalize on the activities embraced in the planning function as currently performed. Moreover, as distinguished from other urban functions, which commonly are handled by a general purpose government, metropolitan planning is most often performed by a single purpose special district. This is because there

are few metropolitan general purpose governments, and it has not been feasible or desirable to attach the comprehensive planning function to any of the metropolitan single purpose districts performing line functions of government, such as sewer and water districts or port authorities.¹⁰⁸

A common activity of the metropolitan planning agency is to prepare a comprehensive plan for the area and to coordinate plans of local units within its geographical boundaries. Many existing planning agencies are still in the process of preparing plans. Usually coordination of local plans consists only of the metropolitan agency's effort to keep itself informed of local plans and projects and to inform localities of instances where local plans do not conform with the metropolitan agency's comprehensive plan. Few have the authority of mandatory review of local plans. Other responsibilities of metropolitan planning agencies are; for example, development of cooperative techniques among local governments for solution of metropolitan problems; preparation for local governments of standards for zoning, building, and subdivision control ordinances and other planning regulations; and contracting with other governments to provide specialized planning services.¹⁰⁹

A major concern of professional planners now is a definition of the metropolitan planning function, and delineation of the relationship between metropolitan planning and local planning in urban areas. The existence of two governmental agencies with the function of providing planning service in the same geographical area causes conflict of jurisdiction unless their separate roles can be clearly defined. A step toward defining metropolitan planning was taken by the American Institute of Planners (AIP) in a background paper on The Emergence of Metropolitan Planning prepared by the Planning Policy Committee of the AIP, "distilled from actual metropolitan planning experience." The AIP

committee statement suggested that long-term policies for metropolitan planning agencies be as follows:¹¹⁰

The metropolitan planning agency should seek the development of a unified plan for land use, density and design, the provision and correlation of public facilities, services and utilities, and the preservation of open space and wise use of natural resources. It should strive to coordinate local planning, both public and private, with planning at the metropolitan level; similarly, the metropolitan plan should be coordinated with state and national plans—particularly those affecting transportation, public facilities and natural resource programs and functions that are metropolitan in scope. To this purpose, there should be a legal requirement that the agency review the content, conformity or compatibility of all proposals affecting the metropolitan area.

To carry out metropolitan planning policies, the AIP committee suggested four basic functions to be performed by the metropolitan planning agency: research—to provide the data needed for preparing the comprehensive plan; planning—to prepare the comprehensive area plan; cooperation and coordination—in regard to the objectives, proposals and plans at various levels of governmental units affected; and, advice and assistance—to other planning agencies and local governmental and nongovernmental organizations, including establishing standards for planning regulations and encouraging local units to adopt and properly administer them.¹¹¹

Recognizing the existence of governmental agencies already providing services on an areawide basis, and the need for involving planning closely in their operations, the AIP group said:¹¹²

The metropolitan planning agency should seek to establish especially close relationships with other institutions concerned with metropolitanwide development such as water supply and development authorities, mass transportation agencies, special districts, highway departments, park and recreation agencies and

air pollution control bodies. Efforts should be made to participate in the decision-making processes of such agencies as a major means of accomplishing areawide development goals.

The metropolitan planning agency, according to the AIP, should develop a comprehensive plan for the entire population area, yet within that area numerous municipalities will continue to develop their own comprehensive plans. The AIP recognized the possible conflict by saying that the metropolitan agency must "coordinate local planning, both public and private, with planning at the metropolitan level." For this purpose, the AIP said that the metropolitan planning law should require that the metropolitan planning body review the content, conformity or compatibility of all proposals affecting the metropolitan area. It seems likely that these proposals would include such measures of municipal planning as the local comprehensive plan and zoning and subdivision controls. The AIP made clear that the metropolitan body's review power is only the power to be heard, not the power to approve or reject. On these vital matters, therefore, the AIP suggested that ultimate power to heed or ignore the recommendations of the metropolitan planning agency would be in the hands of the locality, and thus in matters of conflict, local planning would take precedence over metropolitan planning.

Powers given to the metropolitan planning body in the AIP statement might, as a practical matter, enable the agency to act so as to keep conflicts with local planning bodies to a minimum and still influence areawide development. First, the metropolitan planning body is urged to seek to establish close liaison with governmental agencies performing areawide line functions and to try to participate in their decision-making processes. Presumably, the propriety and value of such close ties would be recognized by local agencies. Second, the agency's extensive powers to prepare plans, conduct research and educational activities, and

advise and assist local planning bodies, including the suggestion of standards, would be expected to have a persuasive educational effect on local governmental units and their planning bodies.

In the final analysis, however, if it came to an issue of one planning jurisdiction's recommendation taking precedence over the other, the recommendation of the local planning body would prevail under the terms of the working statement of the AIP. The AIP statement thus leaves the function of guiding areawide development to the localities and whatever influence can be brought to bear on them through the educational and other indirect means of the metropolitan planning body.

The intercommunity spillover of benefits from sound planning, and social costs resulting from lack of it, are widely recognized by layman and specialists alike.¹¹³ Indeed, the economic foundation of an entire metropolitan area depends upon the way in which land is zoned and used in each of its component communities. Because local government relies so heavily upon the property tax, the chief obstacle to sound areawide planning is the competition among municipalities for land use developments which are productive of large tax revenues. The rationale of many zoning ordinances lies in fiscal competition rather than desirable spatial arrangement of uses. This kind of policy is self-defeating, however, and results in a reduction of total economic resources for the area as a whole.

Within the planning framework provided for the area by plans for generalized land use, transportation networks, major utility lines, public capital facilities, open space and urban renewal, planning by individual communities creates benefits which are largely confined within their boundaries. Local land use limitations, as long as they conform to area-wide requirements, create basically local benefits. Similarly, since there is little spillover among communities

of benefit from local playgrounds and parks, fire stations, police precinct stations, distributional water and sewer lines, etc., planning of capital facilities for these functions creates essentially local benefits. The placement of shopping areas, industrial neighborhoods and residences of varying density, as well as public facilities, near the borders of a municipality does affect its neighbors, however. It is therefore necessary for local and areawide planning to be closely coordinated.¹¹⁴

Thus, the more direct and less complicated the organizational ties between government officials and metropolitan planning agencies, the greater are the possibilities for more effective planning. The ideal solution would be the creation of a unit of general government which has jurisdiction over the entire metropolitan area. While the governmental functions assigned to such a unit would vary from place to place, the metropolitan planning agency should be an arm of that unit of government. However, as discussed in the following paragraphs, various socio-economic factors, political interests and even the principles and practice of planning have prevented the creation of regional governments that would encourage a more effective and economical approach to the assignment and delivery of local and areawide planning services.

Metropolitan Planning and Government Reorganization*

The institution of planning which is largely concerned with land use, transportation and other closely related matters has been regarded by some as the focal point of

* A more detailed analysis of the various alternative approaches to the reorganization of local governments is contained in Chapter III. The concept of government reform is introduced here to more fully develop the various aspects of metropolitanization on the planning function. The theory and some recommendations pertaining to government reform proposals are more fully developed in Chapter V.

metropolitan government reform.¹¹⁵ This is not surprising when one considers that metropolitan planning was virtually a Federally sheltered workshop—formerly subsidized through the urban planning assistance program and guaranteed through the provisions of the A-95 review process—and that a significant majority of all recent reform proposals and their supportive literature have been Federally inspired or financed.¹¹⁶ In fact, however, the actual record of these planning agencies demonstrates little relevance to most day-to-day land development decisions, but much to agency survival and to obtaining Federal grants. Few metropolises have political bodies capable of adopting areawide plans and having them supersede local plans.

Local planning is largely isolated from metropolitan planning as well as from the executive and regulatory agencies of local government itself.¹¹⁷ As a result of this manifestation, most of planning has been relegated to an advisory role for the benefit of local officials and regulators and as such is not a self-implementing process. This gap between planning and action is the result of several institutional factors.

As previously alluded to, the methodology of planning, particularly at the metropolitan level, is very general in nature and at times highly abstract. Procedurally, it deals with issues at a macro level that encompass a long time-horizon, all of which is somewhat irrelevant to the public official, whose interests seldom stretch beyond his own terms of office.¹¹⁸ Moreover, the technically and goal-oriented procedures for deriving a rational policy model of regional planning, which proceeds from a systematic analysis of variables through the use of inductive logic to the evaluation and recommendation of plan alternatives via deductive reasoning, are inconsistent with the more pragmatic and intuitive approach of political decision makers. For them, the relevant fact is public opinion, not computer

simulation models or decision-theoretic approaches to plan formulation and evaluation. Thus, as planning has become more professionalized, it has also become less participatory at the metropolitan level.¹¹⁹

Metropolitan planning, as it is currently practiced, bears little direct relationship to the land development process. It is regarded as advisory to any capital improvements program and the regulatory process and the advice is often too general to help with specific functional decisions. Because operating agencies are better equipped in both money and manpower to do their own planning, the metropolitan planning agency's role is frequently reduced to that of reviewer rather than initiator of policy.¹²⁰ In the absence of a comprehensive metropolitan capital improvements program, implementation is left to the very agencies least receptive to comprehensive planning.

Planning at most levels, and particularly at that of the metropolis, aims at "end-state" plans without establishing a related set of programs covering resource allocation or scheduling. Thus, plans become simply documents of public persuasion rather than policies and strategies aimed at achieving results like those used in military organizations. The planners' acceptance of the separation of planning from implementation has seriously limited the potential of the planning process in formulating development policies. If "development" were the end of the process, then planning would be the means of producing the public decisions needed to guide both public and private sectors to that state—not merely a delineation of what that state should be. As it exists now, metropolitan planning is not an integral part of a development strategy. It is not surprising, then, that local officials are not heavy users of metropolitan planning products. This stems partly from the factors discussed above, as well as from the nature of their legal duties, the demands on their time from an almost endless variety of competing

official and private interests, and the schedule on which decisions about the budget, agency programs, or grant applications, for example, must be made.

Perhaps the most important institutional characteristic of metropolitan planning remains the dominance of functional over comprehensive planning. Functional agencies, supported by clientele groups who come to their aid at budget time, generally have greater financial resources than the "comprehensive" agency.¹²¹ They can implement their plans and show results within the terms of office of elected officials. Further, they use the compelling logic that they are service agencies just doing their job. Metropolitan planning, therefore, often consists of worrying about the unanticipated consequences for development of all the successful operations of these functional agencies. The initiative is in the hands of the operating agencies and the developers, not of the planners.

The public and private institutions of metropolitan development serve some interests better than others. The various actors in the development process, special economic interests and citizen groups alike, use those institutions available to them to achieve their objectives. Should they be unable to get what they want through existing institutions, they may become interested in institutional changes; i.e.; metropolitan reform. However, writing constitutions and reorganizing governments is basically an exercise of subdividing the spoils; in any metropolitan reform some interests will do better than others. The classic types of government reform, consolidation of local governments and federation, have more implications for the way in which development decisions are made than for the actual results on the ground. If representative systems are restructured, for instance, then regional capital improvements may better serve some groups now short-changed in the capital budgets of localities. If a metropolitan government has planning powers and can

assert the integrity of its plan against the claims of localities, then a substantial change may occur in the location of regional facilities, employment centers, and large-scale developments. Metropolitan government produces a new political rationality in development policy simply because political interests are weighed differently on the metropolitan scale. This does not mean that development policy will be better, only that it will be different.

Whatever is done about general government organization, other metropolitan reforms are needed to change development patterns, reforms that deal directly with the institutions presently governing land development. While general reform may be a prerequisite for some specific reforms, it is not for all. Reform or modification of market institutions is more likely to result from specialized State or Federal legislation than from self-improvement projects. The pluralism of land development institutions in the political economy suggests that any substantial reform will require a long-term strategic effort designed to alter the way in which planning institutions function. In this context, the effort to establish metropolitan government is important as an alternative means of authoritatively arriving at objectives for a metropolitan planning and development policy.

Comprehensive or radical reform of planning and development institutions, however logical, is not likely, given the facts of institutional life. A strategy of reform, therefore, must be devised and pursued which exerts leverage on those institutions with the greatest existing or potential impact on the character of regional development—land assembly, financing of development, capital improvements, the metropolitan fiscal system, land-use regulation, and planning.

Planning, Reform and Metropolitica

Since private interests tend to align their organizations with the official system, there is little point in having a

metropolitan-wide planning organization if there is no metropolitan governmental body associated with the organization which can be influenced. This arrangement substantially restricts the kinds of conflicts that can arise over planning issues and structures the way in which conflicts can, or cannot, be resolved. Moreover, since private development, regardless of its regional impact, has to occur in some jurisdiction, a developer is going to be far more concerned with local development policies than with any regional policies unless they affect his ability to develop. For example, as long as local zoning authorities do not require conformity to regional plans and policies, such plans will not become prominent factors in the decision making patterns of private development.¹²²

Some interest groups — lenders, utilities, general contractors, and commercial or office building developers — do operate on a metropolitan scale and have to think in regional economic terms. Along with their major industrial and commercial clientele, they constitute an important political base for efforts aimed at metropolitan reform which will help them achieve their development objectives. Their objectives, however, rarely require sweeping or radical metropolitan government reform; in fact, a general reform movement might introduce a political system that would be indifferent to their interests or promote other development priorities than a convention center or downtown renewal. Since political cohesion among these groups depends upon specific attainable projects that achieve profitable economic consequences, their form of developmental politics tends to limit any organizational reform to the least change necessary that will effectuate their narrow objectives.

Where a clear political monopoly is not possible, a favorite, but less significant strategy, is the creation of a technical monopoly. Frequently a ploy of bureaucracies, the technical monopoly involves the constructive domination

of the information or accrediting power required to make policy or be a participant in a land development activity. Historically, the most effective technical monopolies have been those utilized by the highway agencies, in which they control both the collection of data and the subsequent analysis of that data, on which the heart of decision making rests.¹²³ From the private standpoint, realtor associations establish the conditions of membership and the regulations of business practice and provide almost all of the information available on current markets through their membership services in the form of computerized multiple listings.

To the extent that political and/or technical monopolies have been established, metropolitan reform is made that much more difficult. Even with charter reform and the establishment of independent state agencies, little effective control over development is achieved, because local charters cannot supersede state law. Having control of the local councils can help, but if the planning agency is an instrumentality of the State, then full control over the local legislative delegation also may be necessary. Such control can be obtained only after a long period of political activity involving compromise on the composition of election tickets, and subsequently, on the substance of legislation in order to ensure its enactment.¹²⁴

Reform groups are more often agreed on the need for planning than on what a plan should contain. Opposing alliances can effectively delay action, giving the advantage to those who have fared well under the existing system. What normally emerges are mechanistic responses to organic problems. New procedures or organizations may be agreed to, but they are likely to involve no basic institutional change in the development process. Few have the patience, the time, or the vital interest to endure the long struggle involved in institutional change. The culture of reform is heavily oriented to organizational change, with little appreciation

of the fact that organizations may be only a facade behind which basic institutions remain intact.¹²⁵

At both the metropolitan and local levels, the inertia of the status quo is an important fact in the politics of planning. The first law of any institution is survival; its ultimate skills are defensive.¹²⁶ Officials of local jurisdictions stoutly resist government reforms that would abolish their offices or materially alter their ways of doing business; their opposition and that of their constituencies have frequently been decisive.

When change cannot be prevented, one defensive strategy is to foster harmless change. The council of governments (COG) is, in part, such a strategy for local governments, allowing the appearance of dealing with metropolitan problems through a consortium of existing local governments. While COGs have been appraised as an evolutionary step toward full-blown metropolitan reform, most of the evidence leads to a different conclusion. Once established, COGs create bureaucracies that value survival above action and concentrate on "safe" issues on which intergovernmental consensus is likely. Most conflicts involving COGs result from jurisdictional violations, or moves by the COG to preempt activities currently performed by other agencies. Though COGs usually lose, they may come out of the fight with face-saving "cooperative" agreements with the agencies.¹²⁷

The reality of institutional change is, therefore, that in both local and metropolitan settings it normally occurs through slight, incremental adjustments over very long periods of time. Normally these changes only dull the thrust of reform and force the reformers to consent to "give it time to see if it will work." These modest changes, however, do set in motion new forces that often render the initial reform plan obsolete and require additional incremental adjustment.

The experiences of some metropolitan reforms, such as the creation of the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council and the New York Urban Development Corporation, suggest that major reforms may have to be imposed by state legislatures, where a whole different set of political influences prevail.¹²⁸ Apparently, only by leaving the metropolitan arena does it seem possible to put together the proper coalitions required for substantial institutional changes in metropolitan government. This theme was recently echoed in the State-legislated consolidation of the city of Indianapolis and Marion County. However, it is important to note that the UNIGOV consolidation was achieved in a manner most different from other reform approaches and emulating these procedures could, if not carefully handled, result in more bifurcation within the metropolitan area rather than improved efficiency and economy.¹²⁹

The Failure of Reform. The value patterns of those who support plans for metropolitan supergovernments are not dominant in the community, and the leaders of reform movements characteristically do not give adequate consideration to other values. The result is that proposals for reorganization of metropolitan governments are rarely implemented.

Upper-income business and professional people tend to favor metropolitan government for a number of reasons. Some are concerned lest, as a result of the middle-class exodus to the suburbs, the political control of the central city be lost to low-income groups with little education. Some believe that governmental consolidation will reduce costs through economies of scale.¹³⁰ Low-income groups tend to oppose metropolitan government for a number of reasons. Negroes fear that such a government will weaken their political power, since Negroes are concentrated in the core city of the metropolitan area. Labor leaders sometimes oppose consolidation because business leaders favor it, and they assume it must therefore be to the advantage of the

business leaders. Labor leaders or working-class people sometimes also oppose metropolitan plans because they include proposals for a short ballot and professional leadership. That is, they fear a loss of access and representation. Some low-income persons fear that metropolitan government would be more expensive to them; that it would result in more rapid tax increases than would otherwise be the case. The question of whether or not to have metropolitan government is not, therefore, simply a question of efficiency and economy, as the reformers of a generation ago believed, but is a political question closely related to costs and to perceived abilities to influence policy making.¹³¹

Suburban officeholders and the entrenched bureaucracy of the area will almost always oppose metropolitan government, and reformers seldom pay enough attention to their values and interests or show any imagination in compromising with them. They fail to recognize that representativeness of government and access to the decision makers are likely to be more important considerations for the typical citizen than are questions of efficiency and economy. Rarely does a metropolitan-area study even mention these two psychologically important factors, to say nothing of adequately providing for them. In addition, it is a well known fact that the central cities of larger metropolitan areas outside the South are dominated by the Democratic Party and that suburban areas are generally Republican. The merging of central cities and fringe areas into a single metropolitan entity would almost certainly decrease predictability for local party leaders. In most areas it would also benefit the Republican Party.¹³²

Negro voters, in particular, have been suspicious of proposals for metropolitan-wide government. In Cleveland, on ten issues submitted to referendum between 1933 and 1959, the level of support for metropolitan government steadily declined, but it declined much more rapidly among Negro

voters than it did among whites. The percentage of positive vote among Negroes declined from 79 percent in 1933 to 29 percent in 1959, while the vote in predominantly white wards declined from 69 percent to 46 percent.¹³³

Reformers tend to forget that the symbols—efficiency, improved economy and the like—that they respond to with enthusiasm ring no bells for the average citizen. It is the latter, of course, which dominates the decision when a proposal is put to a popular referendum. The ordinary citizen is characteristically apathetic. If water flows from the tap and the toilet flushes today, he is not likely to ask whether it will do so tomorrow.

Yet, votes against metropolitan government are not necessarily votes in favor of the status quo. They may be votes in favor of gradual or incremental change rather than revolutionary change.¹³⁴

Communicating a concept of future needs on a realistic basis is seldom done by groups organized to support metropolitan governmental reorganization. Furthermore, the reformers tend to put their arguments on a theoretical plane, discussing efficiency without translating it into concrete terms as it affects the ordinary citizen. Examples are often not made meaningful. It makes little impression on the suburbanite to be told that his police force is amateurish and inferior if, in practice, his community has little crime and the state police take care of the arterial highway traffic.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations conducted a study of 18 efforts at structural reform in order to identify the issues, and techniques that were relevant to the outcome of the reform effort.¹³⁵ For the most part, the proponents of reform stressed the inadequacy and weakness of the existing local governmental structures, the need for urban services in the outlying areas, and the need to achieve an areawide allocation of the costs of metropolitan services through areawide taxes. On the other hand, the opponents

stressed the tendency to allocate costs more heavily to suburban areas, the "drastic" nature of the proposals, the possibility of lost jobs for local officials and employees, and the dilution of minority group influence in the central city.

The commission found that certain techniques appeared to contribute to the success of the reform movement in the eight out of 18 areas in which it succeeded. These techniques were state legislative support, careful staff preparation for the campaign, and the extensive use of public hearings on the proposed changes. Where the reform efforts failed, a variety of factors appeared to contribute strongly: (1) the failure of the general public to perceive a crisis, (2) the fear of higher taxes, (3) low voter participation, (4) competition with other reform approaches and efforts, and (5) overemphasis on efficiency and "good government" and underemphasis on the political realities and interests of the metropolis. This final point has been emphasized by other scholars as well. In speaking of metropolitan reform efforts, Charles Adrian remarked that "a more serious cause of rejection centered in their almost total lack of concern with the political process."¹³⁶

It is clear that the real trick in metropolitan government reform is to create the kind of political environment in which a strategic combination of reforms can be used in concert to make possible the planning and management of metropolitanization. Unfortunately, the present pluralistic system is a live and going concern with each element serving well some established interest. A constituency for officials who do not yet exist is needed to counter the political and technical monopolies that now determine development policy and subsequently the delivery of urban services. It will be necessary to use the available political processes; ironically, the best hope for government reforms lies with the States, aided by Federal backing.¹³⁷

Conclusion

Metropolitanism has greatly influenced the practice of planning at the local level. The conduct of metropolitan planning today is being shaped more by the metropolitan context than by any other single factor. The planner's heritage, municipal administrative arrangements, and intergovernmental programs all must adapt to the pressing nature of the metropolis. This chapter has attempted to analyze what this context means to the urban planning function. Because of the distribution of population and economic activity within the metropolis, different problems and planning issues occur in different parts of the metropolitan areas. Secondly, metropolitanism has generated certain pressures for areawide planning. However, metropolitan planning has been less than successful. Planning in the metropolis is as fragmented as the structure of governments existing in metropolitan areas. The planner working within a given jurisdiction tends to address himself primarily to the needs of that jurisdiction. As a result, problems have arisen in the decision making process at the areawide as well as the local levels; in the continuing economic and social disparities between the central city and the suburbs; in the efficient and economical delivery of those public goods and services requiring area-wide treatment; and in the development of a genuine sense of metropolitan identity or citizenship.

A growing recognition of the lack of success with metropolitan planning has prompted further actions to change. Separated as it is from public decision making, the planning process has proven ineffectual in terms of the implementation of regional plans. As civic leaders are becoming more aware of the limitations on areawide action stemming from the municipality of local governments and the difficulty of carrying out regional plans, they are grasping for suitable alternative governmental arrangements involving reform or reorganization. One such approach discussed herein was the

council of governments, which was seen as a device for putting metropolitan planning into the local government mainstream. However, COGs and other alternative approaches to government reorganization have been only partially successful as mechanisms for achieving a metropolitan-wide government that could support and promote a metropolitan planning agency. A more detailed analysis and discussion of this conclusion will be presented in the following chapter. Suffice it to say at this point, however, that despite the wealth of evidence in support of the need for alternative government reorganization strategies that would encourage a sound theory of metropolitan planning, most of the reform strategies to date are lacking as regards acceptability to the public who ultimately must vote on their adoption or rejection. Thus, if the functions of areawide planning are to ever be achieved in a manner consistent with the suggested evaluation criteria of economy, equity, accountability and effectiveness, they must have an areawide basis of government that is politically amenable to the clients which they serve.

While this chapter has pinpointed the influence of metropolitanization on the urban planning process, it has at the same time, sharpened the focus of this research to the fact that there is much more to the context of planning in the metropolis than a recognition of the forces of centralization and decentralization and the need for an areawide government that can cope with the social, economic and physical disparities that result from their interactions. Planning is a service function of government and as such must rely on a myriad of political factors that are inherent with the federation form of governmental decision making. As will be analyzed in Chapter IV, political involvement in the planning process encompasses a diverse environment of actors, resources, and stakes which generally interact through a mixed strategy of inputs, processes and outcomes thereby resulting in the generation of conflict. When the effective

delivery of urban services results in differences regarding who should get what, how they should get it and when should they receive it, the issues and stakes involved create tensions in the allocation system which can only be compromised by elected public officials through the political process; not through the decision-theoretic approaches and cost-effectiveness techniques frequently employed by planners. Unfortunately, this chapter has revealed (not for the first time) that the practice of planning is nearly void of the realities of metropolitics.

The remoteness and isolation of the conduct of planning from the political process and the tendency for political officials to make decisions without being informed as to the consequences relative to areawide planning considerations constitute reciprocal failures. When this happens, the actual setting of policies and plan-making takes place through a network of people not identified as planners and of agencies not identified as planning agencies. For example, while the planning agency is busily engaged in regional land use and transportation plans that will encompass all facets of development up to the year 2000, developers, public utilities, land managers, and others are busily rubbing elbows with key political officials who, on a daily basis, will make decisions that actually determine the near-term physical development of the area in ways that may be wholly inconsistent with the directions being mapped by the planners. In short, the implementation of "plans" generally fails because the planner does not give proper nor sufficient consideration to political "realities," because the politician does not give adequate weight to areawide planning considerations that involve a long period of time, or some combination of the two.

The exact relationship that improved integration of political and metropolitan planning functions implies between planners and decision makers is apparently a situation

composed of trade-offs. The more closely the planner is involved in the actual policy decision, the more likely his thinking and work will be sensitive to the political dimensions and constraints of an issue, perhaps at the expense of technical planning considerations. On the other hand, elegance, rationality, and technical rigor may be bought at the expense of relevance or usefulness to the person with responsibility for decision making. In part, this tension is reflected in the continuing professional discussion of the "how to" of planning. Debates concerning planning philosophy continue, for example, between advocates of a rational theory of planning and those who favor the concept of incrementalism.¹³⁸ Further, there still persists a dichotomy as regards schools of thought on the relative importance of planning products as opposed to the planning process.¹³⁹ Current notions concerning planning borrow heavily from modern techniques of decision-theory and systems analysis. To borrow a phrase from a recent work: "It is perhaps a humbler theory than the bold, rational, and logical order conceived of by Walker, but it is also more attuned to political realities by deemphasizing the rational ideal in an effort to achieve implementation."¹⁴⁰

Ideally and practically (as is being emphasized here), the planning process implies the need for an ability to engage those groups whose interests are affected. Simply taking "account" of those interests with broad and often vague lists of goals and objectives in the front of the Comprehensive Plan is insufficient. Due process and equity require that the access of affected constituencies to the decision making process be maintained. To the planner this implies a knowledge and understanding of the formal and informal participants who are likely to become involved in the management and resolution of a planning issue. In the end, the performance and capability of planning will be measured against the stakes associated with the outcome of a particular

issue; the test is one of political relevance and feasibility, not administrative effectiveness and economy.

Notes

1. See, for example, Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City: Past and Present (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1960), pp. 323-328; and, Arthur Gallion and Simon Eisner, The Urban Pattern (2nd ed.; Princeton N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1963), pp. 40-78.
2. Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 15-116; James Q. Wilson, ed., The Metropolitan Enigma (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 144-169, passim; C. A. Doxiadis, "A City for Human Development: Eighteen Hypotheses," EKISTICS, vol. 35, no. 209 (April 1973), pp. 177-187; and John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics and Economic Life (New York, 1965), pp. 34-180, passim.
3. The census definition of urban areas is used here. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Statistics for Federal Regions, States, and Metropolitan Areas," Reprinted from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973, pp. 26-28. Although the major objective of the Bureau of the Census in delineating urbanized areas was to provide a better separation of urban and rural population in the vicinity of the larger cities, individual urbanized areas have proved to be useful statistical areas. They correspond to areas called "conurbations" in some other countries. An urbanized area contains at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more in 1970, as well as the surrounding closely settled incorporated places and unincorporated areas that meet the criteria listed below. An urbanized area may be thought of as divided into the central city or cities, and the remainder of the area, known as the urban fringe. All persons residing in an urbanized area are included in the urban population. In addition to its central city or cities, an urbanized area also contains the following types of contiguous areas, which together constitute its urban fringe:
 - 1) Incorporated places with 2,500 inhabitants or more.
 - 2) Incorporated places with less than 2,500 inhabitants, provided each has a closely settled area of 100 housing units or more.
 - 3) Towns, in the New England states, townships in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and counties elsewhere which are classified as urban.

4) Enumeration districts in unincorporated territory with a population density of 1,000 inhabitants or more per square mile. (The areas of large nonresidential tracts devoted to such urban land uses as railroad yards, factories, and cemeteries were excluded in computing the population density of an enumeration district.)

5) Other enumeration districts in unincorporated territory with lower population density provided they served one of the following purposes:

- a. To eliminate enclaves.
- b. To close indentations in the urbanized areas of 1 mile or less across the open end, and
- c. To link outlying enumeration districts of qualifying density that were no more than $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the main body of the urbanized area.

4. Two terms to be used in this discussion need definitions: "Metropolitan Areas" and "Central City". The Bureau of the Census defines its Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as an area containing at least one city or contiguous cities with a population of 50,000 or greater. Also included in the area is the county surrounding the city(s) and any contiguous counties which are "metropolitan in character". The city(s) with the population of 50,000 or more are the central cities. The definition of an individual SMSA involves two considerations: First, a city or cities of specified population to constitute the central city and to identify the county in which it is located as the central county; and, second, economic and social relationships with contiguous counties which are metropolitan in character, so that the periphery of the specific metropolitan area may be determined. SMSAs may cross state lines.

Population criteria—The criteria for population relate to a city or cities of specified size according to the 1970 Census of Population.

1) Each standard metropolitan statistical area must include at least:

- a. One city with 50,000 inhabitants or more, or
- b. Two cities having contiguous boundaries and constituting, for general economic and social purposes, a single community with a combined population of at least 50,000, the smaller of which must have a population of at least 15,000.

2) If each of two or more adjacent counties has a city of 50,000 inhabitants or more (or twin cities under 1b) and the cities are within 20 miles of each other (city limits to city limits), they are to be included in the same area unless there is definite evidence that the two cities are not economically and socially integrated.

Criteria of metropolitan character—The criteria of metropolitan character relate primarily to the attributes of the contiguous county as a place of work or as a home for a concentration of nonagricultural workers.

3) At least 75 percent of the labor force of the county must be in the nonagricultural labor force.

4) In addition to criterion 3, the county must meet at least one of the following conditions:

a. It must have 50 percent or more of its population living in contiguous minor civil divisions with a density of at least 150 persons per square mile, in an unbroken chain of minor civil divisions with such density radiating from a central city in the area.

b. The number of nonagricultural workers employed in the county must equal at least 10 percent of the number of nonagricultural workers employed in the county containing the largest city in the area, or the county must be the place of employment of 10,000 nonagricultural workers.

c. The nonagricultural labor force living in the county must equal at least 10 percent of the number in the nonagricultural labor force living in the county containing the largest city in the area, or the county must be the place of residence of a nonagricultural labor force of 10,000.

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CHAPTER III

PLANNING AND THE STRUCTURE OF URBAN GOVERNMENT

The previous chapter stressed the influence of metropolitanism on the planning function. However, the metropolitan environment is only one critical aspect of the planning ideology as currently practiced. Two other variables — government and politics — are highly inter-related with metropolitanism when the formulation of planning policy is examined in depth. Therefore, any suggestions or proposals related to metropolitan reform must attempt to identify and explain the potential impact this mixed relationship has on the performance of the planning function in developing relevant policies and programs.

The governmental context of the planning function is a major variable in the formulation of planning policy. The term "variable" is used here in a literal sense; variations in the governmental context of planning are as extensive as the number of planning agencies in existence. Every planning agency has a unique mixture of governmental programs and responsibilities. These have a significant impact on how the planner is able to serve his community. The particular mixture for a given planning agency should affect planning policy formulation in two ways: first, it affects the kinds of planning issues which arise; second, it will partially determine the route which the planner must take to communicate his ideas to the political decision makers. The formal lines of communication between the planner and the decision makers will most probably impact the way in which planning decisions are made.

However, there is more to the governmental context of the planning function than the administrative structure of public planning at the local level. Planners must work within a context of law, policy and financial assistance which comes from the State and Federal governments. These intergovernmental relationships have become so complex that it is no longer desirable for students of government to speak of "levels" of government in the sense that each separate "level" operates independently of the others. Interdependence now characterizes our Federal system of government. At one time students of American government referred to the Federal system as a "layer cake" where each level of government had its own duties and functions. Whatever term is used, it is a fact that the administration and financing of local governmental services are significantly affected by policies of the State and Federal governments. Since the planning agency is a part of the municipal government, the interrelationships between local, State, and Federal governments are a very important aspect of planning's governmental context.

Municipal Governments and Planning Agencies

Numerous formal institutional arrangements define the administrative structure of local planning agencies. These arrangements have largely evolved out of the development of the structure of municipalities. State governments originally established municipalities to provide services needed by people living in urban communities¹. When municipalities were few in number and small in size, the functions which states allowed them to perform were limited. In some instances local public services were initially provided by semi-independent agencies which gradually merged with the municipality. Planning was introduced to municipal government as an agency which was legally

separated from regular municipal government. However, unlike most other municipal functions, a majority of the planning agencies have retained this semi-independent status. Only the field of education has managed to remain more aloof from municipal government than planning. Coincidentally, in both the education and planning fields, there has been a running debate over the question of the desirability of independence from municipal government. In fact, many of the arguments used by planners to justify an independent or semi-independent status are identical to those used by advocates of continued independence for education. Over the years, some of the arguments have become a little more sophisticated but, for the most part, the question of the best organization for the planning function has consisted of a repetition of old arguments. Thus, consideration must be given to these arguments since the location of planning in the structure of local government is an important aspect of planning's governmental context.

A knowledge of the debate is useful in pointing up some of the questions raised by planning agency organization. However, the debate has not been useful in determining whether an independent planning agency will affect the performance of the planning function differently from an agency which is integrated with the municipal government. Instead most of the debate has been based upon the personal experience of planners, rather than on determining the type of impact each arrangement has had on planning practice. Even with little data on the planning organization question it is apparent that the structural arrangements for the planning function are of significance. The formal linkages between the planner and the policy makers may affect both the kinds of issues which come to the planner's attention as well as his ability to communicate with other governmental officials in resolving those issues. Therefore, some knowledge of alternative structural arrangements, the arguments that have

been made for and against these arrangements, and some speculations concerning their impact on the performance of the planning function are important to an understanding of the formulation of planning policy.

Structures of Municipal Governments

American municipal government comprises a number of fundamentally different structural types and within each type a seemingly infinite number of variations. The types and variations refer only to the formal decision making roles and responsibilities. If we were to consider the informal structure of government, the number of different types of municipal governments would be almost as great as the number of existing governments. Since there are many different formal arrangements, only the major structural types will be described in general terms.

Mayor-Council Forms. There are two major structural forms of this classic model of local government. One, and perhaps the oldest form of municipal government is the weak mayor-council type. Under this system the council assumes both executive and administrative roles. As portrayed in Figure III-1, the various city departments, such as police and fire, are run directly by the councilmen through a committee system in which there is a separate council committee for each city department. Department heads are sometimes elected directly by the voters. The mayor under this arrangement is only an advisor to both the council and the department heads. Although he is an elected official, he has few if any formal powers. The weak mayor-council government has been widely criticized for its inability to separate administrative and legislative duties and for failure to properly coordinate intergovernmental activities. Consequently, this once popular form of municipal government is today rare.




Figure III-1. Simplified Governmental Structure of a Weak Mayor-Council City

A more prevalent type of government structure is the second form of a mayor-council government. Commonly referred to as the strong mayor-council form, this type of municipal governmental structure is very common in the large metropolises of the Northeast. Under this system, both the mayor and the members of the city council are elected by the voters. As depicted in Figure III-2, it is the mayor's responsibility to appoint and/or dismiss all executive officers and administrators. The various city departments are under his




Figure III-2. Simplified Governmental Structure of a Strong Mayor-Council City

control. Apart from his administrative duties, the mayor can develop and introduce legislation to the council, and has the power to veto legislation that the council has enacted. The mayor's formal position of central authority and his ability to provide jobs makes him a powerful political figure in city government. Therefore, the role of the city council is strictly legislative; initiating legislation and enacting it. In many cities, much of the council's time is spent deliberating on legislation that has been proposed by the mayor and his executive officers.

The Commission Form. Another type of municipal government, the commission, is found most often in smaller cities. This scheme was developed in Texas in the early 1900's.² Its popularity increased as municipal reformers supported it as a more efficient form of government based upon sound business principles. Like the weak mayor-council, the commission government combines the legislative and executive duties as indicated in Figure III-3. A number of directly elected commissioners acting as both executive department heads and councilmen provide governmental leadership. One of the

commissioners generally is elected as mayor, department head, and president of the council. The other commissioners are elected at-large and their departmental role such as fire, police, etc., is decided by the commissioners after the election. Each commissioner is responsible for the appointment or dismissal of those executive officers and administrators within his department. The commissioners propose, enact, and execute all legislation and policy. In terms of formal power, the mayor has no more control over the municipal government than any other commissioner. The mayor's only duties beyond those of the other commissioners involve the coordination of policy. However, informal practices sometimes gives the mayor additional powers which may allow him to function as a strong executive. The other commissioners then become his staff. Since the commissioners control both the legislative and executive activities, power tends to be more centralized under the commission government than under any other type.




Figure III-3. The Commission Government Structure

It has been stated that commission cities suffer from a lack of administrative integration.³ Separately elected department heads and the lack of a real central authority provide no focus for coordination. Vote trading and departmental autonomy characterize this style of government. The commission form lost much of its appeal to reformers, most of whom have switched their allegiance to the council-manager form. Only forty cities with populations over 50,000 plus a few smaller cities, mostly in the South, now use this form of municipal government.⁴

Council-Manager Form. The newest major type of municipal organization is the council-manager governmental structure. The development of this form of government was begun by a group of municipal reformers in 1911. The greatest growth in the adoption of the council-manager plan came during a fifteen year period after World War II when approximately seventy-five municipalities a year adopted the concept.⁵ In recent years, this boom has cooled off considerably. The major assumption made by advocates of council-manager government is that cities should be run like industries. However, the objective of city government is not to make profits, but rather to serve the public. The developers of the council-manager plan thought this objective could best be accomplished by centralizing the authority for the formulation of policy in the hands of a small council. All administrative responsibility would be assumed by a professional administrator chosen by the elected council members. Thus, as shown in Figure III-4, the typical council-manager government consists of an elected council which handles all legislative matters and has ultimate control over the executive function. A professional city manager is appointed by the council and serves at the council's "pleasure". His duties are to take charge of all administrative matters.

As the theory of the council-manager plan was originally designed, the manager was expected to administer but remain aloof from policy-making. However, it has become evident in recent years, that the manager is inevitably involved in controversial issues. Further, the manager's role in policy-making is heightened when the council depends upon his professional judgement. Typically, council members are part-time officials not professionally trained in proposing and enacting policy decisions. Although most managers do become involved in politically charged issues, they have different styles in the way in which they handle their efforts. Some shape the basic policies of their governments and then enlist the aid of interest groups, private citizens and councilmen in their efforts. Others work through official channels. In some instances, the manager has taken an aggressive role by forming key political alliances to prevent his dismissal and then acted more like a strong mayor. Whatever the style, defining the success of a manager lies largely with their




Figure III-4. The Council-Manager Government Structure

ability to remain in office as opposed to their capabilities for guiding innovations through local politics.

The Significance of Governmental Structures

Political scientists and planners have argued the merits of the various forms of municipal government for years. Their discussions range from allegations about the democratic future of government dominated by political accountability to the businesslike efficiency that should be expected from governments dominated by professional management. As noted previously, most individual municipalities have a general mix of these two extremal elements in their governmental structures. This obviously makes comparison of these structures difficult at best. One form of assessment used by Lineberry and Fowler was to compare local governments by showing traits that have been reformed in the name of professional management with those that had not.⁶ According to their assessment, unreformed cities have mayor-council governments, ward selection of councilmen and partisan balloting for mayor and council. Reformed cities have either the manager-council or commission form of government, at-large selection of councilmen and nonpartisan balloting. Table III-1 shows the relative proportions of each of these institutional forms for reformed and unreformed cities with populations over 50,000.

Table III-1. The Incidence of Government Forms in 200 Cities With Over 50,000 Population

Institutional Form	Reformed		Unreformed	
Form of government	Manager	45%	Mayor-Council	43%
	Commission	12		
Type of election	Nonpartisan	67	Partisan	33
Type of constituency	At-large	63	Ward or mixed*	37

*Includes combinations of ward and at-large elections.

Table III-2 indicates the extent to which the three major forms of municipal government are used by cities in various population categories. The mayor-council form is still the most widely used. However, if one analyzes the data over a period of time, it becomes apparent that the council-manager form is enjoying more adoptions every year and commands a greater percentage of the total each year. For example, in 1967, 51.8 percent of those cities with populations over 5,000 had a mayor-council form of government as compared to a 40.3 percent figure for the council-manager form. When compared with the data in Table III-2, one can see that the mayor-council form has dropped 4.7 percent in terms of total representation (9.1 percent relative negative change), while the council-manager form has increased 2.5 percent in relation to the total (6.2 percent relative positive change). Much of this increase can be traced to the decline of the commission form which is clearly the least popular of the three. As the history of the reform movement indicates, a certain logic can be found in a move from the commission to the council-manager form where the commission form has proven to be unsatisfactory to the city.

Table III-2 reveals one other item of interest. The popularity of the mayor-council and council-manager forms appears to be closely related to the cities concerned. Mayor-council government is most often used in the very large (over 500,000) population group and in the very small (5,000 to 10,000) group. On the other hand, council-manager government is popular in the middle-range cities (10,000 to 500,000) and enjoys a majority in the 25,000 to 250,000 range. There are two separate explanations for the predominance of mayor-council governments in small and large cities. In small cities, there is seldom enough revenue or work to justify the employment of a professional manager. Both the mayor and the council in towns under 10,000 are typically part-time officials. In the largest cities there is too much social

Table III-2. Form of Government in Cities over 5000 Population

Population Group (thousands)	Total Number of Cities in Table	Mayor- Council		Com- mission		Council- Manager	
		Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Over 1,000	6	6	100.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
500 to 1,000	20	15	75.0	0	0.0	5	25.0
250 to 500	30	13	43.3	3	10.0	14	46.7
100 to 250	98	38	38.8	9	9.2	51	52.0
50 to 100	255	94	36.9	13	5.1	143	56.1
25 to 50	520	170	32.7	39	7.5	293	56.3
10 to 25	1357	586	43.2	57	4.2	613	45.2
5 to 10	<u>1548</u>	<u>883</u>	<u>57.0</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>2.9</u>	<u>522</u>	<u>33.7</u>
All cities over 5	3834	1805	47.1	166	4.3	1641	42.8

Source: International City Management Association, Municipal Yearbook, 1974 (Chicago, 1974). Computed from data in Table 3, Introductory section.

and economic heterogeneity to escape severe political tensions. Strong factions are highly unlikely to accept a professional manager who would take the key offices out of their reach.

There is also a regional bias in the selection of municipal government structures. Mayor-council cities dominate in the Northeast; council-manager cities are found most often in the South and West; and, the Middle West shows a mixture of the two forms.⁷ These differences appear to reflect the ages and social compositions of cities in each region. Northeastern cities are most likely to be old and

have a European ethnic. The mayor-council structure has the legitimacy of tradition, and competition among distinct European ethnic communities (now joined by politically sophisticated black enclaves) tends to ensure that politics remains in local government. By way of contrast, Southern and Western cities have reached substantial size only in the last two generations. They faced an obvious need for re-examining their government structures because of population increases that occurred when the reformers were working hardest for council-manager (or commission) forms. Moreover, in the South the ethnic tradition favors professional management due to the whites using the professional manager as a device by which to isolate local government from the potential black vote.

Several scholars have examined the influence of formal structures of government on the nature of politics and the formulation of public policies.⁸ To some extent, the various measures of the impact of governmental structures on the types of policies that become enacted infer that structure has something to do with these scores. However, it is also possible that such findings reflect more the influence of the peculiar social or economic environment than the happenstance of a coexistence of structural features with particular policies. Local political life may affect the choice of government structures, or features of the social or economic environment may be powerful enough to affect a certain kind of policy, as well as to affect the development of government structure. Until such time when the ambiguities of these analyses are resolved, no factual evidence can be cited that shows a causal relationship between the type of governmental structure and the nature of the formulation of public policy.

Planning Agency Organizations

All local planning agencies are attached in one way or another to one of the major types of municipal governments. Thus, even two planning agencies with similar internal organization may operate quite differently due to differences in the structure of their respective municipal governments. Planning agency organizations vary considerably beyond their relationship to the structure of municipal government. Three major types of planning agency organizations will be discussed here: the semi-independent planning commission, the executive staff agency, and the legislative staff agency.

Planning made its debut as a semi-independent function and in most communities the semi-independent planning agency still persists, set apart from the rest of the municipal agencies. A planning commission composed of "respected" citizens in the community is appointed by the members of the council, or by one of the department heads; by the mayor with the consent of the council; or the commissioners may be elected. The important point is that in almost all cases a commissioner is very difficult to remove from office once he is appointed. Generally, formal charges are required for dismissal. Further, commission members are usually appointed for overlapping terms. The theory behind these appointment procedures is to insulate the commission members from the influence of the politicians. In the early days of planning commissions, the commissioners themselves did the planning. However, in most cities of any size today, the planning commission has at a minimum one full-time planning director who is a trained professional. In more and more cities, the planning director has been given a staff of professionals. Under the purest form of the semi-independent planning agency, the commissioners hire the planning director and his staff. Under those circumstances, the professional planner's client is the planning commission. The professionals make their recommendations to the commissioners who in turn decide what

recommendations will be made to the council and/or to the chief executive. Therefore, under the semi-independent planning agency, the route from the professional planner's recommendation to plan effectuation involves three steps. First, based on their research and know-how, the professionals make recommendations to the commission. Then the commissioners make recommendations to the executive and legislative bodies, based on the planners' recommendations and their own citizen's point of view. Finally, the council decides whether to pass legislation or the executive decides what to do about the recommendations of the planning commission. Political and administrative considerations come into the decision at this point. In some instances, the professional-client relationship is more complex since professional planners serve both the planning commission and the executive or council at the pleasure of the elected officials.

One reason the semi-independent planning agency and its commission is still predominate is that this type of organization is imbedded in many state statutes. In order for municipalities to engage in planning, they must have permission from the state government in the form of enabling legislation. In 1928, the United States Department of Commerce published a Standard City Planning Enabling Act which, with a few modifications, is still the model used by states for their planning enabling statutes.⁹ Other model acts were the basis for a number of additional state statutes.¹⁰ These early models of state planning legislation greatly influenced the organization of the planning function. The model acts favored the semi-independent lay planning commission to administer the planning function.

A few states have made their legislation more flexible. Others have granted "home rule" charters to their own liking. In some municipalities, the planning function has become a regular executive agency. With this arrangement, the planner is hired directly by the mayor or city manager and

is responsible to him. The planning commission usually continues to perform in an advisory role. The planner and his staff become either a special agency in the office of the mayor or manager or a regular administrative department. Thus, when the planning function is established as an executive agency, the planners' client is the mayor or city manager. Recommendations made by the planner go directly to the chief executive who in turn may make legislative proposals to the council or act directly on his planners' advice.

Alternatively planning can be a legislative staff agency where the planners' primary client is the city council. A pure form of this type of organization would eliminate the citizens planning commission. The professional planning staff would serve the council directly. However, as in the case of the executive staff agency, the citizens planning commission can continue to play an important role.¹¹ The planners in such an agency still advise the commission but are hired by and are more closely aligned with the city council.

It should be stressed that the planning agency organizations described above are only general types. Wide variations of agency organization within each of these types exist. Further, when we consider the different varieties of municipal governmental structures, it becomes clear that there is a broad range of possible planning agency organizational schemes. The debate over which scheme is best focuses on who the professional planners' client should be — the citizens planning commission, the executive, or the city council?

The participants in this debate usually make the assumption that there is an "ideal" type of planning organization which all agencies should conform to. A close examination at the available evidence casts some doubt on this assumption. Therefore, it is likely that none of the

debators will ever be declared the winner. Each debator has based his conclusions on very different perspectives regarding what planning is and what planners ought to be doing. Furthermore, quite different assumptions have been made about the nature of municipal government and communities.¹² These differing perspectives and assumptions are clearly not applicable to all planning agencies. For this reason the arguments used in the debate lack general applicability. The kinds of perspectives and assumptions are outlined as follows:¹³

1. The planners' objectives — provision of technical information versus the implementation of plans;
2. The scope of planning subject matter — technical physical considerations versus broader policy formulation;
3. The relative complexity of the issues with which the planner must deal and the extent to which these issues are interrelated with other municipal government activities;
4. The formal organization of municipal government itself.

The proponents of the semi-independent planning agency have several arguments they use in favoring that form of planning organization. Their first argument is that the commission composed of respected citizens in the community will help gain acceptance for the planning function and lend prestige to the proposals of the professionals. The endorsement of the planning commission is also supposed to help gain favorable action from elected officials. Today, planning still lacks acceptance in some municipalities, but in others the "endorsement" function of the planning commission is losing its value as planning becomes more and more accepted.

A second major argument in favor of the semi-independent planning commission is that planning should be free of "politics." The early proponents of this position were expressing a general distrust for municipal government which grew out of planning's reformist heritage. In addition, an

assumption was made about the scope of planning. These advocates assumed a very narrow scope for the planning function. Many planners today recognize that even such technical problems can involve differences of opinion which create a need for political settlement. Thus, if one stressed the need for planning implementation and takes a broader view of the scope of planning, the "no politics" argument makes no sense at all.

A closely related argument suggests that while planning cannot be separated from politics, there are differences between the kind of decision making that goes on in planning and that which is conducted in other kinds of municipal policy. Howard, for example, makes a distinction between activities which are amenable to "political" action and those which call for "civic" action.¹⁴ Planning, he argues, is in the latter category. The objective of planning, according to Howard's view, is to guide private developmental decisions which cannot be regulated by the government. Such guidance is best achieved by "citizen leaders" rather than by persons who are seeking re-election. Howard's argument tends to limit the scope of planning to providing technical and physical advice. To him there is little interrelationship between planning and other municipal activities. Finally, Howard's argument implies a lack of confidence in the ability of elected officials to do what the "citizen leader" can do. Howard's central thesis is that the acceptance or rejection of planning proposals by government does not depend on the organization of planning but on the attitude of the politicians.

Banfield and Tugwell have also argued for the planning commission on the grounds that planning is a different kind of function.¹⁵ Unlike Howard, however, they argue that the scope of planning should be very broad. Politicians, they argue, are concerned only with matters of immediate practical interest and thus the planner's role should be to expand the

scope of realistic alternatives for the politician. In sum, the semi-independent planning commission is justified on the grounds that planning is a function which is different from all others and cannot be handled by elected officials. This view may be applicable under the conditions which Tugwell and Banfield specify. Chief among these conditions is the assumption that the planning function should only be engaged in "developmental planning." Another assumption is that politicians will not adopt policies based on futuristic thinking unless they are accepted by a group of "respectable" citizens. These conditions may be present under some circumstances but not under others.

Those who feel that the planning function ought to be administered as an executive staff agency use two kinds of arguments. One consists of attacks on the planning commission and the other of positive statements regarding the logic of planning as an executive staff function. Robert Walker was an early opponent of the semi-independent planning commission.¹⁶ He attributed, from his own observations, that planning was a failure and that this failure of the planning function was mainly due to the performance of the citizens planning commission. He wrote that planning should be as broad as the scope of municipal government, but that planning commissions were concerned almost entirely with zoning administration and similar narrow concerns. Further, he attacked the planning commissions with the assertion that citizens who serve on them are unable to grasp the complexities of planning. Clearly, the competence of a commission to handle the issues which come before it depends on the backgrounds of members and the kinds of things the planning agency is doing. These conditions will vary and so will the relative competence of planning commissions.

A further argument leveled against the semi-independent planning commission is that the endorsement role of the commission is no longer needed. Craig, for example, claims

that planning is now accepted as a municipal function so that the original requirement of a board of distinguished citizens to endorse planning is no longer needed.¹⁷ Walker argues that commission members have little influence over politicians.¹⁸ The validity of both of these arguments is based on the erroneous assumption that communities react to planning and planning commissions in a uniform manner. It seems likely that the critics of the planning commission are correct in some communities but not in others.

Positive arguments have been made by a host of planners and planning theorists in favor of the planning agency as a part of the municipal executive's staff. Practically without exception, proponents of planning as an executive staff agency view planning in very broad terms. They also see plan implementation as an important objective. Given the assumption that planning involves policy formulation as broad as the scope of municipal government, the planning function should be thoroughly integrated with that government. Furthermore, the implementation of plans and planning policy should involve the closest possible working relationship between planners and municipal decision makers. Fagin, for example, has advocated the creation of a planning office which would be in charge of developing the physical master plan, budgeting, and coordinating all municipal governmental activities. He further stipulates that this office would have to be in the executive branch of municipal government.¹⁹ If the planner is concerned with the implementation of his plans and if his planning commission is lacking in influence, then closer ties with the municipal government would be desirable. However, if the planning function has a more limited scope, and if the members of the planning commission are politically powerful, arguments for an executive staff agency become less persuasive.

Those who argue that the planning agency should be on the staff of the municipal legislature have also made a number of special assumptions. Kent, as an example, bases his position on his experience in Berkeley, California.²⁰ Fundamental to this position is the acceptance of Kent's concept of the "general plan." This dictates that developmental decisions should be based upon a broad set of policy statements concerning the future physical development of the city. Thus, the general plan is meant to be a policy guide to decision makers. It contains no specific proposals but provides only "inspirational" assistance. The city council, in the case of Berkeley, is the policy making body while the city manager serves as an advisor to the council and as executor of its policies. The planner reports directly to the council and is subject to a knowledgeable citizens' planning commission. Thus Kent, who was quite satisfied with the way things were going in his community, concluded that their organization for the planning function is best. However, his conclusion is based on a specific perspective of the nature of planning and the assumption that the city council is the prime initiator of policy in all cities.

It should now be clear as to why there may never be an answer to the question of which planning agency organization is best. The debate over this issue has been based on such a variety of different assumptions that one could conceive of instances where all the debators might be correct. A more useful approach to the question of planning agency organization would perhaps be to analyze the experience of a large number of different kinds of planning agencies. However, comparative studies of this sort are lacking. The Walker study of 35 planning agencies was one of the few efforts to go beyond an individual's experience with a few agencies.

One recent attempt to do a comparative study of the effect of planning institutions on the planning function was a survey conducted by Rabinovitz and Pottinger.²¹ A questionnaire was distributed to planning directors and 201 responses were received. Seventy-seven of the respondents were directors of agencies responsible to the chief executive, 76 were responsible to an independent commission, and 48 headed agencies which had combinations of both types. On the basis of the opinions expressed by the planning directors, the authors could not find important differences among different types of agencies relative to the kind of planning being done, or the political involvement of the planner and the likelihood of plan implementation. There was some evidence that the members of the planning commissions had little prestige. Neither did they have the time nor the inclination to put forth the effort planning directors felt was needed. The authors concluded that many people have overestimated the ability of the planning agency organization to enhance the effectiveness of the planning function. They also suggested that the question of the most appropriate planning agency organization has been greatly oversimplified. It has failed to take into account the wide variety of municipal characteristics which could influence planning outcomes.

Another research attempt conducted by Wright, addressed itself to the relationship between structural features of government and the conduct of public programs.²² His findings were markedly different than those results found by Rabinovitz and Pottinger. Wright's findings clearly showed the predominance of the executive staff status of the planning function. Regardless of the respondent or the operational measure, roughly 60 to 68 percent of the reporting units had the local executive as the dominant factor in the operations of planning within city government. This compared to only 38 percent from the survey by Rabinovitz and Pottinger.

Thus, Wrights' findings tend to confirm the extent to which municipal governments have taken seriously Robert Walker's advocacy of planning as an executive staff process.

There are two reasons, however, for the discrepancy between these two surveys. First, the samples were substantially different. The Rabinovitz-Pottinger survey circulated 309 names from the membership roster of the American Institute of Planners whereas the Wright survey sampled chief executives and the heads of planning agencies in 431 cities (response rate was 42 percent). Thus, Wright's survey allowed for responses from the heads of planning agencies who were not "planners" insofar as AIP membership was concerned. The first difference, then, was between a sample of planners and a sample of cities. The second factor contributing to the differences disclosed by the two surveys had to do with the question format. The Rabinovitz-Pottinger study offered the respondents only two planning structure options: 1. Responsible to the chief executive; or 2. Independent of the executive, responsible to the city legislature through lay/professional commissioners. The Wright study offered three alternatives to the organizational position of planning: 1. Independent activity of the planning commission; 2. Staff-aid to the chief executive; and 3. Policy advisor to the city council. Some difficulty in choosing between the two alternatives of the first survey was evidenced by the fact that 24 percent of the respondents circled both alternatives. Further, the Wright findings were sufficiently close to the survey proportions (60-69 percent) published in the Municipal Year Book, 1967 and thus tend to validate Wright's results.

In summary, Wright concluded the following after studying the impact of planning structure on various dimensions of planning:²³

1. The consequences of planning structure are neither uniform nor do they extend across all the dimensions of planning.

2. Planning structure is related to and presumably conditions the people chosen (or choosing) to enter and remain as actors in the planning process. On a highly selective basis, structure affects the preferences and the perceptions of key actors. With one prominent exception, planner-executive contacts, the activities and behavioral performance of municipal planning are unrelated to the type of planning organization.

3. Most importantly, however, it was observed that the single structural feature of planning organization shows greater explanatory power when considered in conjunction with a second structural variable, the form of municipal government. Of special note was the combined effects of the council-manager form of government and the executive staff form of planning organization.

It is important to note that in spite of the fact that no single type of planning agency organization is best under all circumstances, the trend in planning organization is to make the planning agency responsible to the executive. This trend is identified in Table III-3. This does not mean that planning commissions are being abolished, as for the most part they are not. Rather, it does mean that in an increasing proportion of cities the commission is losing its position as the primary client of the professional planner.

There is no way of resolving the debate over which kind of planning organization is best. The answer to this question depends on a large number of assumptions and conditions which vary tremendously. The scarcity of comparative studies of different types of planning agencies makes it difficult to predict what the effect of a given kind of institutional arrangement will be on the planning function under a specified set of conditions. Perhaps the most glaring error made by the participants in the planning organization debate was their assumption that a given set of perspectives on planning and local conditions could be generalized to apply to all

Table III-3. Appointment of Full Time Planning Directors:
1948-1972, Cities over 10,000 Population²⁴

	1948	1959	1963	1972
Percent Appointed by Planning Commission	50.3%	26.2%	16.4%	13.0%
Percent Appointed by Executive (Mayor or Manager)	36.7	54.3	62.0	68.0
Percent Appointed by City Council	8.0	14.3	10.1	10.0
Percent Appointed by Other Authority	2.0	4.6	6.3	5.0
Percent Not Reporting	<u>3.0</u>	<u>0.6</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>4.0</u>
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	(163)	(302)	(427)	(658)

planning agencies. The scant evidence available indicates that such a generalization is neither possible nor desirable. However, it cannot be concluded from this analysis that the organization of the planning agency is an unimportant aspect of planning's governmental context. The formal lines of communication between the planner and the decision makers have an impact on the way in which planning decisions are made. This is true even though that impact is not the same for all planning agencies. Because of a lack of sufficient research, we cannot say exactly how these formal institutional arrangements affect planning policy under different conditions. Neither can we say how important the governmental context of planning is relative to the generation and management of conflict. However, it is necessary that the student and practitioner of planning be aware of the issues that have been raised concerning the impact of planning institutions on planning policy formulation.

The Intergovernmental Context of Planning

Metropolitan planning operations have developed and exist today in a variety of multigovernmental situations and environments. Although no one factor is solely responsible for their degrees of effectiveness, the most important single one is the relationship of the planning agency to the political decision makers. As was previously discussed, the opportunity for increasing the performance of effective metropolitan planning is greatly enlarged as this relationship is enhanced. Therefore, any discussion of organization for metropolitan planning should indicate in a direct manner the ways in which planners might move to advance the art and science of planning through more efficient governmental structure and more effective relationships with all levels of government and the private elements which they serve. This high degree of cooperation is necessary if planners are to develop responsive and useful plans that politicians will seriously consider for implementation, given the political dimensions that surround the formulation and enactment of planning policies.

This section will focus on present intergovernmental relationships that have a significant impact on metropolitan planning policies and procedures. Of central importance is an examination of the issues and causes of present functional assignment procedures for planning services in a metropolitan area. Having previously analyzed the influence of the socio-economic characteristics of metropolitanization on the types of issues and actors that are involved in the provision of planning services, we can now examine the complexity and seriousness of the present haphazard distribution of planning responsibilities within the milieu of the political and governmental context of metropolitan planning. In support of this objective, our discussion begins with a re-creation of the arguments citing the causes of complexity and confusion that exist in present intergovernmental

relationships. Vertical and horizontal relations of the federal system of government associated with an increasing scope of planning will be posited. An evaluation of the intergovernmental fiscal factors which contribute to the structural and procedural incongruities of current functional planning responsibilities will be attempted. From this evaluation, hypotheses will be formulated for the purpose of establishing a normative approach to the proper assignment of areawide and local planning services. As already indicated, the basis of such an approach lies in the integration of an improved metropolitan planning process to a reformed system of areawide government.

The Cause and Effect of Complexity

Every level of government in our federal system has either an exclusive or shared responsibility for providing a wide variety of planning services to the public. However, the actual assignment of these functional tasks among the different levels and types of government is a persistent source of tension and complexity. For example, municipal governments are often the primary providers of land-use control measures although comprehensive land-use planning occurs at the metropolitan or regional level and States generally assume direct control of critical environmental areas or promote land-use regulations that affect local actions.²⁵

The fact that the pattern of allocating planning services varies so widely tends to reflect on the reliance by State-local factions for a vast array of service providers. In New England, counties are of minimal significance as regards major providers of services, while in California, Maryland, New York and Virginia they have extensive service responsibilities. Townships are major providers of services in eleven Northeast and Midwest States, are limited-purpose governments in another ten States, and do not exist in another

29. Special districts are unused in Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, Rhode Island, and Vermont, but have considerable duties in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, and Washington. Sub-state districting has gained increasing prominence in States like Texas, Georgia and Virginia, but is not used in Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Rhode Island, and Wyoming.²⁶

No professionals should be more concerned with the structural and functional impact of institutional reform proposals on metropolitan affairs than the urban planner who, like it or not, has a daily involvement in the political and administrative arrangements that bind city to county, county to region, region to State, and all to the Federal government. No longer is there always a clear domain for the national government, a sector for the States, and a place for the municipality; for the web of government has become a tangled one.

The urban planner often finds himself working on new levels of involvement and activity. At one end of the planning continuum, he may be involved with a large regional or State planning agency or be a private consultant working across the expanse of Appalachia; at the other end, he may find himself conferring with the indigenous leaders of community action agencies that are involved in an endeavor to cope with his city's poverty problems. Thus, instead of a single frame of reference, there is today an entire pyramid of planning jurisdictions, dominated by the influence of the Federal government.

Similarly, an urban planner may feel the frustration that stems from working within a complex of governmental agencies where masses of paperwork often become a convenient substitute for first-hand observation and communication.²⁷ The local and regional offices of State and Federal agencies symbolize this phenomenon with long delays and indecision being the products of their efforts. Increased reliance upon elected officials in Washington and the State houses to

expedite a particular program or funding request is another manifestation of this condition. Further, this local dependence on federal monies is not likely to change within the next decade, possibly not within the next two or three generations.²⁸

With all three levels of government responding to metropolitan needs, sometimes in different fashions, problems in coordinating and controlling the various organizations, operations, and responsibilities occur. Generally, these problems result in fragmentation and overlapping of authority, policy inconsistencies and administrative complexities. As related to the function of planning, however, there are several factors that contribute to the reality of these problems. These factors are: political, economic, fiscal, governmental and physical.²⁹ A brief discussion of these factors is warranted before we examine some of the inter-governmental aspects that make up a large part of the milieu of planning.

Political Problems. The absence of any real degree of regional or even areawide consensus as regards the resolution of planning issues, is a fundamental obstacle faced constantly by the planner in coping with intergovernmental problems.³⁰ Part of this arises from the fact that planning decisions are political decisions and are, by nature, not susceptible to unanimous views. Another part is attributable to the relative weakness of elected political leadership.³¹ In matters concerning regional problems, this is particularly likely to be the case. Parochialism and insularity dominate both sides of the central city's boundary line. Their mark is seen in many unhappy discussions involving transportation schemes, industrial location planning, and school consolidation. Effective political leadership is a crucial aspect of urban government that is directly affected by increased activity.³² At the same time that requirements for leadership swell, its exercise is rendered more difficult. Top

officials have limited time, energy, and mental ability by virtue of being human. The extent to which they are burdened with routine duties is inversely related to their ability to refract bureaucratic activity in new directions, to formulate new policies, and to serve as focal points for hammering out agreements.

In the absence of people and machinery to achieve consensus, and amid problems that cry out for attention, there has been a major recourse to legalistic solutions that involve passing the problem upward³³. One result is seen in the increasing prerequisites to local and regional receipt of Federal and State aids. As previously discussed, there is every reason to expect that this form of "carrot-and-stick" implementation will intensify in the years immediately ahead.

Economic Problems. It is a simple fact that governmental units are geographically fixed, unlike business firms and residents who are free to move about as their situations may require. The result has been to make American cities and metropolitan areas extremely competitive creatures that increasingly rely upon careful public relations programs, tax gimmicks, and other techniques to lure and win to them vital talent, industry and tax revenues³⁴. An effect of this competition has been to stimulate unwise planning decisions that have resulted in a duplication of facilities and misallocation of land areas and other resources. It has caused the planner, in general, to suboptimize his efforts within the confines of his own jurisdiction and to avoid the facts of economic, social, and cultural life that bind cities of a region together.

The intercommunity spillover of benefits from sound planning, and social costs resulting from lack of it, are widely recognized by layman and specialist alike. In fact, the economic foundation of an entire metropolitan area depends upon the way in which land is zoned and used in each

of its component communities³⁵. For example, insufficient land for industry and commerce will discourage development of these enterprises, while over-zoning for commercial or industrial land may cause an unhealthy rivalry among individual communities, which results in poor allocation of economic resources among them. Since local government relies so heavily upon the property tax, a chief obstacle to sound areawide planning is the competition among municipalities for land use developments which are productive of large tax revenues.

Fiscal Factors. In many urban areas, the inability to meet even the ongoing and accustomed services is already evident, to say nothing of accomodating increasing expectations that give rise to new and greater demands for public service³⁶. The record indicates that both States and cities have been stretching their available revenue sources to the breaking point in recent years; their actual rate of increase has been greater than that of the Federal government; for all its multitude of programs³⁷. While the Federal government controls both the credit and tax base of the nation, it has not sharply increased its allocation of resources to domestic, primarily urban problems in terms of dollars³⁸.

The results of this imbalance are recognized as having a strong outward pull on citizens and taxpaying businesses who can select the relative convenience and the temporarily reduced costs of suburban living. In their wake comes a dependency and blight that requires still greater resources for stabilizttion or cure. This process was described and discussed in Chapter II. On the political level, the result has been an increase in federal influence on programs, procedures, and available funds³⁹. While there is consensus that the urban tax problem must be resolved, the answer, for the present, is not at hand.

The fiscal problems of local and state governments go beyond the pressing needs of financing public services, although the demand for public services and their costs do generate the problems. This is the conclusion of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) after a decade of research on fiscal imbalance in our federated system of government⁴⁰. Their findings will be more closely examined later in conjunction with government reform measures. What's important at this point in the discussion is perceiving that fiscal inequities can be a consequence of deeper difficulties. As noted by ACIR, the search for purely fiscal solutions may exacerbate urban problems⁴¹. Any set of financial proposals will have serious implications for the spatial distribution of programs, the capacity of government to provide the desired quantity and quality of public services, and the distribution of benefits and burdens among socio-economic groups. Therefore, policies for local finance, as well as for local government structure must be based upon a broad set of social and political goals.

Archaic Governmental Structure. A solution to many problems of urban growth is further inhibited by the archaic structure and ineffective performance of the vast majority of substate governments⁴². Adjustment of the scale and interactions of government units to reflect the vast expanse of the metropolis has been the most commonly studied type of governmental change; i.e., there is a growing tendency to recognize the metropolis as a distinct entity.

Changes of this type have taken several forms, which will be subsequently described herein. For the most part, they consist of intensified interaction among government units, establishment of special districts, creation of full-fledged metropolitan governments, and organization of assignment mechanisms for coordinated state government acti-

vity in the metropolis⁴³. The various arguments for and against metropolitan organization, and the theory or rationale used by the various reformers, echo common themes. In essence, this theme states that the fundamental contradiction which strains traditional administrative structures is that economic, social and physical events in all metropolitan areas are highly interdependent whereas the many governmental units attempting to influence such events have tended to act in isolation from one another. In order to obtain certain desired results, therefore, governments are increasingly seeking to integrate their activities on a metropolitan scale. Thus metropolitan reorganization is a major aspect of the general problem of the assignment of planning activities commensurate with functional and geographical specialization.

Highlighting this trend in government reform as it relates to the planning function in metropolitan areas is a recent statement by ACIR which pinpointed the major issues involved with the comprehensive study and efforts to restructure substate governments⁴⁴:

Recent Federal and State substate districting actions in comprehensive and functional planning, grant administration, and program coordination, coupled with rising new fears among local officials of the prospects of uncontrollable special and public authorities and continuing hostility toward areawide government, have combined to set the scene for a new debate over regional governance. The focal point of the debate has shifted away from a unitary system and toward two-tier and three-tier approaches involving regional councils as well as general-purpose local governments. The principal antagonists have also shifted way from academicians and "blue ribbon" reformers versus the local government "power structure" and toward the politically responsible generalists versus middle management program specialists at the Federal, State, multi-county, and local levels. The key issues under debate are not only the traditional concerns with economy, and efficiency, although these are important; the basic question to be resolved now is the proper relationship between generalists and specialists to

ensure effective regional planning, programming, and governance.

Physical Problems. There is, finally, the constant need to insert new land uses at higher standards into the built-up fabric of existing cities and regions. Not only must more people be housed, but new uses must be accommodated, such as airports, sewers, expressways and schools. Each of these new requirements, when developed by the planner, tests the ability of existing mechanisms to achieve sensible solutions.

The task of guiding urban development in metropolitan areas has, however, grown beyond the ability of municipal planning agencies as physical, social and economic factors affecting development have extended beyond the municipality's boundaries, and as special districts have been created to provide urban services among a number of municipalities.⁴⁵ As a consequence there has been an increasing realization of the need to conduct comprehensive planning on an areawide basis. Thus, urban planning in metropolitan areas increasingly is a function which is performed at two levels: the local or municipal level, and the areawide or metropolitan level⁴⁶. When one considers the presumed growth of metropolitan areas across the country, it is easy to see why future (and present) physical problems provide still another measure of the planner's stake in intergovernmental relations⁴⁷.

Intergovernmental Relations and Planning

There are two distinct dimensions of intergovernmental relationships in our federated system of government: a division of responsibility sharing among national, State and local levels of government; and assignment of urban functions within a level of local government from among different kinds of governments—counties, municipalities, townships, special districts, and school districts.

With respect to levels of government, the Federal government is the main provider of natural resource development and air and water transport services. State governments are the major providers of higher education, highways and correctional services. Local governments remain as dominant providers of police, fire, sewerage, parks and recreation, land-use planning and its control, refuse collection and library services.⁴⁸

However, these data do not adequately reflect the true assignment of urban functions because they do not take into account the influence of intergovernmental aid on these functions. When this factor is considered, as in the case of the planning function, the Federal government replaces the States as the major financier of comprehensive planning and supplants local governments as the chief source of funds for housing and urban renewal⁴⁹. Intergovernmental aid programs also play a major part in determining patterns of functional assignment within States. Thus, 19 States channel all their welfare aid solely to county governments as do seven States in the hospital function, 12 States in the health function, and five States in the highways function. State welfare aid is disbursed solely to townships in Vermont; hospital aid goes solely to special districts in Georgia, and exclusively to municipalities in Nebraska and West Virginia⁵⁰.

An examination of the issues affecting the functional assignment of planning to responsible units of State, area-wide, and local governments aims at the heart of American federalism. Whether planning should be performed locally, regionally, or at a State or national level is central to the objectives of this research. But, before analyzing recent findings as regards the need and feasibility for improved assignment policies, it may be instructional to briefly outline the traditional pattern of intergovernmental relations as it pertains to planning⁵¹. Recent intergovern-

mental relationships may be classified into two general categories for the purposes of this exposition. Vertical relationships refer to ties that link a jurisdiction to governments of higher and broader jurisdiction. Horizontal relationships describe a government's relationship to its neighbors across invisible boundary lines. Together, these relationships cut across all the functional areas of concern to the planner, such as highways, urban renewal, poverty, pollution, and natural beauty.

Horizontal Relationships

Governmental boundary lines may be invisible to the planner on his field trips, but they are very real in legal, political and practical terms. The walls between jurisdictions appear to grow taller even as accelerated urbanization proves how outdated they have become.

In 1972, there were 78,269 separate governments in the United States, (See Table II-4)⁵². Additionally, there were 267 officially designated Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas⁵³. In all, multiple governments rule, with 90 units per SMSA being average. Although wide variations are apparent, the "typical" SMSA had two counties, 13 townships, 21 municipalities, 18 school districts and 31 special districts⁵⁴. For even the simplest planning purposes, such a number of jurisdictions involves problems of coordination, competition, and political and social distance between people. To the planner, it raises the question: What can he do with his formal charge when it encompasses so small a portion of the total area's resources and needs? A number of possible solutions have been suggested and are being applied across these lines.

Regional Planning Efforts. In planning, perhaps the most common device has been the regional planning commission whose directors represent the constituent political bodies. The typical charge to these regional bodies has been to ad-

Table III-4. Number of Governments In the United States.

Type of Government	1952*	1962	1972	Percent Change 1952-1972
Total	116,807	91,237	78,269	-33.0
U. S. government	1	1	1
State governments	50	50	50
Local governments	116,756	91,186	78,218	-33.0
Counties	3,052	3,043	3,044
Municipalities	16,807	18,000	18,517	+10.2
Townships	17,702	17,142	18,991	+ 7.3
School Districts	67,355	34,678	15,781	-76.5
Special Districts	12,340	18,323	23,885	+93.5

*Adjusted to include units in Alaska and Hawaii, which were reported separately prior to statehood of these areas in 1959.

vise on planning problems and to derive long-term comprehensive plans for regional growth and development. Stress should be placed on the advisory nature of these bodies. Many regional organizations have been a product of primary interests in transportation planning, spawned by planning funds made available from the Federal Highway Administration, and in comprehensive planning as established through the Urban Planning Assistance Program as approved in the Housing Act of 1954⁵⁵. Section 701 of the housing legislation provided 50-50 matching grants-in-aid for planning on a metropolitan basis by official State, metropolitan, or regional planning agencies. As noted by ACIR, these programs tended to foster a substantial increase in individual municipal planning activity rather than to initiate much planning on a metropolitan basis, although eventually some of the "701"-funded planning programs furthered interlocal confederalism⁵⁶.

With the arrival of "creative federalism" during the mid-1960's came a proliferation of new Federal planning requirements and assistance programs aimed at the regional level. (See Figure III-5). Present regional planning councils are in a dilemma largely promulgated by the product of ambivalent Federal policies and inconsistent State action. On the other hand, the Federal government sponsors a comprehensive approach to regional planning and grant coordination and, on the other, it supports function-by-function areawide planning and project development. This bifurcation was exemplified by the Section 204 review requirements of the Metropolitan Development Act of 1966. The trend toward procedural comprehensiveness in the context of separate functional planning processes, often performed by distinct organizations, has remained to the present, and has minimized the potential effectiveness of regional planning⁵⁷.

Outside the framework of the regional planning commission, some metropolitan areas have been experimenting with the formation of councils of elected officials that may deal with specific regional problems ranging from air pollution to transit⁵⁸. Examples may now be found in a large number of areas within the United States; e.g., Philadelphia (Regional Council of Elected Officials) and San Francisco (Association of Bay Area Governments) to name only two. Composed directly of elected officials, this device attempts to bring together political leadership in such a way as to provide a forum for conflicting viewpoints and a change for reaching consensus on one or more specific problems. Moreover, it uses, rather than threatens, existing political units⁵⁹.

In 1972 approximately 576 regional councils with the following characteristics were identified: multijurisdictional local governmental representation, a multipurpose program, legal status to receive funds, and staff. Their number has increased approximately 10% a year for the last




Figure III-5. Annual Growth Rates of Regional Councils, by Federal Program Enactments, 1954-1971.

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Decision Making, p. 76.

three years. Of these councils, 63% (352) have a majority of local government elected officials on their governing bodies⁶⁰.

These state or locally created umbrella regional councils of governments represent one major innovation in metropolitan areas during the last ten years. They are general-purpose, policy-making bodies, often evolving in form from an existing metropolitan planning agency. They are responsible for developing areawide plans and for coordinating the major independent functional agencies within the region, in order to direct the development of the metropolitan area⁶¹.

Extensive research and the use of questionnaires by ACIR in attempting to study the impact and effectiveness of regional planning councils and councils of governments, led them to conclude the following⁶²:

1. Despite increasing pressure from central cities for proportionate representation as regional council responsibilities grow, the majority of regional councils continue to rely on a voting system that gives each member jurisdiction equal power in regional decision making regardless of size, financial contributions, or needs.

2. Many regional councils have become heavily dependent on Federal funds, with the result that local goals and priorities are sometimes displaced by Federal ones, and membership is no longer truly voluntary.

3. Federal planning funds have spurred regional councils into controversial social and life-style areas, but some of these bodies have not established the necessary machinery for handling central city-suburb and inter-suburban conflict.

4. Regional councils are producing more and more comprehensive and functional plans, yet still lack the power to implement them directly or to compel or coerce constituent general purpose jurisdictions or special districts to carry out or abide by them.

5. Even though a consensus is emerging regarding the need to perform certain urban functions on an areawide basis, only a handful of regional councils have been able to assume operational responsibilities for public services and programs.

6. While considerable support exists among regional council directors, mayors, and county executives for these organizations to become umbrella agencies, the feudalistic attitudes of program specialists and the general public's opposition to regional government remain considerable barriers to expanded action.

The essential issue, then, involves whether in light of growing demands for areawide public service delivery and authoritative decision making, regional councils can continue to serve two masters. In a sense, their rather fragile structure is being strained by the conflicting objectives and strategies of higher and lower authorities. The possible future directions of the regional council movement in response to these challenges, and their consequences, will be discussed in Chapter V.

Extraterritorial Controls. A third technique practiced in many states is the use of extraterritorial planning and administrative controls. Extraterritorial powers are those powers which a city exercises outside its ordinary territorial limits to regulate activity there or to assist in providing services to its citizens within its own boundaries⁶³.

Regulatory powers of an extraterritorial nature commonly include control over possible threats to health and safety, abatement of nuisances, and regulation of zoning and subdivisions. The use of extraterritoriality for providing services to the city's residents is most commonly connected with water supply, sewage treatment, recreation areas, and rubbish dumping sites outside city boundaries⁶⁴.

Use of extraterritorial powers by cities varies among the States and by the type of power authorized⁶⁵. State

legislatures have been relatively generous in granting cities power to go outside their boundaries to help in providing a service to their residents. In most States, cities are particularly allowed to obtain their water and treat their sewage outside their boundaries, because of the frequent difficulties of providing these important utility services within their own boundaries. About 30 States have given cities jurisdiction beyond their boundaries for regulating subdivisions⁶⁶. To some extent, the increased establishment of county planning and zoning in unincorporated areas has reduced this need⁶⁷.

As a method for providing or improving city services, the use of extraterritorial powers is a logical and frequently necessary way for a city to discharge its responsibilities to its citizens. From the standpoint of the metropolitan area as a whole, however, this may prove to be a disadvantage if it deters the city from cooperating with other communities in an areawide approach yielding greater overall benefits. This approach also raises the possibility of creating intergovernmental friction if the city is not careful to be a "good citizen" in the manner it carries out its activities in the outside area⁶⁸.

Uncontrolled development at the fringes can have deteriorating effects on property values in the established neighboring areas of the central city, and can complicate the provision of certain services (police and fire, for example) within the municipality. Thus, the use of extraterritorial zoning and subdivision regulation in unincorporated fringe areas can bring these conditions under better control and, by so doing, strengthen the movement toward areawide land use planning.

From the standpoint of political feasibility, the use of extraterritorial controls has the advantage of creating relatively little disturbance in the political status quo. Unincorporated territories usually have only "rudimentary

government", so that the officials and employees whose positions are threatened are few. Moreover, while the extraterritorial controls represent an exercise of governmental power from outside, it is the lack of exercise of such power by the residents of the territory which frequently moves the adjoining city to exercise its power there. Thus, extraterritorial regulation represents a new exercise of power, rather than a shift of an existing power⁶⁹.

A major weakness of extraterritorial controls as an approach to reorganizing local government structure in metropolitan areas is its limited applicability. Many States do not give localities adequate authorization for the most important regulatory powers from the standpoint of dealing with metropolitan growth: planning, zoning and subdivision regulations. Even where these powers exist they are useful only when there are unincorporated areas adjacent to municipalities, a condition long since past for many major urban centers⁷⁰. Moreover, to the extent that these controls help ease the problems of fringe areas, they relieve the pressure for more basic solutions, except where the fringe area cannot veto a proposed annexation initiated by the adjoining city⁷¹.

While extraterritorial controls, as presently authorized in most States, enables the central city to protect itself, it deprives the residents of the outside areas of a voice in determining their own affairs. This is contrary to the principle of local self-determination as guaranteed by the Constitution. It can also generate resentment, to the detriment of the cooperation required for satisfactory intergovernmental relations in metropolitan areas, as well as continuing work to achieve more comprehensive approaches to metropolitan reorganization.

Intergovernmental Agreements. Far greater use, however, has been made of intergovernmental agreements for the joint planning and administration of services and facilities.

Through the process of contracting, some services have been shifted from city to county levels. These accords then become binding agreements upon participating governments and follow from legislative action⁷².

Much more numerous than such shifts of function are the thousands of voluntary agreements entered into by localities. Such agreements may be for the provision of sewer or water services, or, in some areas, for library services. There may also be highly informal, professional arrangements for sharing police and fire communication equipment or for providing emergency assistance in any one of many service areas.

These various forms of intergovernmental agreements represent the greatest breakthrough yet achieved in solving intergovernmental problems of the horizontal type⁷³. They get things done that might not otherwise be possible, while respecting local identities and foundations. Nevertheless, they have severe shortcomings. A summary of these weaknesses follows⁷⁴.

A basic weakness of joint agreements is that they are practical only when the immediate local interest of each participating unit is not likely to be in conflict with the broader areawide interest. Conflicts between areawide and immediate local interests are apt to arise in handling functions requiring an areawide approach. These are the governmental functions which have the most significant effects on economic growth and development. Sound long-range development of a metropolitan area's economy might call, for example, for decisions on these functions which would encourage location or development of new business in City A which threatens to be competitive to existing business in City B. Such decisions would not be carried out under a voluntary intergovernmental agreement. Thus, intergovernmental agreements are not suited to effective decision making on issues which transcend the interest of any one part

of the area and must depend on an areawide majority approval rather than areawide unanimity of all governmental jurisdictions.

Issues involving the adjustment of service areas and areas of tax jurisdiction can be resolved, as a practical manner, only by such areawide decision making. A community which is now paying less than its proportionate share would be reluctant to consent to an agreement for a tax restructuring which would increase its tax payments.

Intergovernmental contracts have a weakness where the "seller" municipality has a virtual monopoly of the service. If one community controls the water supply of an area, for example, only its own self-restraint protects the purchasing communities from being exploited on price and service. Thus, where the parties to an agreement are not in an equally strong bargaining position, and monopoly conditions exist, some outside authority is needed to protect the purchasers.

As noted in a recent study completed by ACIR, both the voluntary Councils of Governments approach to reorganization of local governments in metropolitan areas and the Urban County approach are basically hybrids of the intergovernmental agreements approach⁷⁵. As such, they contain all of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. As indicated in the ACIR findings, time may be running out on these types of governmental reorganization approaches unless corrective measures are applied. Their present and future roles appear to be ones of useful but limited application for solving lesser and noncontroversial problems in small urban areas while the problems of metropolitan growth and polarization continue⁷⁶.

Special Purpose Districts. A metropolitan special purpose district is an independent unit of government organized to perform one or a few urban functions throughout part or all of a metropolitan area, including the central city⁷⁷.

The composition of special district governing bodies varies greatly, but most of them have appointed or ex officio members, with the appointments made by the Governor or by governing bodies of local governments within the jurisdiction of the special district. Special purpose districts generally finance themselves from service charges, sales, rents and tolls. Many do not have taxing power, but where they do it is frequently unhampered by the constitutional and statutory tax limits that apply to other local governments. Exercise of the bonding power usually does not require referral to the voters, but frequently is restricted to the issuance of revenue bonds⁷⁸.

The extensive use of metropolitan special districts, and the transfer to them of local government functions to be handled on an areawide basis, is one of the most significant changes in local government organization in metropolitan areas in recent years. (Refer back to the figures in Table III-4). To a large degree this development has been due to the fact that special purpose districts are free from the constitutional and statutory limits on the fiscal powers of general-purpose local governments. Undoubtedly, however, this development has been a response to the need for providing some way of handling areawide problems when other methods for adapting local government to areawide needs were impossible to achieve.

The key advantage of the special purpose district approach is its high degree of political feasibility. One reason is that it is only a minor threat to existing political organization and power. The minor threat is the chipping off of a function which may have been previously performed by existing local government. However, this erosion may not become serious enough to arouse alarm until after a number of functions have been chipped away, by the creation of additional special districts⁷⁹.

Another reason that the metropolitan special purpose district has high political feasibility is that it usually can be created by a simple act of the legislature, and does not require constitutional amendment like city-county consolidation, county home rule, or federation forms of government. Further, such legislative acts also do not require approval by the local electorate⁸⁰.

The special district approach has proven effective in providing an areawide geographic base for dealing with areawide problems. It can carry out its functions unrestricted by the boundaries of regular governmental jurisdictions. It has the advantage of consolidated administration of a larger scaled operation, and better planning and execution of the function in the area. Further, it is adaptable to use where the metropolitan area overstrides more than one county, or more than one State⁸¹. Some of the other reorganization methods are practically limited to a single county or State.

Assigning the special purpose district just one, or at most a few, functions makes its responsibility clear. It is likely to give the public exactly and quickly what it wants. On the other hand, this singlemindedness approach often works to the detriment of a coordinated approach since basic planning services, such as urban redevelopment or transportation have a major impact on other area development programs.

The special purpose district approach to governmental reorganization in metropolitan areas also has other weaknesses. Extensive use of the device complicates rather than simplifies the problem of governmental organization in the metropolitan area. Authority is further diffused rather than consolidated which increases the problems of voter control and duplication of effort. Once set up, special districts are difficult to abolish or consolidate, with the result that whatever areawide approaches might exist in the

metropolitan community tend to be fragmented rather than coordinated⁸².

Special purpose districts tend to erode the importance of general-purpose governments—usually cities—and, as such, diminishes their capacity to elicit the support, interest and respect of the citizenry, and therefore their ability to govern. The voter has no direct control over the district's conduct. In most cases, there are several such districts in an area, and they have different boundaries, and different methods of selection of the members of the governing bodies, making the problem of voter visibility and control all but hopeless⁸³.

Special purpose districts frequently are established with the intention of being self-supporting. The need for covering their costs tends to become a preoccupation, with the result that they may neglect the effects of their activities on other related services, and resist efforts to have them assume responsibility for such activities (e.g., mass transit rather than toll bridges) which may not be self-supporting⁸⁴.

Ironically, metropolitan special purpose districts can provide an inducement to general government reform at the regional level. For example, the Metropolitan Council in the Twin Cities area evolved from the need for a regional agency to coordinate the planning and development activities of metropolitan special districts. Presently, the Council reviews all plans of each independent commission, board, or agency which would have an areawide effect. Special district plans must be submitted to the Council before any action may be taken, and the Council may indefinitely suspend any operation of the plan which it considers to be inconsistent or detrimental to the comprehensive metropolitan development guide. Moreover, the Metropolitan Council is charged with making recommendations as to which governmental agency is best suited to discharge functional responsibilities

affecting the development guide⁸⁵. Consequently, other regional districts, when they are created, will better fit into the overall metropolitan governance system.

Despite the weaknesses of the special district approach, it exhibits a great deal of flexibility. It can be coterminous with a unit of general local government or overlap its boundaries; it can have varying degrees of independence from local governing bodies; and it can be used to amend boundaries to follow functional needs. Its functional, structural, fiscal and territorial flexibilities insure that it may continue to play a prominent role in most metropolitan governance systems.

Annexation. Another mechanism for rationalizing metropolitan problems is the technique of annexation which, in some sections of the country at least, has done much to clarify service areas and extend planning effectiveness. Annexation is the absorption of territory by a city. While such territory may be incorporated or unincorporated, usually it is unincorporated territory, and smaller than the annexing city. The result is a larger and not essentially different governmental unit.

Annexations are carried out in five principal ways: (1) Legislative determination, where municipal boundaries are extended by special act of the State legislature; (2) Popular determination, in which votes determine whether a territorial extension shall take place; (3) Municipal determination, in which the annexing municipality makes a unilateral determination; (4) Judicial determination, in which the State judiciary decides whether a proposed annexation shall take place; and (5) Quasi-legislative determination, in which a commission or board makes the determination⁸⁶.

Annexation has always been the most common method for adjusting the boundaries of local governments in metropolitan areas. The nation's great cities achieved their present

size largely through this process. Annexation was relatively easy to achieve because it could be accomplished by special legislative act, by unilateral action of the annexing city, or by approval of a simple majority of the combined vote of the city and territory to be annexed⁸⁷. As distinguished from the large annexations by the big cities in the 19th century, recent annexations have been mainly of small areas⁸⁸. This reflects the fact that annexation has come to be used mostly as a means of resolving the problems arising between the central city and its abutting unincorporated urban fringe; the type of uncontrolled development referred to in the previous section on extraterritorial powers.

Annexation is sometimes used in conjunction with other approaches to governmental reorganizations. As long ago as 1876, the city-county separation of St. Louis, Missouri was accompanied by the city's annexing of 43 square miles. In 1950, the realignment of city and county functions between Atlanta and Fulton County, Georgia was accompanied by Atlanta's annexing of 82 square miles of contiguous, unincorporated territory. A similar plan for Louisville and Jefferson County, Kentucky was defeated in 1956⁸⁹.

The use of annexation powers must also be considered in connection with two other procedures affecting the orderly development of unincorporated territory in metropolitan areas: extraterritorial regulation and incorporation of new units of government. As noted previously, extraterritorial regulation can be an important step in paving the way for sound annexation. It established control over unincorporated territory at the critical formation time in the development of a community, when decisions of great importance for the urban future of the area are made. Controls over new incorporations are necessary to assure that new units of government have the potential for providing adequate urban services, and that further fragmentation of

government in the metropolitan area is minimized⁹⁰.

Cities in the States of Virginia and Texas have had unique success in the use of annexation, due to the special legal provisions of those two States. In Virginia, local government units or citizens may petition for an annexation, in which case a special annexation court is set up to hear and determine whether the annexation shall be carried out. The court may uphold, modify, or set aside the annexation action⁹¹. Virginia has operated continually under this annexation procedure since early in this century. In Texas, cities may empower themselves through home rule charter provisions to annex unincorporated territory by ordinance. In the ten year period 1961-1970, of the 20 cities in the nation having annexed the most territory, four Texas cities stood among the highest⁹².

The major strength of annexation as an approach to reorganization of local government in metropolitan areas is that it broadens the geographical jurisdiction of municipalities. Moreover, it is a flexible way of broadening jurisdiction. To the extent that it forestalls incorporations or creation of special purpose districts, it keeps the governmental pattern from becoming more complex. Further, as an approach for handling areawide problems, annexation strengthens rather than weakens general purpose governments⁹³.

Annexation brings areas at the fringes of municipalities under controlled growth and development. If left uncontrolled, such areas can be a source of trouble and cost for the entire area. Annexation provides an absolute right of self-determination and local control where consent of the annexed area is required. In those States which regard annexation issues as affecting a broader territory than just the area to be annexed, due regard for local wishes can be provided. This can be done through adequate provisions for standards in determining the soundness of a proposed annexation, and for judicial review. While annexation can be an important

approach to reorganization by itself, the fact that it is generally limited to use in unincorporated areas makes it likely to be most useful as a supplement to other reorganization approaches⁹⁴.

The weaknesses of annexation as an approach to the reorganization of local governments in metropolitan areas are summarized as follows⁹⁵:

1. Legal obstacles in most States prevent municipalities from annexing territory. These legal obstacles are mainly the exclusive power of annexees in many States to initiate annexation procedures, and their exercise of a veto over adoption of the annexation plan.

2. Limitations of annexations to unincorporated areas reduces its effectiveness as a tool of reorganization where central cities are hemmed in by incorporated territory. However, the villages and towns bordering central cities may find the method useful in expanding their territories.

3. Another weakness of the annexation method is that it may precipitate "defensive" incorporations by fringe communities that do not want to be absorbed by their big neighbor. The result is additional fractionalization of political authority. A related reflex action is that all the cities in the area may start competing for the annexation of unincorporated territory, producing a haphazard annexation pattern.

4. There have been examples of abuse of the annexation power by cities taking in attractive areas in terms of high taxable value and minimum problem conditions, and carefully avoiding the problem spots. However, this abuse can be guarded against by establishment of proper criteria for annexation and a requirement of approval by a judicial agency.

In conclusion, annexation has been used extensively to enlarge municipal boundaries (with the notable exceptions

of the closely-built eastern states and in the largest cities). Most individual annexations are small, but the total area added by this method is considerable (during 1970 and 1971, 1,517 square miles were annexed)⁹⁶. Although annexation continues to be a useful method in bringing urban services to fringe areas, it has not been an effective tool for achieving metropolitan government in this century.

City-County Consolidation*. In a few instances, State legislation has effected a union of services across the whole or part of a metropolitan area. The classic example is Boston's Metropolitan District Commission (MDC) which, since 1919, has provided water, sewer, park, and certain police functions to more than 40 cities and towns in Greater Boston⁹⁷. The MDC is a kind of super-government whose revenues are obtained from an assessment formula applied to each participating city and town.

Despite the considerable attention paid to the activity, the examples of actual consolidation of municipal bodies are few and far between⁹⁸. In 1945, Baton Rouge, Louisiana was completely consolidated with its county (parish), an action which produced one set of officials, one planning commission, and a more effective service over a large geographic area⁹⁹. Thirty years later, however, it remains an almost solitary textbook example of city-county consolidation. As a contrast, UNIGOV, put into operation in January, 1970 by State legislation consolidating Indianapolis and Marion County, achieved permanent status January 1, 1972, when the first elected mayor and city-county Council took office.

*City-county consolidations are the merging of two units of different stature. "Consolidation", as opposed to the former approach, is the joining together of two or more units of government of approximately equal stature to form a new unit of government. Consolidation has been a rarely used reorganization approach when compared with other approaches and, as such, will not be discussed. For a detailed discussion of this reorganization approach see, ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 58-67.

The new government has one mayor elected by all of the citizens of a 402-square-mile county and one 29-member city-county council elected in 25 single-member districts and four county-wide districts. However, the consolidation pertained only to civil government, not school government. As a result, independent cities and towns within Marion County retain many governmental functions and all services are not provided on a county-wide basis¹⁰⁰.

City-county consolidation takes three forms: (1) the merger of a county and the cities within it into a single government, which is the most complete form of consolidation; (2) substantial merger of the county and the cities, but the retention of the county as a separate unit for some functions; (3) unification of some, but not all, of the municipal governments and the county government. Sometimes the consolidation is broadened to include the territory of two or more counties and the county and municipal governments within them, or to include other local governments¹⁰¹.

City-county consolidation has the advantage of providing the base for a unified, coordinated program of service, development and control over an enlarged area. It is thus suited to the more effective handling of areawide problems, the achievement of an optimum scale of operation, and improved relationship between expenditure needs and fiscal resources. It also simplifies the voter's task of understanding the governmental structure and holding it responsible¹⁰².

As a means for adjusting boundaries to the geographical area of metropolitan problems, city-county consolidation has the greatest potential in medium and small metropolitan areas that are contained in one county and are unlikely to extend beyond the county's boundaries for some time to come, and

in which there is one urban center surrounded by considerable undeveloped territory¹⁰³.

Obstacles that stand in the way of adoption of city-county consolidation are the fact that many State constitutions do not authorize consolidation, and when they do, enabling legislation is still needed and is not easy to obtain. Another obstacle is the frequent requirement that for approval the plan needs the favorable vote of separate majorities in the central city and the rest of the county, and perhaps even in one or more of the other municipalities of the county¹⁰⁴. A recent study of local government reorganization involving referenda, concluded that voter acceptance of governmental reorganization attempts was typically one of nonacceptance¹⁰⁵. Of those reorganization referenda that came up during 1970-1972, only two out of a possible 10 were passed by the voters. Despite this record, however, some 60 major reorganizations were reported under consideration in 1972-73¹⁰⁶. Still another difficulty is the potential resistance from those in office, since a consolidation is a threat to the positions of numerous officials and employees.

A single consolidated city-county is a move in the direction of reducing local participation in local affairs, and of making it more difficult to vary government services and finances according to local desires. Recent plans have sought to overcome this defect, however, through differential service areas¹⁰⁷.

The problem of tax equities arises when the consolidation takes in a substantial area of rural territory, for which it is unwise or unnecessary to provide urban services. However, the establishment of separate service and taxing districts is a way of meeting this objection. Another way is to require the establishment of special purpose districts for specific urban services in the rural areas. This has some of the disadvantages, however, of special districts

(see previous section on Special Purpose Districts).

A final difficulty of the city-county consolidation method is the inflexibility of the new unit's boundaries because of the constitutional and statutory restrictions on a county's taking in territory from adjoining counties. How serious this problem is will depend on how much undeveloped territory is included in the new city-county, where this territory lies in relation to population expansion and how fast the expansion is proceeding¹⁰⁸.

Federation. The federation approach to governmental reorganization involves the division of local government functions in the metropolitan area between two levels (tiers) of government. Area wide functions are assigned to a "metropolitan" government, with boundaries encompassing the units from which the functions are assumed. The local-type functions are left to the existing municipalities, which are sometimes enlarged in territory and called boroughs. In their advanced stage of development, the urban county and multipurpose metropolitan district resemble the federation as a form of government organization, since they provide a clear separation of most areawide and local functions¹⁰⁹.

Although authorities in the field of local and metropolitan government for many years have considered the federation form an attractive approach to the problem of government organization in metropolitan areas, very few (three to be exact) have been adopted in the United States. The most famous and first federation in North America was the federation government of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, created in 1954¹¹⁰.

Two types of two-tier, general metropolitan government organizations exist. One involves a general-purpose areawide government and a set of constituent local units; the other centers around an areawide body which is a subordinate State or local instrumentality and which conditions rather

than performs selected areawide functions. The general-purpose two-tier arrangement exists in Dade County, Florida, and Toronto; the instrumentality approach to metropolitan federation occurs in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Atlanta¹¹¹.

The assignment of each governmental function to its appropriate level under the federal approach facilitates achievement of the best handling of each function, from the point of view of most effective planning, decision, and optimum scale of operation. Retention of the identities of local governments preserves the focus of local civic pride, interest, and participation. It also permits the maximization of diversity, and experiment, and the performance of functions¹¹².

Federation permits coordinated areawide approaches to areawide problems, and a closer relating of taxing areas to benefit areas. By assigning to the metropolitan government the areawide problems and to the municipalities the local problems, it keeps officials at each level from being overwhelmed by details¹¹³.

A weakness of the federation approach is that, while it sets up a new general purpose government, it diminishes the strength of the lower tier of general purpose governments. Also, the federation approach requires working out many details that are not required in the other approaches. These details, which are likely to be controversial, include the exact distribution of powers between the areawide and municipal governments, and the composition and method of selection of the governing body¹¹⁴.

The federation approach has less political feasibility than a step-by-step approach, such as the piecemeal transfer of functions to an urban country. Also, the federation is a new political entity, not foreseen at the time when most State constitutions were prepared, so constitutional revision is invariably needed. The relationship to county governments must be worked out, and this may be especially

difficult if the new unit overlies more than one county or involves more than one State¹¹⁵.

Furthermore, a key question in political feasibility is the requirement for voter approval. Commonly, local approval requires separate majorities in different sub-units within the area of the contemplated federation, and sometimes this involves majorities in each of the political subdivisions affected. This amounts to giving each unit a veto over the whole, and is a particularly difficult obstacle to overcome¹¹⁶.

Finally, there exists no clear evidence that urban civic and political leadership in the United States are as yet favorably disposed to the concept of "metropolitan government" as such, which is embodied in the federation plan. The conceptual ties to traditional forms of local government are very strong, and the image of a single new form of general government covering an entire metropolitan area is untenable to many.

Summary. When viewed collectively, all of these devices for improving horizontal intergovernmental relationships fall far short of contending successfully with the problems they seek to address. The more grandiose types of solution, federation and consolidation, have been somewhat disappointing to their advocates. Recent findings of ACIR highlight the generally lackluster performances of these two approaches to government reorganization¹¹⁷:

1. The two approaches to reform outlined in this chapter aspire to comprehensive change. Comprehensive change is atypical in urban political systems where local policy inputs are numerous and diverse in nature, where there are many veto groups, and where no breakdown in social order has occurred.
2. Although they have been successful in securing Federal grants, metropolitan city-county consolidations have served as the focus for very few Federal substate

and regional districting efforts.

3. Few federative approaches have been utilized in American metropolitan areas. The Toronto-type federation has remained untried, and Dade County represents the sole example of a deliberate chartering of a federated urban county. Few States allow the incorporation of metropolitan multi-purpose special districts, and no more than two or three such districts are presently functioning.

4. The State supported umbrella regional council represents the chief innovation in federative forms during the past decade. This is a general purpose policy-making body, which has the responsibility for developing areawide plans, for coordinating the major independent functional agencies within the region, and controlling the development of the metropolitan area. It is illustrated by the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council.

5. To an even greater extent than whites, blacks resist metropolitan reform efforts largely because of fear that their central city voting strength would be diluted by the adoption of areawide government. In the two campaigns where black majorities supported consolidation efforts, influential black leaders participated from the beginning, "black" single-member districts were delineated, and a possibility existed that the central city would annex the urban fringe if the reform attempt failed. To date, formal black representation on consolidated city-county councils has generally equalled or exceeded the proportions held on pre-reform central city councils.

6. Although metropolitan federations or consolidations might make redistributions easier legally, no fundamental shifts have yet been made in the collection and distribution of local tax revenues in favor of those at the lower end of the economic scale. Evidence exists, however, that reform governments have been more successful than their predecessors in securing Federal aid for the administration of programs that are redistributive in nature.

7. Less than conclusive data suggests that although consolidated and federated governments result in higher total costs for local government, they do not always result in higher tax rates. Further, reform governments are likely to bring strengthened over-head management, more effective use of tax money, and a higher level of public services, especially in those programs which depend heavily upon major physical facilities.

Some hope is currently being placed in solving the problems of governing the metropolis through the same "carrot-and-stick" approach employed by Federal and sometimes State aid programs. The theory (actually it's more a hypothesis) cited in support of this approach is that local tradition and other barriers to cooperation and coordination of local government practices can only be solved through directive and inducement, rather than through locally achieved consensus; through the medium of additional revenues rather than through academic arguments. This point will be explored in Chapter V. Prior to such a discussion, however, it is necessary to examine the vertical relationships of metropolitan governance as they exist for the planner and city administrator alike.

Vertical Relationships

Although cooperation between local governmental units has been slow to mature, the same cannot be said of relationships between local units of government and those of higher jurisdiction, especially the Federal government. Here, the number of linkages has steadily been climbing, often through frustration in working out closer-to-home solutions. The results to the planner or administrator, however, may not appear dissimilar, for frustration in making these new links work is generally of equal intensity. The problems are simply those of feast, rather than famine. Briefly, then, let's examine the traditional and current character of this relationship.

The State. In our federal system the State is the father of the municipality and all other jurisdictions within the boundaries. "Dillon's Rule" that local government is a creature of the State suggests that local governments have no powers or authority beyond what their State governments

give them. The powers and authority of local governments in different States may be quite dissimilar. In fact, it is important to note that local governments operate in a specific State-local governmental system which has been developed by the State. More specifically, local governments possess a particular mixture of administrative and fiscal responsibilities assigned them by statute and constitution. In addition, the State plays a regulatory role over the local governments' performance of these responsibilities. There are two ways in which the State-local system can effect the planning function. One is through the State's control over the kinds of services local governments provide and the other is the amount of money available to pay for these services. Such control affects the planner's work indirectly. Public services are a part of the environment for which the planner is responsible. The State's fiscal controls may also affect the funds available for the planning function. The State-local governmental system also directly influences the planning function by administrative regulations and, to some extent, by offering technical assistance¹¹⁸.

States have a variety of fiscal controls over the local governments. Most States have statutory and/or constitutional limitations on the amount of taxation local governments may levy and on the amount of money they are allowed to borrow. In addition, States specify the sources of revenue that are available to their local governments. Since local governments rarely have enough money to pay for all of the services they need, State financial assistance is another means of State control over local finances.

Politicians and some students of American government

have argued that States should not have such extensive control over local government. Thus, an alternative to the "creature" theory of local government known as "home rule" is in effect in many communities¹¹⁹. Without home rule municipalities must get permission from the State legislature for every possible change in procedure including personnel regulations, salaries and administrative organization. Local governments which have been granted home rule powers have more freedom in these and other areas. The theory behind home rule is that individuals create the State government for their individual benefit, and therefore, the actions of the local government should be determined locally. The need for greater fiscal flexibility and the ability to organize local government to meet specific local needs are among the major arguments for home rule. Some opponents of home rule have stated that the cry for more autonomy for local government ignores the fact that in metropolitan areas local governments are highly interdependent. Thus, greater centralization of authority rather than independence is needed.

One reason for some of the demands for home rule is that State governments have not been meeting the growing needs of local governments in urban areas¹²⁰. States have historically favored rural interests in their legislatures. This was quite appropriate when the United States was a rural nation. As urbanization and metropolitanism shifted the nation's population from the farm to the city and suburb, however, the patterns of representation in State legislatures remained the same. Some State constitutions, until recently, have based representation on geographical areas regardless of the distribution of population. Others have had apportionment formulae which give the more populous communities relatively less representation. It is not possible at this point to predict what the impact of the reapportionment of State legislatures will be¹²¹. Some have suggested it will result in a coalition of rural and suburban legislators which

will keep the big cities at a disadvantage. Others have argued that a more equitable system of representation will be the result. One thing is clear. The pattern of policies resulting from the heritage of rural dominance of State legislatures will not be completely wiped out in a few legislative sessions¹²².

Given the rural bias of State legislatures, it is hardly surprising that the States have not been very attentive to the planning of urban areas. Some States have created state planning agencies which are mainly concerned with the development of the State as a whole, however, these agencies have not been extensively involved with planning at the local level. Nearly all of the States' technical involvement with local urban planning agencies has been stimulated by the Federal government. Federal planning grants are funneled through the State to the local governments. This Federal requirement has caused many States to supervise the local agency's use of Federal funds. At times this supervision is coupled with some technical assistance¹²³.

In general, the state enabling statutes control the outward organization and administration of the local planning agency. In some cases they limit the kinds of activities the local agency may perform. There are problems with such comprehensive state laws. The conclusion of a previous section that no single type of planning agency organization is equally appropriate for all communities, would suggest a need for agency structures which are tailor-made for individual situations. Specific statutes outlining the duties and general operation of the agency do not permit such flexibility. A further problem is the fact that most state statutes still reflect "model" ordinances written in 1923. The statutes themselves are a clear indication that the States have given little thought to the question of the appropriateness of their laws for the needs of today's urban communities. Perhaps as State legislatures are reapportioned

this situation will change. At the present time, however, the role of the States in local urban planning is not very helpful.

Comprehensive planning, usually based upon regional divisions, is now under way in many States. The newest state, Hawaii, was the first to complete a statewide plan. This was followed rapidly by significant efforts in such states as New York, California, Michigan and New Jersey¹²⁴. In Pennsylvania, these new activities have been in large measure responsible for establishment of a department of community development to coordinate all the State's planning assistance programs¹²⁵.

Summarizing all these trends, Goodman stressed these aspects of the State's role in local planning affairs¹²⁶:

1. The possible emergence of a clearer hierarchy of responsibilities for planning and development made possible through the exertion of greater leadership by the States either through legislation, financing, or a combination of devices.

2. The opportunity for municipalities to receive increasing assistance from the State in conducting local planning programs.

3. The necessity for local officials to become increasingly alert to the impact of a growing array of State projects and policies on the local area so as to avoid State-local conflicts and to minimize local financial burdens.

4. A likely increase in State regulatory controls over local growth and development for residential areas, industrial areas, etc. Parallel to this will be the need for ever-increasing cooperation and communication among professionals operating at both levels.

The National Government. At the national level the spate of programs produced by recent administrations has had a revolutionary effect upon the scope and context of

urban planning. A major share of the credit for this dramatic shift in the traditional definition of federalism is, of course, the rapid growth of urban populations and problems, and the inadequacy of State and local responses to the demands thus created. However, Federal programs affecting the planning function, both directly and indirectly, have sometimes worked at cross purposes. Some programs, for example, have attempted to help cities recover from problems induced by the movement of people and industries to the suburbs. Other programs have encouraged this movement¹²⁷. While inconsistencies in the results of Federal programs have cropped up from time to time, there have been some very clear trends with respect to the over-all impact of these programs on the planning function. These trends relate to the scope of planning being undertaken in cities (the subject matter of planning) and to the geographical area affected by local planning policy.

Those Federal programs affecting the scope of planning have tended to encourage broad planning activities, while the planning activity of local governments still focuses on physical development. However, Federal programs are using grants to encourage localities to enlarge this focus to include economic and social development as well. A second thrust of Federal planning programs has been to encourage the development of meaningful planning policies for entire metropolitan areas. Early aid to local planning agencies benefited only small individual municipalities. Recently, however, strong inducements have been offered to the municipalities within metropolitan areas to cooperate and develop coordinated planning policy on a metropolitan-wide basis.

The intent of the Federal programs has not, at this point, been reflected in local planning policy. Planning in metropolitan areas today is still largely physically oriented. Furthermore, the policies are geared to the goals of individual municipalities rather than to entire metropoli-

tan areas. Nevertheless, the Federal planning programs have placed considerable pressure on local governments to change the thrust of their planning activities.

Grant-In-Aid Programs. Perhaps the most powerful mechanism in this century for reshaping national-state-local relations has been the grant-in-aid system of national financing of State and local activities. It was by far the most significant form of vertical relationship for the planner in today's federal system. The precise number of grant programs that were ever put into operation depends a bit upon one's definition. Using the criterion of separate authorizations, ACIR estimated a total of 530 grant-in-aid programs in 1970 with a dollar volume of \$30.3 billion in 1971¹²⁸. Tables III-5 and III-6 illustrate this point.

A grant-in-aid may be defined as money payments furnished by a higher to a lower level of government to be used for specified purposes and subject to conditions spelled out in law or administrative regulation. Grants are thus distinguished from, although first cousins to, the concept of general revenue sharing, which means money given by one level of government to another without advance specification of purpose and without specified conditions—that is, "no strings attached" aid. Grants are very similar to special revenue sharing with the exception that special revenue sharing allocates money in the form of a block grant—monies are designated by general category rather than by specific programs within a category¹²⁹.

The historical origins of the grant-in-aid system actually antedate the Constitution. The Land Ordinance of 1785 provided that lot number 16 of each township carved out of Federal lands should be reserved for maintenance of public schools. Although most of the early grants were in the form of land rather than cash, there were a few of the latter kind. In 1808, there was a Congressional appropriation of

Table III-5. Growth of Federal Areawide Programs: 1954-1972.

No.	Name of Program	Federal Agency	Year of Enactment/ Major Amend.
1	Areawide Comp. Plng. Grants (701)	HUD	1954/1965
2	Open Space Grants	HUD	1961
3	Urban Transportation Planning Grants	DOT/FHWA	1962/1970
4	Resource Conservation & Development Loans	USDA/SCS	1962/1966/1970/1972
5	Urban Mass Transportation Planning Grants	DOT/UMTA	1964/1970
6	Community Action Grants (CAP)	OE0	1964
7	Water and Sewer Facilities Grants	HUD	1965
8	Water and Sewer Planning Grants for Rural Communities	USDA/FHA	1965/1972
9	Water and Waste Disposal Systems Grants for Rural Communities	USDA/FHA	1965/1972
10	Regional Medical Program Grants	HEW	1965
11	Economic Develop. Plng. Grants	Commerce/EDA	1965
12	Appalachian Local Devel. Dist. Grants	ARC	1965
13	Solid Waste Plng. Grants	EPA	1965
14	New Communities Land Devel. Mortg. Loan Guarantees Supplemental Grants	HUD	1965/1970
15	Comprehensive Areawide Health Planning Grants	HEW	1966/1967/1970
16	Project Notification & Review Process (A-95)	OMB	1966/1968
17	Air Pollution Control Grants	EPA	1967
18	Manpower Plng. Grants (CAMPS)	Labor	1968
19	Law Enforcement Plng. Grants	Justice/LEAA	1968/1970
20	Airport System Plng. Grants	DOT/FAA	1970
21	Water Quality Management Plng Grants	EPA	1970/1972
22	Rural Development Plng. Grants	USDA/FHA	1972
23	Rural Industrialization Loans & Grants	USDA/FHA	1972
24	Areawide Waste Treatment Management	EPA	1972

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 169.

Table III-6. Funding of Federal Areawide Programs (FY 1972 estimates in millions)

Name of Program	Capital & Operating Funds			Total
	Planning Assistance Funds	Operating Funds	Capital Funds	
Air Pollution Control (EPA)		\$42.9 (a)	\$	42.9
Airport Systems Planning (DOT)	\$15.0	(k)		15.0
Appalachian Development Assistance (ARC)	2.0	64.6 (k)		66.6
Areawide Comprehensive Health Planning (HEW 314b)	13.2			13.2
Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (HUD 701)	35.4 (b)			35.4
Areawide Waste Treatment Management (EPA)	50.0 (c)	5000.0 (a)		5050.0
Community Action (OEO CAP)		342.1		342.1
Economic Development (EDA)	5.5 (d)	142.2 (k)		147.7
Law Enforcement Planning (LEAA)	14.0	(k)		14.0
Manpower Planning (CAMPS)	17.6	(k) (e)		17.6
New Communities (HUD)	(f)	212.2		212.2
Open Space (HUD)	0	100.0		100.0
Project Notification and Review (A-95)		0 (a)		0
Regional Medical Program (HEW)		140.7		140.7
Resource Conservation and Development (USDA)	(g) (c)	20.9		20.9
Rural Development Planning (USDA)	10.0			10.0
Rural Industrialization Assistance (USDA)		100.0 (c)		100.0
Solid Waste Planning Grants (EPA)	3.1	(k)		3.1
Urban Mass Transportation (DOT)	25.0	510.0 (j)		535.0
Urban Transportation Planning (DOT)	22.6	1483.5		1506.1
Water/Sewer Facilities (HUD)	(f) (h)	200.0		200.0
Water & Sewer Planning for Rural Communities (USDA)	2.0			2.0
Water & Waste Disposal Systems for Rural Communities (USDA)				
Water Quality Management Planning (EPA)	5.4 (i)	40.4		40.4
TOTALS	\$220.8	\$8399.5		\$8620.3

Source: Office of Management and Budget, Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Sixth Edition (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972).

Table III-6. Continued.

a	Planning funds are included, but the use of funds for this purpose is determined by individual grantees.
b	The total appropriation is \$100 million, but much of it goes for local and statewide planning, rather than for areawide or regional planning.
c	Grant authorizations enacted for FY 1973.
d	This represents 40 percent of the \$35 million which the States receive.
e	The \$9.8 million in supplemental grants included here was subject to OMB spending constraints.
f	Planning for these programs is assisted under Areawide Comprehensive Planning Assistance (701).
g	Planning for this program is provided through Federal technical assistance.
h	These grants are made to areawide bodies whenever possible, but are often made to single counties.
i	This program will no longer be funded, now that the Areawide Waste Treatment Management Program has been established.
j	Estimated on the basis that the planning funds equal 1.5 percent of the total available in the urban areas subject to areawide planning.
k	The related "hardware" programs have been omitted because they are separate from their planning programs and are not usually thought of as areawide programs or allocated through areawide organizations.

of \$200,000 to assist the development of the State militia; and the early 1800's also saw cash aid for railroads and canals, supplementing the very large land grants given to the railroads. By 1915, the dollar volume of cash grants had only reached \$5 million. The major categories were agricultural extension, highways, and (after 1917) vocational education. From World War I to the New Deal these programs amounted to about \$100 million annually. During the New Deal there was a spurt in grant programs with the new Federal aid being associated with social security programs of public assistance and unemployment agencies, aid for State and local planning and, in 1937, the first public housing program, under which the Federal government provided long-term loans for State and local housing authorities to construct low-rent housing and grants for slum clearance¹³⁰.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) planning programs as they are known today are a direct outgrowth of the 1949 Urban Renewal Act, the first major Federal effort to affect the pattern of urban development. The Urban Renewal Act was the first Federal legislation that required a determination by the local governing body that a Federally aided housing proposal must conform to the general plan of the locality. The requirement of a local plan assumed the existence of some local planning capability. It soon became apparent that smaller communities could not finance such a planning operation even for the duration of a specific renewal project, and this provided the stimulus for some form of Federal assistance¹³¹.

In 1953 President Eisenhower's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs recommended that grants be made on a matching basis to State or metropolitan area governmental planning agencies to cover the cost of technical assistance for small cities and towns and for metropolitan regions within the States. Congress subsequently enacted the Section 701 Comprehensive Planning Assistance

program as part of the Housing Act of 1954¹³².

Soon after the initiation of the urban renewal program, it appeared that other areas of the city began to decay as rapidly as the renewal area progressed. Therefore, a requirement for a Workable Program for Community Improvement was established to prevent further blight by adopting housing and building codes and establishing an effective planning capability. Section 701 planning funds were made available to assist communities in meeting many of the Workable Program requirements.

The Housing Act of 1961 established the first of the areawide planning requirements to be satisfied prior to obtaining a Federal grant, in this case for open space land acquisition in urban areas. The Act required that the planned open space be part of the comprehensively planned development of the area. The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 further strengthened metropolitan and local planning. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 stipulated areawide planning requirements in issuing basic sewer and water facilities grants. A final stimulus to urban planning in metropolitan areas came from the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, which required that programs for highway construction in urban areas not be approved unless they formed part of a continuing comprehensive transportation planning process carried on cooperatively with States and localities¹³³.

The 1965 amendments to Section 701 widened the assistance program so that for the first time metropolitan and regional groups became eligible for financial support. The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 created the Model Cities program and, concomitantly, some new approaches to planning assistance. The program included considerable funding to assist localities in developing planning capability. In addition, Section 204 of the same Act required review of applications for Federal loans and grants, thus anticipating the Intergovernmental Coopera-

tion Act of 1968, which further developed coordination requirements by establishing the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) A-95 review procedure. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act established a "network of State, regional and metropolitan planning and development clearinghouses" to coordinate and evaluate the use of Federal funds. In practice, although A-95 has given considerable emphasis to a regional or metropolitan scope for planning, actual review and coordination are often more a matter of sentiment than of substance¹³⁴.

The 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act had three major effects on planning: (1) The definition of comprehensive planning was broadened to include planning for the provision of government services and for the development of human and natural resources; (2) a housing element, including local plans to expand and/or improve the housing stock, would be required as part of any 701 planning program; and (3) the 701 planning assistance program was revised to provide grants to State planning agencies so that they might assist in nonmetropolitan planning¹³⁵.

Planning requirements and assistance have continued to evolve in the 1970's. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 reflects a movement toward incorporating most of HUD's nonhousing categorical grant programs into block grants. Under Title I of the Act, the previous categories of community development programs, i.e., urban renewal, water and sewer grants, Model Cities, rehabilitation loans, public facility loans, open space land, neighborhood facilities, urban beautification, and historic preservation programs, are consolidated. Funds in the form of block grants are allocated on a formula based on population, overcrowded housing, and poverty (counted twice) to cities of more than 50,000 population and urban counties. To secure funding, a community must file an annual application which provides the following¹³⁶:

1. A three-year plan of community development needs and goals, and an overall strategy for meeting those needs consistent with area-wide planning and the national urban growth policy.

2. A program to eliminate or prevent slums, blight, and deterioration, and provide improved community facilities and improvements.

3. A housing assistance plan, compliance with civil rights laws, and providing for citizen participation. Further, the community must certify compliance with environmental standards.

Funding started January 1, 1975, with \$2.5 billion earmarked for community development in FY 1975, and \$2.95 billion in each of fiscal years 1976 and 1977. Up to \$50 million for each of the first two years and \$100 million for the third year are authorized for providing transition grants to communities with urgent needs that cannot be met through other allocations of the Act¹³⁷.

With this brief history as background, a more detailed look at three Federal programs designed to upgrade local capabilities to plan and manage is warranted: Section 204 and A-95 reviews; HUD Annual Arrangements and Planned Variations; and the Housing and Community Development Act. These programs illustrate the evolving and current concepts of Federal grants in general and an assessment of the implications of these procedures in building local and metropolitan planning capabilities. This will be necessary in order to develop arguments for fiscal support of alternative government structures.

Section 204 and A-95. The passage of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966 (the Model Cities legislation) brought the first statutory mechanism for reviewing and coordinating the use at regional, metropolitan and local levels of Federal grants-in-aid. Section

204 of the Act stipulated that applications for Federal funds be submitted for reviews "to any areawide agency which is designated to perform metropolitan or regional planning for the area within which the assistance is to be used¹³⁸". In practice, HUD usually designated the existing regional, county, or metropolitan planning body to review applications, and implementation of Section 204 provisions became a responsibility of the Bureau of the Budget.

The quality of the reviews and procedures that grew out of Section 204 was generally not high. Review and coordination were only as good as the quality of areawide planning, which was generally not adequate; neither the Bureau of the Budget nor any areawide agency established adequate criteria and procedures for review; staffs for handling the review were inadequate at both the local and Federal levels; and Section 204 applied only to metropolitan areas. Yet Section 204 did inspire the proliferation of areawide planning bodies with responsibilities for review functions¹³⁹.

Section 401 of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act in 1968 largely superseded Section 204. Title IV of the Act stipulated that "the President shall...establish rules and regulations governing the formulation, evaluation, and review of Federal programs and projects having a significant impact on area and community development, including programs providing Federal assistance to the States and localities...".

The Office of Management and Budget, successor to the Bureau of the Budget, was assigned responsibility for implementing this government-wide review procedure; in 1969, it issued Circular A-95, which spells out the process: (See Figure III-6.)

The circular sought to stimulate a "network of State, regional and metropolitan planning and development clearinghouses" to receive and disseminate information about proposed projects; to coordinate between applicants for Federal assistance; to act as a liaison between Federal agencies contemplating Federal development projects; and to conduct an "evaluation of the State,

Figure III-6. The Project Notification and Review System.

regional, or metropolitan significance of Federal or Federally-assisted projects¹⁴⁰".

A-95 procedures have largely been implemented at the regional and metropolitan levels by councils of governments (COG's) that serve as the clearinghouses. State governments have also established clearinghouses¹⁴¹.

Most HUD program applications are now admitted to the A-95 process by virtue of having a potentially "significant impact on area and community development". Further, though A-95 is an OMB process, the COG's, which are the instruments of A-95, are largely creatures of HUD 701 planning funds.

A-95 procedures are designed as a screen to ensure comprehensive planning. However, the project-by-project review and comment process of A-95 precludes a broad initiating role in comprehensive planning for A-95 reviewers. Furthermore, because of its frequent poor quality and small quantity, local comprehensive planning is an inadequate yardstick for measuring applications for Federal or Federally-assisted projects. The absence of good comprehensive planning to serve as a basis for judging applications under A-95 procedures has lessened the need to make harsh decisions. This may well account for the uncontroversial nature of A-95's widespread implementation.

Although A-95 is a Federally imposed procedure for review and coordination, Federal support of the program has been inadequate. Neither OMB nor any other Federal agency provides special funds to support review and comment activities beyond the HUD 701 support of planning staff. Neither the A-95 circular nor OMB define performance criteria. Moreover, Federal agencies concerned with their own programs have often failed to follow recommendations of local reviewers about funding decisions¹⁴².

For these reasons, the A-95 program lacks political force. The review process has not been an effective tool

for securing interjurisdictional planning. Federal support of the review process has been insufficient to ensure cooperation and planning among local jurisdictions¹⁴³.

The history of A-95 provides ample illustration of the magnitude of the effort required to bring problem and jurisdictional boundaries into alignment. In fact, A-95 was instituted as an effort to overcome the detrimental effects, on planning, of institutional fragmentation. While A-95 procedures may be an important step in the right direction, by their very nature they will not result in more than negative review, which may force some plan modification. Because of this essentially negative approach, A-95 can probably never be an instrument for political cooperation in formulating solutions. Thus, the very limited effectiveness of A-95, even when it is working well, points up the incongruity between the problem and jurisdictional scope.

HUD Annual Arrangements and Planned Variations¹⁴⁴. In order to develop some experience with greater local freedom pending revenue-sharing legislation, HUD has recently instituted two administrative arrangements designed to increase the responsibilities of city governments. In 1971, it initiated the Annual Arrangements process whereby HUD and the local government negotiate annually concerning the city's needs and arrive at preliminary agreement on a total package of HUD programs to address the problems identified. This process is intended to bolster the power and authority of the chief executive (who chairs the local effort) and to achieve local coordination of HUD-assisted programs. One hundred and ten cities are operating under Annual Arrangements¹⁴⁵.

Planned Variations is a similar arrangement that operates exclusively in Model Cities, although—unlike Annual Arrangements—planning monies are made available to Planned Variations cities from Model Cities program funds. Twenty Model Cities are operating under the two-year demonstration, which also

places responsibility for determining needs and establishing priorities on the chief executive. The process encourages coordinated and more rapid responses from the Federal Regional Councils as well as areawide strategies for problem solving. Designed to breathe new life into the Model Cities program, Planned Variations grew out of recommendations of the President's Domestic Council. "It is also the frontrunner of such significant initiatives as Community Development revenue sharing and General Revenue Sharing¹⁴⁶".

The Planned Variations program may take three different forms¹⁴⁷: (1) Citywide Model Cities in which cities are given additional dollars to expand their Model Cities programs to cover all or at least more of their deteriorated areas; (2) Chief Executive Review and Comment (CERC), which gives the local chief executive stronger coordinative powers through the right to review and comment on all applications for Federally-assisted programs; and (3) Minimization of Review procedures on the part of Federal agencies. Of the 20 Planned Variations cities, 16 are "full variations cities" receiving \$157.2 million to participate, while the remaining 4 are participating in the CERC variation only, receiving \$1.6 million.

Both processes are so new that very little evaluation of their efforts has been done. After a year of operation, the HUD-sponsored evaluation of Annual Arrangements¹⁴⁸ suggests at least that the process is developing stronger linkages between community development and housing programs. Further, HUD concludes that all Annual Arrangements have included some actions taken by the community to further stated national goals and the Federal interest. While HUD area offices appear to be honoring project commitments made as part of the Annual Arrangements agreement, processing of applications has rarely been expedited. The Annual Arrangements process has prompted cities to reorganize for better program control and fund utilization. However, the degree

of local chief executive involvement in the negotiations and agreements has not been as great as anticipated¹⁴⁹.

The HUD-sponsored review of Planned Variations¹⁵⁰ suggests a mixed Federal response within HUD and from other agencies. Although Planned Variations, and especially CERC, is stimulating cities to develop a central policy and program coordinating mechanism, implementation has been slow. Yet all of the Planned Variations cities have taken steps to improve the local chief executive's management capability through reorganization and additional staffing. In "full variation cities", Model Cities programs have been expanded, and the role of the chief executive has become stronger. At the same time, citizen participation has been relegated to an advisory position and represents a smaller proportion of the budget. Finally, Planned Variations has not been more than minimally effective in providing State and county government support for the program.

At this stage, Planned Variations and Annual Arrangements have limited value for study as precursors to revenue sharing. The processes are too new to permit conclusive findings. As in the case of Model Cities, these processes lack the authority to compel cooperation both within HUD and from other agencies. Nevertheless, both programs have had partial success in reducing Federal constraints upon local decision-making and in bolstering the role of the local chief executive¹⁵¹.

The discrepancy most amply illustrated by Planned Variations and Annual Arrangements concerns goals, objectives, and priorities that are not shared. Although these programs were designed to minimize Federal intervention in planning and priority-setting, the Project Selection System(PSS) was superimposed upon the localities' freedom to select their own programs. PSS was HUD's method of ensuring that the localities would pursue its goals—chiefly the construction of integrated and low-income housing. Use of PSS therefore

clearly reflects HUD's own judgment that the localities are unlikely to share Federal goals or to assign them the priority that HUD would wish¹⁵².

The ambivalence that leads to a self-contradictory policy of enhancing local power to set priorities while imposing Federal priorities is likely to continue until experience with revenue sharing can overcome the fears that prompt attempts at Federal control. HUD's earlier behavior suggests that considerable frustration might result after the passage of special revenue-sharing legislation unless this ambivalence is faced and dealt with.

Special Revenue Sharing. In 1973, the Nixon administration proposed to consolidate some 70 categorical grant programs into four special revenue sharing programs. One of the four, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, was signed by President Ford into law on August 22, 1974. The Act does not affect HUD's subsidized housing programs, but in effect replaces seven separately funded categorical grant programs. By folding these programs into a single special revenue sharing program to be administered by HUD, the Community Development Act will provide a total of \$11.9 billion of shared revenues to cities, urban counties, and States for community development activities¹⁵³.

Activities for which a community would be permitted to use its shared revenues provided under the Act include any community development activity permitted under the seven categorical programs. These are broadly defined as acquisition, clearance, and renewal of real property and land; relocation payments and assistance to persons and businesses; purchase and development of open space, historic sites, parks, and playgrounds; building of streets, malls, neighborhood and community centers, recreation areas, and other public facilities, including water and sewer facilities; rehabilitation of residential or commercial properties;

elimination of harmful physical conditions that endanger health or safety; and provision of community services considered necessary to carry out the community development objectives of the particular community. The funds may also be used to meet local matching requirements of other Federal community development programs¹⁵⁴.

A hold-harmless provision contained in the bill is designed to assure that metropolitan cities and urban counties that have been receiving more from categorical programs than their annual entitlement would not receive less in the years immediately following enactment. The hold-harmless amount is calculated on the average amount received by the city or urban county under the relevant categorical programs during the five fiscal years ending prior to July 1, 1972. The hold-harmless amount would be granted for two years, and in the succeeding three years the grant would be cut by one-third each year of the excess of the hold-harmless amount over the entitlement amount. Smaller communities that are neither metropolitan cities nor urban counties and therefore are not eligible for an annual entitlement are also protected by hold-harmless provisions, if they had ongoing Model Cities, Neighborhood Development, or Urban Renewal programs funded in the last five years¹⁵⁵.

It is pointless what with funding under the provisions of the Act having only begun—January 1975—to attempt an empirical analysis of the impact of special revenue sharing in relation to its intent. However, several points and arguments can be posited after careful examination of the Act's provisions.

Community development special revenue sharing represents no increase in funds over former HUD appropriations for the programs being folded into block grants¹⁵⁶. Therefore, in terms of total impact upon community development problems, special revenue sharing will not make a greater monetary contribution than did the overstrained categorical programs.

However, the relatively greater freedom of the localities to allocate special revenue sharing monies should enable them to concentrate expenditures where problems are perceived to be the greatest.

The allocation of \$110 million for planning and management assistance is seriously insufficient. The nature of revenue sharing poses much larger local planning and management problems than did the categorical grants procedures, yet only marginal increases are planned in funds for Federal assistance. Revenue sharing will increase both the amount and range of responsibility left to localities. As a result, revenue sharing will intensify the need for improved local planning and management capabilities relative to that present under former Federal programs relying on categorical grants-in-aid. This added demand on planning can be expected to point up deficiencies in present capabilities, especially with respect to the disparities between ends, means, and points of view as discussed in Chapter II. Disparities between the capability to plan and to manage should become more obvious, and scarcity of resources for planning and decision-making can also be expected to be felt more acutely. Yet, under the present legislation, less help is being offered to meet the new challenges than has been available under the old programs. Therefore, it is apparent that without serious attention to planning and management capabilities, the special revenue sharing effort is frivolous.

The failure of the Community Development Act to provide support for areawide and metropolitan organizations leaves the implication that the Federal government is willing to abandon past efforts concerning the survival of these institutions¹⁵⁷. The failure to stress coordinative planning, could be interpreted as an abandonment of a modest but growing Federal commitment to such planning considerations. While appropriations to councils of governments and other multijurisdictional organizations have never been large, 701

support to areawide institutions has steadily increased. Although the inadequacy of past efforts to alleviate the problems of areawide planning is readily apparent, that is certainly no basis upon which to suggest a diminished Federal concern.

In conclusion, special revenue sharing, as a mode of Federal financial assistance to localities, offers new opportunities to allocate resources to what are locally perceived as the most serious problems. At the same time, however, the Community Development Act continues to carry on the tradition of magniloquent, rhetoric and niggardly resources established in the 1960's. Recognizing the fact of life in all fields of domestic social and economic policy that there simply aren't enough resources to go around, does not preclude stating that the amounts authorized under special revenue sharing are grossly inadequate for dealing with the array of metropolitan problems. Unless future increases in the funds are to be made available, much of the promise of the new revenue sharing approach will inevitably go unfilled.

Summary. Planning will have to learn how best to cope with the fiscal realities of the "New Federalism". The scope of urban planning under the new fiscal imperatives, some of them as yet more potential than actual, remains to be determined, but the general outlines can be discerned and the careers of both the categorical-grant and revenue-sharing type of planner may well be subject to further truncation.

The fiscal roots of the New Federalism are quite possibly more compelling in its formulation than its ideological roots as represented by the Nixon administration. Characterizing the fiscal situation leading to "reform" in New-Federalism terms are the following:

1. Continued reliance by both local and State governments on revenues from the Federal government to perform the tasks and services demanded by the voters;

2. An increasing scarcity of discretionary funds at all levels of government, as larger shares of available funds went to segregated trust funds, to special districts and authorities operating on a metropolitan basis, to continuing programs (especially related to welfare and social security), and to salaries for certain classes of civil servants (especially teachers, policemen and firemen);

3. Increasing disparities in fiscal capacity among governments in metropolitan areas, a situation making it increasingly difficult to obtain political consensus for implementation of important metropolitan-wide policies;

4. Increasing concern that built-in inflationary forces would tilt the balance of fiscal federalism irrevocably toward the Federal government;

5. Increasing disenchantment with the effectiveness of many categorical grant programs combined with displeasure in certain quarters with the substance of these programs and with the feeling that the fiscal power of the Federal government gave it excessive influence over local choices.

It is to the credit of the urban planning profession that many of these characteristics of fiscal imbalance were first described and documented by planners interested in getting more comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, and social responsibility into the intergovernmental system. Having done so much, they will have to learn to live with their success.

In sum, the fiscal content of the New Federalism, when stripped of its ideological wrapping, can be defined as a series of measures that seem to suit the public's mood for improvement in the intergovernmental system that formerly provided for widespread discontent. These corrective measures, that collectively represent a change in our methods of operating a federal system, include the following:

1. An emphasis on enhancement of the power of general purpose governments, giving them fiscal resources and greater

control over special districts;

2. An emphasis on enhancement of the power of a chief executive within general purpose government to determine policy, while simultaneously restricting the resources given to subordinate agencies in the form of categorical grants;

3. An emphasis on redistribution of nonproperty taxes by formula from higher to lower governments, combined with a variety of methods for decreasing reliance on taxation of real property; and,

4. An emphasis on consolidation of categorical grants into block grants covering a multitude of purposes and client groups, combined with increasing interest in subsidizing individuals directly rather than subsidizing local governments.

The theory of symbiosis between a fiscal system and urban planning suggests that the previously described adjustments to the federal system will have an impact on the scope of planning. The evidence cited in this chapter of the various changes in the planning environment currently taking place continues to support that theory. The implications of these changes tend to reinforce the trend of thought as witnessed in much of the recent planning theory literature—the scope of urban planning has been enlarged, and theories of the planning process have become more "generic", a term that describes the freeing of the profession from its early servitude to property-related concerns¹⁵⁸.

While local planning commissions and urban renewal agencies were important in the era of Standard Planning¹⁵⁹, decisions are now being made in the "office of the Mayor" by budget and management analysts who spend more effort on the programming and budgeting aspect of their Planning, Programming and Budgeting Systems (PPBS) than on the "planning" aspect.

Where formerly funds for planning could be obtained by a local planning unit (or by a metropolitan agency), under

the "701" or CRP programs by application directly to the Federal government, the New Federalism approach will establish the State government as the disbursing agent. Thus a local form of urban planning has lost one degree of fiscal autonomy and may not survive the gauntlet of review of an application by State officials.

The five-year experiment in General Revenue Sharing is still underway, but experience in the early years of the program justify at least two conclusions; First, planners had very little to say about how such funds were to be spent; and secondly, only miniscule amounts (perhaps none) were allocated to urban-planning-type studies or operations. Thus, while the General Revenue Sharing system represents an attempt to lessen dependence of local government on the property tax, it also represents a decrease in the status of the planner in practice, if not in theory¹⁶⁰.

One special revenue sharing program has been enacted, specifically the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. As a fiscal measure, it would operate by formula (instead of local initiative) to provide funds for a wide variety of dissimilar programs, with few funds earmarked for the planning aspects of these programs and no requirements that any planning process must be adhered to. Moreover, the locus of operational responsibility will pass from specialized agencies to the chief executive of the local government (assisted by a staff of policy advisors); whether urban planning will contribute to this process of decision making is the issue.

Allied to these Federally-inspired approaches for improving intergovernmental relations are other important concepts, among them (1) the metropolitanization of planning, (2) the pressure for areawide approaches to reorganize local governments and for tax-base sharing on a metropolitan level, (3) the establishment of environmental and land use controls under State supervision, and (4) an increase in the res-

possibility of State government over education, finance, health planning, environmental conditions, and many other areas. Thus, as the fiscal structure in a given State adjusts to the new centers of power and responsibility, the locus and definition of planning must also adjust.

Conclusion

The governmental context of planning is a second important part of the service aspect of planning policy formulation. The formal position of the planning agency in the local public bureaucracy is one facet of planning's governmental context. It is not clear how one form of agency organization versus another actually influences the effectiveness of planning. It appears, on the basis of the evidence cited herein, that no single form of agency structure works best under all circumstances. The structure of government in operation within a given community, however, does determine the formal lines of communication between the planner and the rest of the government. The evidence posited by Wright¹⁶¹ showed a high degree of congruence among the responses of chief executives and planning directors with regard to the responsibilities of the planning agency. But this same evidence also suggested a converse and more general conclusion: The nature of urban planning, as defined by activities performed and functional roles, is the result of forces quite dissimilar from types of planning organization. This conclusion suggests that structure is not a "powerful" variable in accounting for variations in more objective performance-based activities. Thus, the influence of the formal organization of the planning agency should be analyzed, but on an individual community basis.

Intergovernmental relations is another important aspect of the governmental context of planning. Federal-State-local relations determine the basic legal framework under which the planner operates. Two types of relationships were dis-

cussed: those relations between identified levels of government, termed horizontal relationships; and relationships between various levels or tiers of government, termed vertical relationships.

Horizontal relationships among officials of different levels of government have been seriously hampered by the historical proliferation of governmental units. This phenomenon has created serious difficulties for local governments in their attempts to cope with metropolitan or areawide problems. The results of their attempts have been less than satisfactory and in general have prompted many efforts to reorganize government so as to combat (1) fragmentation and overlapping of governmental units, (2) disparities between tax and service boundaries, (3) State constitutional and statutory restrictions, (4) ineconomies of scale, and (5) ineffective handling and, thus, poor performance of urban service functions.

This chapter examined the relative strengths and weaknesses of eight major alternative forms of metropolitan reorganization that have been utilized in this country in attempting to overcome the problems associated with metropolitanization. In conclusion, a number of generalizations can be drawn from the previous analysis of these different approaches, and the record of the use that has been made of them.

1. There is no best single approach to governmental reorganization that is applicable to all conditions and times. Every metropolitan area has to consider its own peculiar needs and situation when fashioning its reorganization plan.

2. The various approaches studied are not mutually exclusive, and can be used to supplement one another. The joint exercise of powers and intergovernmental service agreements appears to be a useful approach that could be utilized in almost every metropolitan area, even if following the adoption of a more comprehensive reorganization, such as

city-county consolidation.

3. Use of the milder approaches may prove adequate to meet the need for governmental reorganization in some metropolitan areas on an interim basis. Thus, they could serve as stepping stones to more comprehensive approaches if such approaches are warranted. In fact, the use of these approaches may reduce the need or pressure for a more comprehensive approach to reorganizing local government.

4. Annexation continues to show vitality in many of the metropolitan areas of the country, although it is no longer of much usefulness as an approach to reorganization of local government in the larger, older metropolitan areas. It has been used as a separate approach or in conjunction with other approaches. The negligible use of annexation in the largest urban centers is due to the fact that the central cities are completely surrounded by incorporated territory.

5. Limited purpose metropolitan special districts have proven useful in dealing with urgent special problems of a metropolitan character in the face of the failure of more traditional comprehensive approaches to provide feasible alternatives. However, they have attributes which seriously undermine vigorous local government—they diffuse and weaken citizen interest and control, and erode the strength and importance of general purpose governments.

6. City-county consolidations, which were largely used to accomplish major expansions of jurisdictions before 1900, have shown recent limited potential as a method of governmental reorganization. Its major weakness—limited usefulness in handling metropolitan problems in areas not confined to a single county—will probably prevent it from being an extensively used reform approach. It had its greatest period of impact and usefulness before the automobile accelerated urban sprawl, and before municipal home rule became effective in protecting the boundaries and powers of the great number of units of government that grew up around

the major cities.

7. The federation approach has led to increasing interest in two broad techniques which, when fully developed, incorporate two common basic elements: a two-tier structure of government, and the assignment of certain general-purpose responsibilities to both tiers. Functions not assigned to the areawide government are retained by the municipalities or are shared jointly by both tiers. The two basic hybrid approaches containing these features and which exhibit a reasonable degree of political feasibility are the general purpose areawide approach of the urban county and the instrumentality approach. The true federation approach, favorably regarded by many scholars, lacks political and public acceptance within this country.

The foregoing analysis and general conclusions concerning alternative governmental structures does not establish an adequate basis upon which to conclude that any one or all of these two-level approaches are the best comprehensive solutions to the problem of government reform. The development of a theory of government structure and an evaluation and testing of that theory using valid criteria that relate to a framework of assignment for urban service functions, such as planning, must be attempted. The theoretical dictates of the ensuing model would afford planners with additional information related to the formulation of metropolitan planning policy and the assignment of planning functions. This is one major aspect of Chapter V. However, before this theoretical analysis can be attempted, it is necessary to explore into the political aspects and ramifications of planning on a metropolitan basis. This is the subject matter of the following chapter.

The vertical intergovernmental relationships depicted within this chapter were largely of two kinds: those that exist between the State and local governments, and those between the Federal and local governments. The States have not paid much attention to the planning done by their local

governments. The historical rural bias of the State legislatures may partially explain the State's lack of concern with local planning. States through their constitutions and statutes have considerable legal leverage over the operations of local planning agencies. In most States the legislation governing these agencies dates back to the 1923 "Model Planning Enabling Act". The States' planning enabling statutes, largely based on the "model", tend to be very detailed and generally inhibit local flexibility in the administration of the planning function.

A recent report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations¹⁶² which examined in depth the problems, issues, and solution alternatives concerning the challenges confronting both State and local governments in attempting to modernize archaic governmental institutions, placed the burden of responsibility for any future policy actions squarely on the shoulders of the States. Their specific recommendations as regards the State Role are contained for the reader's information in Appendix A of this report. The author agrees entirely with these recommendations for the time being. It is possible that conclusions to be derived from the subsequent analysis of Chapter V may warrant some extensions to these recommendations. However, it is highly unlikely that any of ACIR's recommendations will sharply disagree with those of this report.

Planning as a profession has, just as have other urban service functions, been hampered by the lack of sound political leadership and effective policies from State government that would promote a more effective and efficient conduct and delivery of required urban planning services. A recent statement, accompanying the aforementioned recommendations of ACIR, adequately depicts the nature of this situation¹⁶³:

All these efforts are geared to facilitating the modernization of local and areawide governmental institutions, so that they may discharge their servicing responsibilities to their respective communities in a more

effective, equitable, efficient, and accountable manner. The primary burden for leadership in this matter is placed on the States. This is as it should be. States no longer can assume the role of the passive bystander in this vital matter. Given the plethora of programs, mechanisms, and special purpose bodies that have by-passed or superseded general local governments, it does not overstate the case to claim that the existence of such local governments, as we have known them, is very much at stake. At this juncture, the State, as the legal parents of the localities and of many of the institutions that compete with them, must assume an active stance, as some States recently have done. The localities obviously have a role here, and a complementary Federal role could be of critical help. In the final analysis, however, the electorate has the final word on all major reforms advanced here. But, the initiating thrust must come from the States and such is the basic assumption undergirding this recommendation.

The Federal government has held considerably more influence over local planning policy and practice than the State governments. This influence evolved out of a series of urban programs involving categorical grants-in-aid. Most of those grants went directly to local governments with the primary objective being to encourage a broader scope of planning that covered an entire metropolitan area. However, the evidence cited in this chapter (and amply documented in previously cited sources), indicates that physical planning has predominated despite recent attempts at emphasizing the social and economic aspects of planning in urban areas. Communities tended to make one-shot studies rather than engage in a continuing planning process as recommended by HUD within the confines of its categorical grants programs. Little effort was made to integrate planning with local decision making, although one emphasis in the HUD 701 Handbook was upon the development of management capability and thus suggests at least partial recognition of this problem. A heavy reliance upon outside consultants, especially in the smaller localities that could not afford to support a planning staff, is indicative of this tendency.

The recent advent of general and special revenue sharing as a replacement for the former grant-in-aid system of fiscal Federal-local dependence has shifted the locus of priority-setting from the national to the local level. Thus, the possibility of a continuing gap between stated program goals at the national level and the realities of local administration will be strengthened simply because of the existing incongruity between the goals and priorities at the national and local levels of government.

Special revenue sharing proposals rely on existing units of government rather than on nontraditional arrangements such as metropolitan organizations or decentralized units within a large city. However, it is clearly evident that many of the problems that planners have been and will be facing transcend traditional political boundaries. In metropolitan areas especially, the situation is one of fragmented jurisdictions with widely disparate resources confronting coherent problems that ignore jurisdictional boundaries. Thus, an important criterion for planning capability under the New Federalism and special revenue sharing will be the ability of State and local planning entities to escape these artificial geographical boundaries and, through coordination procedures or otherwise, make the scope of planning match the scope of the problem. At the same time, however, recent changes in the fiscal system are liberating State and local executives from the burden of urban planning:

1. Fewer categorical-grant programs with their requirements for "planning" means that more money is available for discretionary use by chief executives within State and local governments;
2. Larger amounts of funds distributed from income and sales tax revenues implies less concern over the relationship between planning and the property tax base; and
3. To whatever extent that federal funds designated for planning (of the kind that has supported the profession

in recent years) will be available in the future, the likelihood is that they will be under the control of the State executives, who in turn may disburse them to metropolitan and local agencies.

Planning theory itself may not change in the process, for the profession still needs to wrestle intelligently with such questions as how to define and choose between alternatives, how to encourage and better utilize citizen participation, what is to be included in a cost-benefit analysis, what is the meaning of "urban design", and so on.

It is the scope of urban planning as it is practiced in the field that is the major issue at the present time. Funds for planning will be more at the pleasure of chief executives than in the tranquil days of categorical grants with their planning requirements and of separate funds for planning as was indicative of the "701" programs. Not only do local chief executives have a poor track record in terms of their recognition or appreciation of planning (much preferring a decision making process that maximizes short-term gains), but city mayors, managers and councils alike are finding their power bases draining away to State-wide and metropolitan-wide agencies under the thumb of higher-level chief executives.

In sum, economic efficiency of the local fiscal system was the mainspring of the urban planning fetus during its embryonic stages. As that efficiency-system sowed the seeds of its own destruction, creating a demand for equity and redistribution in the name of social justice, the categorical-grant fiscal system altered the scope of planning. Now a new fiscal system, characterized by non-categorical grants and non-property-based funds in the hands of elected public officials operating more at the State and regional levels than at the local level, has severed the "umbilical cord" of older forms of urban planning and conjured up an image of policy-makers freed from the constraints of land-based tax-

ation.

The preceding analysis and discussion of Federal-local fiscal relationships suggest that urban planning at the local level will diminish until the fiscal wheel turns again to make those public officials responsible for policy and decision making dependent upon revenues derived from, and with the consent of, those who live and work in the affected local area. Whether that time will come, with some new form of local fiscal autonomy emerging out of the State-level cocoon in which the New Federalism has been placed, is uncertain. The only certainty is that the form of the fiscal system, the structure of urban government and the scope of urban planning are inextricably linked.

Notes

1. The subordination of local to state governments is shown in the lack of specific provision for local governments in the U.S. Constitution; by the acceptance in many state courts of "Dillon's rule", which limits local government powers to those explicitly provided for by state constitutions and statutes; and by the failure of local governments to raise sufficient revenues to meet their citizens' service demands, even when their jurisdictions include abundant private wealth. For a more extensive coverage of the relations between cities and states, see John H. Baker, Urban Politics In America (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 28-51.
2. Charles Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 230-236.
3. Robert L. Lineberry and Ira Sharkansky, Urban Politics and Public Policy (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 120.
4. International City Management Association (ICMA), Municipal Yearbook, 1974, eds. Richard Hofrichter and Emily Evershed (Washington: The Association, 1974), Table 3.
5. A good discussion of the council-manager form may be found in Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 168-186. The material presented here is, in part, based on

that discussion.

6. Robert L. Lineberry and Edmund Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities", American Political Science Review, vol. 61 (September 1967), pp. 704-706.
7. U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Governance and Population: The Governmental Implications of Population Change, ed. A. E. K. Nash, vol. IV (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 46-49.
8. Lineberry and Fowler, "American Cities", pp. 700-716, and the literature cited there.
9. U.S. Department of Commerce, The Standard City Planning Enabling Act (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1928).
10. Charles R. Adrian, Governing Urban America (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961), pp. 180-188.
11. Berkeley, California has such an arrangement. Its operations are described and evaluated in: T. J. Kent, The Urban General Plan (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1964).
12. For more details as regards the perspectives and assumptions of this debate see: Frederick N. Cleaveland, "Organization and Administration of Local Planning Agencies", in Local Planning Administration, ed. Mary McLean (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1959), pp. 40-75.
13. Another discussion which stresses the differences in outlook between administrators and planners is appropriate to the point being made here. Robert Daland, "Organization for Urban Planning: Some Barriers to Integration", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 23, no. 4 (Winter 1957), pp. 200-206.
14. John T. Howard, "In Defense of Planning Commissions", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 17, no. 2 (Spring 1951), pp. 89-94.
15. R. G. Tugwell and E. C. Banfield, "The Planning Function Reappraised", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 17, no. 1 (Winter 1951), pp. 46-49.
16. Robert Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 147-182.

17. David W. Craig, "A Plea for the Eventual Abolition of Planning Boards", Planning 1963 (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1963), pp. 62-81.
18. Walker, Urban Government, p. 164.
19. Fagin, "Urban Government", pp. 109-114.
20. Kent, General Plan, passim.
21. Francine F. Rabinovitz and J. Stanley Pottinger, "Organization for Local Planning: The Attitudes of Directors", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 33, no. 1 (January 1967), pp. 27-32.
22. Deil S. Wright, "Governmental Forms and Planning Functions: The Relation of Organizational Structures to Planning Practice", in Planning and Politics: Uneasy Partnership, eds. Thad Beyle and George Lathrop (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1970), pp. 68-105.
23. Ibid., pp. 103-105.
24. For the years 1948 and 1959, data was adapted from a table found in Cleaveland, "Planning Agencies", p. 55. 1963 data and 1972 data were taken directly from the respective years of the Municipal Year Book.
25. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Area-wide (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 21-22. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Local and Area-wide). See also, Thomas P. Murphy and Patricia S. Florestano, The Allocation of Local and Area-wide Functions in Metropolitan Areas (Washington: National Academy of Public Administration, 1973), pp. 3-10.
26. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area-wide, vol. IV, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 2. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Governmental Functions).
27. See, for empirical evidence ACIR, Governmental Functions, pp. 37-41.
28. National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing and the Planning Process (Washington: The Academy, 1974), pp. 41-62.
29. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR),

Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities: Implications for Intergovernmental Relations in Central Cities and Suburbs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 39-55; and, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts, vol. I, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 316-319. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Regional Decision Making).

30. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Challenge of Local Governmental Reorganization, vol. III, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 14. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, The Challenge.)
31. Annmarie H. Walsh, The Urban Challenge to Government (New York: Fredrick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1969), pp. 11-12.
32. Ibid., p. 206.
33. See Daniel J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View from the States (New York: Crowell Publishing Co., 1966), Chapter 1.
34. Melvin R. Levin, Jerome G. Rose and Joseph S. Slavet, New Approaches to State Land-Use Policies, (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1974), pp. 44-48.
35. ACIR, Local and Areawide, p. 223.
36. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Measuring the Fiscal Capacity and Effort of State and Local Areas (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 45-73; and Michael D. Reagan, The New Federalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 33-36.
37. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System, vol. 2 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 108-114.
38. This conclusion is drawn from an analysis of pooled appropriations in terms of grants-in-aid, revenue sharing and block grants. See ACIR, Fiscal Balance, vol. 1, pp. 275-279.
39. National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing, pp. 41-45.

40. ACIR, Local and Areawide, pp. 33-49; ACIR, Metropolitan Social and Economic Disparities, pp. 41-54; ACIR, Fiscal Balance, volumes 1 and 2; ACIR, Measuring Fiscal Capacity, pp. 45-73; and ACIR, Governmental Functions, pp. 87-89, 120-138.
41. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 9-10.
42. Considerable research and documentation as regards government reform measures have been conducted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the Committee for Economic Development, the International City Management Association and a host of researchers and students involved with urban affairs. This section is only meant to introduce the concept of government reform as one central aspect to the whole issue of improved intergovernmental relations. A detailed analysis of the theory behind continuing efforts to revitalize the structure of government on the substate level will be conducted in Chapter V.
43. ACIR, Alternative Approaches to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 20-80; Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Governance: Promise and Performance, vol. II, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 1-110, (Hereafter referred to as Promise and Performance); and Committee for Economic Development (CED), Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas (Washington: The Committee, 1970), pp. 7-10.
44. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 15.
45. Managing the Modern City (Washington: International City Management Association, 1971), pp. 432-440.
46. ACIR, Local and Areawide, p. 215.
47. National Commission on Urban Problems, Building The American City (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 13-16.
48. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1970-1971 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), Tables 6 and 7.
49. Reagan, Federalism, pp. 41-47; and ACIR, Fiscal Balance, vol. 1, p. 153.
50. ACIR, The Challenge, p. 4.

51. For a more detailed coverage of intergovernmental relations as it pertains to the function of urban planning see David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co., 1969), pp. 62-84; and supra, n. 46.
52. Data for Table III-4 was compiled from the following two sources: International City Management Association (ICMA), Municipal Year Book, 1974 (Washington, 1974), Table 2; and, Robert L. Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1971), p. 2.
53. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistics for Federal Regions, States and Metropolitan Areas (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 910-911.
54. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 2.
55. In this context, passage of the Interstate Highway and Defense Act of 1956 contributed to a sense of urgency for a federal policy supporting regional planning in a particular functional area; see, Interstate Highway and Defense Act of 1956, 70 STAT. 374, 23 U.S. C. 101 (1956). Although the "701" program provided a positive thrust for areawide confederalism, grants under this section were only for specific studies leading to comprehensive plans, not for continuing operation and overhead; see, Housing Act of 1954, 68 STAT. 590 (1954), 40 U. S. C. 461 (1965).
56. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 56.
57. Ibid., p. 109.
58. Royce Hansen, Metropolitan Councils of Government (Washington: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966), pp. 3-14.
59. International City Managers' Association (ICMA), Principles and Practice of Urban Planning (Washington: The Association, 1968), p. 33.
60. National Association of Regional Councils, 1972 Regional Council Directory (February 1972), p. i.
61. ICMA, Municipal Yearbook, 1974, p. 13.
62. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 109.
63. ICMA, Principles and Practice, p. 33.

64. International City Managers' Association (ICMA), Local Planning Administration (Chicago: The Association, 1959), pp. 335-340.
65. Russell W. Maddox, Extraterritorial Powers of Municipalities (Corvallis, Oregon: Oregon State College, 1955), pp. 2-4.
66. ICMA, Municipal Yearbook, 1974, pp. 64-65.
67. American Society of Planning Officials, Extraterritorial Zoning, PAS Information Report No. 42 (September 1952), *passim*.
68. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 20-24.
69. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 9-10.
70. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, p. 23.
71. See, for example, ACIR, Promise and Performance, pp. 328-336.
72. ICMA, Principles and Practice, p. 34.
73. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 32-33.
74. Compiled from the findings of a national survey of nearly 6,000 incorporated municipalities conducted jointly by the ACIR-ICMA staffs. For a complete discussion of these findings see ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 29-52.
75. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Intergovernmental Service Agreements for Smaller Municipalities, vol. 5, no. 1 (Washington: International City Management Association, 1973), pp. 123-136.
76. ACIR, The Challenge, p. 52.
77. A much more prolific type of special district is the urban special district, which contains a small part of a metropolitan area, usually an unincorporated, densely settled part. Since this is not generally a method of broadening the jurisdiction of local units of government, it is excluded from treatment as a method of governmental reorganization in metropolitan areas as defined for this outline.
78. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), State-Local Finances: Significant Features and Suggested Legislation (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 160-161.

79. Also, some special districts are created to perform areawide functions only as a supplement to the continued performance of the function on a local basis, and thus the threat to political feasibility is not immediately obvious.
80. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), The Problem of Special Districts in American Government (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 75-81.
81. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, p. 51; and ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 35-36.
82. Melvin Mogulof, Five Metropolitan Governments (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1972), p. 119.
83. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 43-45.
84. Ibid., pp. 38-43.
85. ACIR, Promise and Performance, pp. 116-118.
86. National League of Cities, Adjusting Municipal Boundaries: Law and Practice (Washington: The League, 1966), p. 4.
87. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 59-60.
88. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1972 Boundary and Annexation Survey Report" (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1973), p. 2.
89. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Factors Affecting Voter Reactions to Governmental Reorganization in Metropolitan Areas (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 37-38, 49-50.
90. See previous section on Extraterritorial Controls.
91. ACIR, The Challenge, p. 86.
92. Richard L. Forstall, "Changes in Land Area for Larger Cities, 1960-1970", Municipal Year Book: 1972 (Washington: ICMA, 1972), p. 87.
93. This conclusion is drawn from the previous discussion concerning special purpose districts and their weakening of general purpose governments.
94. This is the opinion of ACIR as a result of its research

and findings documented in its recent report on Sub-state Regionalism and the Federal System. See ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 82-107, passim.

95. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 64-65.
96. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1972 Boundary and Annexation Survey Report", p. 2.
97. ICMA, Principles and Practice, p. 34.
98. The recent findings of ACIR highlight this statement. The 13 city-county consolidations approved since 1962 represent more adoptions than occurred during the previous century and a half. However, from another perspective, the number of city-county consolidations is unimpressive. In 1970, of the 127 single-county SMSA's in the United States, only three were city-county consolidations. See ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 90-92.
99. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, p. 73.
100. Norman Beckman, "Metropolitan Area Trends and Developments", Municipal Year Book: 1974 (Washington: ICMA, 1974), p. 12.
101. Council of State Governments, The States and the Metropolitan Problem (Chicago, 1956), p. 53.
102. Administrative economies from elimination of duplicated activities are likely to be greatest where the city and the overlying county with which it consolidates are closest to one another in size. See ACIR, Promise and Performance, p. 45, 62.
103. The converse situation indicates a major weakness of the city-county consolidation approach: It has limited usefulness in handling metropolitan problems in areas that are not confined to a single county.
104. A good summary discussion of the issues and problems surrounding the milieu of voter reactions pertaining to government reorganization referenda is contained in Vincent Marando, "Local Government Reorganization: An Overview", National Academy of Public Administration, November 7, 1972 (unpublished), pp. 1-40. For a discussion of the negative attitudes of most urban black residents concerning metropolitan reorganization, see ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 101-104.
105. Marando, "Local Government Reorganization: An Overview", p. 4.

106. ICMA, Municipal Year Book: 1974, p. 12.
107. ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 93-94.
108. Committee for Economic Development (CED), Modernizing Local Government (New York: The Committee, 1966), pp. 11-13.
109. ACIR, Alternative Approaches, pp. 75-76.
110. CED, Reshaping Government, pp. 70-83.
111. ACIR, Local and Areawide, pp. 111-114.
112. American Institute of Planners Planning Policy Committee, "The Emergence of Metropolitan Planning", a Background Paper (Chicago, 1965), pp. 10-20; and CED, Reshaping Government, pp. 51-56.
113. Mogulof, Five Metropolitan Governments, pp. 82-83.
114. ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 97-101.
115. ACIR, Local and Areawide, pp. 111-112.
116. A 1972 referendum to alter the nature of metropolitan Dade County, Florida government was rejected by a vote of 66,998 to 144,274. Under the proposal, the position of county manager would have been replaced by an elected mayor, an office of ombudsman would have been established, and district elections would have been substituted for at-large elections for the county commission. ICMA, Municipal Year Book: 1974, p. 12.
117. ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 106-107.
118. Reagan, Federalism, pp. 33-44.
119. Many of the important arguments for and against home rule are summarized by W. Brook Graves, American Intergovernmental Relations (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), pp. 205-215, passim. For a general discussion of the concept, history and application of home rule, see Adrian, Governing Urban America, pp. 180-181.
120. Ranney, Planning and Politics, pp. 62-64.
121. This subject is discussed from the planner's point of view by : Peter Nash and Richard Strecker, "Legislative Reapportionment, Urban Planning and the Supreme Court", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 28, no. 3 (August 1962), pp. 145-155.

122. Ibid., p. 154.
123. ICMA, Principles and Practice, pp. 36-37.
124. Ibid., p. 37.
125. A similar arrangement also exists in the State of Indiana and in the city of Indianapolis. See, ACIR, Promise and Performance, pp. 64-70.
126. William I. Goodman, "Urban Planning and the Role of the State", State Government, vol. 35 (Summer 1962), pp. 149-153.
127. Reagan, Federalism, pp. 86-88.
128. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
129. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 168-176.
130. For an excellent descriptive history of the development of grants-in-aid, see W. Brook Graves, Intergovernmental Relations in the United States (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), chapters XIV-XVI.
131. President's Advisory Committee on Government Housing Policies and Programs, Recommendations on Government Policies and Programs (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 173-176.
132. For a complete description of the functions of the 701 program, see Comprehensive Planning Assistance Requirements and Guidelines for a Grant, HUD Handbook No. 1 (March 1972), CM Publication CPM 604; and supra, n. 55.
133. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 168.
134. U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Circular A-95 (Washington, July 24, 1969); and Title I, Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, as summarized in HUD, The Model Cities Program (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 9-12.
135. National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing, pp. 18-19.
136. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD Challenge (Washington, November 1974), pp. 2-3.
137. Ibid., p. 2.
138. National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing, pp. 25.

139. Bureau of the Budget, Section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966: Two Years' Experience (Washington, 1969), p. 1.
140. Melvin B. Mogulof, Governing Metropolitan Areas (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1971), p. 6.
141. All 50 states now have some form of statewide A-95 review and comment function. Additionally, all HUD's designated areawide planning agencies, of which there are over 200, utilize the A-95 review procedures. Program applications requiring review have been added by OMB since the inception of the system, so that there are now over 100 federal programs for physical, economic, and social planning that come under the A-95 procedure.
142. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 148-153.
143. Reagan, Federalism, pp. 86-88.
144. This section borrows heavily from the following sources in order to preserve consistency while striving for brevity: ACIR, Regional Decision Making, pp. 155-156; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Planned Variations: First Year Survey, Community Development Evaluation Series No. 7 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-59; and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Annual Arrangements Phase I, Community Development Evaluation Series No. 6 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-40.
145. According to the Evaluation Division of HUD's Office of Community Development, as of March 31, 1973, 110 cities had completed agreements to operate under Annual Arrangements and another 126 cities were in the process of negotiating such agreements.
146. HUD, Planned Variations, p. 1.
147. Ibid., pp. iii-iv.
148. HUD, Annual Arrangements, pp. 15-35, presents preliminary findings with respect to the Annual Arrangements process "as a means of 1) achieving coordination among HUD Programs; 2) achieving the purposes of special revenue sharing within the framework of existing legislation; and 3) improving the operating relationships between the HUD field offices and the cities".
149. Ibid., pp. 33-34, indicates variation in chief executive involvement related to the form of local government.

Local chief executive participation was generally higher in the manager-council form of government than in the strong mayor-council. The larger cities have generally had the least chief executive involvement in the negotiations.

150. HUD, Planned Variations, pp. 9-58, offers preliminary findings with respect to the Planned Variations demonstration "as a way to convert a portion of the present Model Cities program into a test of what can be accomplished under the revenue sharing approach to intergovernmental relations".
151. ACIR, Regional Decision Making, p. 156.
152. Ibid., p. 163.
153. HUD Challenge, p. 2.
154. Ibid., p. 3.
155. National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing, p. 51.
156. Reagan, Federalism, pp. 125-132.
157. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Special Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of the Administration's Grant Consolidation Proposals (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 24.
158. See, for example, John Friedman, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), pp. 1-193, passim; Anthony Catanese, "Plan? or Process?", Planning, (June, 1974), pp. 14-16; John Friedman and Barclay Hudson, "Knowledge and Action: A Guide to Planning Theory", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 40, no. 1 (1974), pp. 2-16; Martin Krieger, "Some New Directions for Planning Theories", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 40, no. 3 (1974), pp. 156-163; and Stephen Grabow and Allan Heskin, "Foundations for a Radical Concept of Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 39, no. 2 (1973), pp. 106-114.
159. The "Standard" era of planning is a term used by the planning profession to encompass the context of planning practice and theory as it was conducted from 1900 to the beginning of the categorical grants period.
160. For a good discussion of General Revenue Sharing and its implications for the urban planning process, see National Academy of Sciences, Revenue Sharing, pp. 42-46.

161. Supra, n. 22.

162. ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 151-154.

163. Ibid., p. 154.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLITICS OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING

Traditionally, planners have been characterized as professionals endowed with peculiar technical abilities which would, if enacted *carte blanche*, cure the ills of the cities through adjustments in the physical and social environment. This acquired competence supposedly set them apart from the dirty business of bargaining over selfish interests which was thought to be the context of politics. Elected officials possessing the proper legal authority to formulate public policy were supposed to accept the planners pronouncements with a sigh of relief. When they did not, the planner normally concluded that the politician was more concerned with his own selfish ambitions than with the good of the city.

Somewhat to the anguish of the proponents of planning ideology, recommendations of the planner have more often than not been rejected by the elected officials. Part of this rejection is explained by the traditional dichotomy between the political and the governmental administrative roles. The latter, represented by the various bureaucracies throughout the three levels of the federal system, actually do the things we think government does. Yet it is the former role, that of the political system, which actually authorizes and pays for the governmental goods and services. Planning, unfortunately, has been thrust into the untenable middle. Thus, truly effective planning becomes virtually impossible. The larger portion of the elected officials' rejection concerns the vast differences in the temporal bases of long-range, area-wide planning versus the short-term objectives of politicians¹. Much of the responsibility for failing to accommodate this difference rests with the institution of planning and its "end state" approach as previously discussed. Gradually, however, planners have begun to realize that any

kind of public policy (including planning) affects individual values. Since all people within a governmental jurisdiction do not generally share identical values, the formulation of public policy will most likely be accompanied by conflict. The process of resolving or managing conflict over public policy is what politics is all about.

In many ways the process of metropolitanization described in Chapter II has shaped the scope and focus of the politics of metropolitan planning. The distribution of social and economic characteristics in the metropolis has created a situation where very different kinds of planning issues arise in different parts of the metropolitan area. This fact results in two major political ramifications. In the first place it is very difficult to plan on an area-wide basis as was previously stressed. Secondly, planners in different parts of the metropolis will confront varying (and often conflicting) kinds of politics. This point will be of major concern in this chapter.

Planning, Conflict and Decision Making

Few, if any, planning policy decisions do not involve value judgements. Consequently, the formulation of planning policy is often accompanied by conflict². In making recommendations based on technical considerations, the planner is also making value judgements. The allocation of land to particular uses, as represented in a land-use plan, has both technical and value content. How much land should be devoted to low-cost housing for low-income families in a community and what priority should that form of housing have relative to other aspects of a city's growth cycle? Those low-income families and persons who feel that their present living accommodations are inadequate would favor a plan which places a high priority on the development of housing units that coincides with their needs. On the other hand, the downtown businessmen feel that they need to have more

affluent customers living nearby. Thus, they would favor a plan which places a high priority on replacing "slums" with middle and upper income housing or parking garages. Whose values come first, is quite clearly a matter to be solved through the political process. Though there are technical considerations in these issues, there is also a need to weigh the values involved. Both professional planning service and political considerations must form the basis for much planning policy.

Like it or not the planner is a key participant in the politics of planning. His initial decisions will often generate actual or potential conflict. He may go out and drum up support for his proposals from within the impacted community, or make his decisions in line with his own values and ignore both the community and the politicians. Alternatively, he may decide to alter his initial decisions so as to avoid any form of conflict.

Eventually, however, some elected official(s) must decide how or if they should act on the planner's recommendations. In some situations the mayor or city manager will have the responsibility for acting on planning proposals while in other circumstances the city council or a number of different officials will have this authority. Assuming that these officials wish to be re-elected, it is intuitively likely that they will be very interested in the political implications of planning policy recommendations. Thus, an elected official will search for a policy that will produce the most satisfaction on the part of his constituency while generating the least amount of dissatisfaction. In some instances, there will exist the need to persuade the voters of the benefits to be derived from a given policy. At other times the politician will have to compromise either his or his planner's position in order to satisfy powerful opposition to the measures of the proposed policy.

Describing how planning recommendations are transformed

into public policy through the interstices of the political process is complicated. The relative amounts of technical and political content of a planning decision will vary from issue to issue and from community to community. These variations are primarily due to the large number of factors which determine political behavior relative to planning in a given community. In order to employ methods to manage or resolve any subsequent conflict due to the wide variation of political behavior, it is necessary to examine the broad ranges of conflict and political involvement in planning³.

Political Involvement In Metropolitan Planning

The politics of planning is a dynamic process involving the resolution of conflict over daily issues which are to a large extent influenced by past decisions. The formulation of most planning policies involves a continuous series of interactions between the planner, elected or appointed governmental officials and non-governmental participants in the planning process⁴. Private groups or individuals react to proposed or actual planning policy by making demands on either elected public officials or the planner. The elected officials in turn make demands on the planner either as a result of pressure from private groups and individuals or in anticipation of that pressure. In addition, some governmental officials may become actively involved with a planning issue if they feel that the outcome of that issue would affect their position in the government. This involvement may take the form of direct pressure on the planner to change his recommendations, specific action based on the planner's recommendations, a lack of action on these recommendations, or pressure on some other governmental official⁵.

The scope of these interactions has a great deal of influence on the degree of potential or actual conflict which a planning issue will generate. Further, it is fairly apparent that most of these interactions are politically

motivated. Therefore, a knowledge of the kinds of things which prompt groups or individuals to become involved with a planning issue is essential to an understanding of the politics of planning. Generally, the scope of political involvement can be understood by determining why certain groups and individuals are prone to take political action on a given issue, uncovering the means which they have at their disposal to influence the resolution of the issue and observing how they would utilize this influence. One method that has been used in several studies dealing with political involvement in local government involves answering the following questions: Who are the actors involved and what are their stakes in the resolution of the planning issue in question? What political resources do these actors possess and how effectively do they use those resources? The major theoretical framework employed in these studies is used here as the basis for explaining the nature and extent of political involvement in planning policy matters⁶.

The actors in the politics of planning consist of government officials and their employees as well as individuals and groups who do not work for the government. Some elected officials of local government become automatically involved in the politics of planning since they must ultimately decide on the recommendations of the planner. In either the mayor-council or city manager form of municipal government, the chief executive will introduce planning legislation to the city council or act directly on the planning agency's recommendations. He may also have to respond to actual or potential pressures from either governmental or non-governmental actors before a decision is made. Other governmental employees besides the elected officials may decide to become involved in the resolution of a particular planning issue. This involvement is most likely to occur when an individual feels that the planner is dealing with a policy area in which his department or agency has an interest. For example,

Altshuler noted in examining a conflict over the location of a major highway in St. Paul, that the planners and the highway officials became major adversaries in the dispute⁷. Thus, local administrators are often actors in the politics of planning because many planning issues affect departments within the local bureaucracy.

As noted previously, the impact of many municipal planning policies reaches well beyond the boundaries of the municipality making that policy. Further, any number of governmental actors involved with planning are not employed by the same government for which the planner works. Some of these local public officials work for other local governments. When a local jurisdiction is affected by the planning policies of a nearby municipality, its government officials will generally try to influence such policies. Frequently, officials of State and Federal governments become involved in local planning decisions. The traditional and often extensive role of the Federal government in local planning through the many Federally funded programs makes their participation in local planning decisions almost automatic.⁸ Many State officials will become involved with local planning issues by virtue of the advisory role that State government has in local planning matters⁹.

Several types of non-governmental actors play a substantial role in the politics of planning. Because elected officials generally wish to be re-elected, the electorate as a whole is at least indirectly involved. An incumbent will generally not adopt planning policies which he believes would be unsatisfactory to his constituency. He would, however, encourage policies that produce tangible results in a short period of time. Large construction projects, for example, show the electorate that their representatives are doing something. From this standpoint, therefore, the electorate is generally involved in the politics of planning.

Depending on the planning issues at stake, a wide variety of private groups and individuals enter the process of planning policy formulation more directly. Neighborhood associations, ad hoc citizen groups and private individuals will normally take an active stand on matters of planning policy when it affects them personally. Local businessmen frequently become active participants in the resolution of planning issues. Decisions that affect the real estate market frequently result in the involvement of appraisers and agents in the policy making process. Labor unions, concerned with the welfare of their members, sometimes speak out on matters of planning policy. Finally, the mass communications media will often push for victory or defeat of various planning proposals.

All groups and individuals, be they governmental or non-governmental, do not concern themselves with every recommendation of the planners. Rather, they are highly selective about those planning issues in which they become involved. Some knowledge about the kinds of things that motivate people and groups to take an active part in the resolution of specific planning issues would help in understanding political involvement and the generation of conflict. Generally speaking, people become politically involved in a planning question when they feel that they have a stake in the outcome of the matter¹⁰.

There are several different kinds of stakes leading to political involvement. One is acquiring and maintaining an elected office; or related to this, the desire and ambition to advance politically. This kind of stake is particularly important to those elected officials who have the responsibility for acting on the planner's recommendations. Their reaction to his plan alternatives will be greatly affected by the possible political ramifications of any action or stance they take.

A second stake in the outcome of planning policy decisions is economic. Many businesses or individuals stand to gain or lose money and/or jobs as a result of the implementation of planning policy. For example, central city businessmen have economic stakes in the redevelopment policies of the central business districts. In one large midwestern city, it was proposed that an extensive residential area be redeveloped as a commercial center¹¹. This effectively would have created a new central business district. Those businessmen whose establishments were located in the existing district fought the plan because it would adversely affect them. Clearly, the stakes in this planning issue were economic. The redevelopers who planned to invest in the proposed development had favorable economic stakes, because if the plan were adopted they would make money through their investment.

The level of services offered by the government constitutes a third stake in planning. The capital improvements program which schedules all of the municipality's capital investment is a good example of this type of stake. Major street improvements, school buildings, new fire stations, and expanded park facilities are among the many items covered by these programs. Those groups or individuals who place a high value on the quality of their streets or the expansion of a school's physical plant would have a public service stake in the priorities established within the capital budget.

Stakes which motivate involvement with the politics of planning are not always as tangible as public office, money, jobs and services. Desires for prestige, power, feelings of altruism and other intangibles can also be motivating factors¹². Sometimes an ideological belief such as an aversion to Federal government programs in local areas causes citizens to take a stand against urban renewal projects. Sayre and Kaufman have observed that the goal

of having a master plan as a guide to local policy is itself an ideological stake for certain groups in New York City¹³. It is difficult to determine who might have intangible stakes, because people who have such stakes cannot always say exactly why they have become involved in a conflict over a particular issue.

Many of the groups and individuals who become involved in the politics of planning have a combination of these different kinds of stakes. The extent of the combined stakes in the outcome of a planning issue does not necessarily determine the final decision¹⁴. The political influence of the actors in the politics of planning may be very unequal. The possession of political resources will, in part, govern the amount of influence that can be used over the decisions of the planner and the elected officials. Just as there are different kinds of stakes in planning policy, there are also different political resources which individuals or groups can use to influence public decisions. The vote is a significant political resource. Those who control a large number of votes tend to find that their viewpoints on matters of planning policy are very important to those elected officials who must eventually make such policy. There are also other kinds of resources which determine the ability to influence those who control the votes as well as the voters. Money is one resource which can be used in many ways to include bribery or the financing of political campaigns. Control of jobs is an important political resource with the promise of employment being highly significant in influencing the way people vote. Another important resource is control over the dissemination of information. Those who own the local newspapers and radio and television stations have considerable potential power since the news media can determine what kinds of information the public will receive and the manner in which they receive it. It is rather common for participants in a planning conflict who have little or

no control over public information to publish and distribute issue-relevant information themselves. A person's popularity or social status can be a resource since an individual who is known and respected will generally be able to find a sympathetic audience for his views on an issue¹⁵.

Technical knowledge is another resource used in the resolution of planning issues. Planners frequently use their acquired expertise as a source of power in resolving planning conflicts. Although the position that "I know what's best for you because I'm a professional planner" is not infallible, there is evidence that it is convincing to some people when it is backed up by a certain amount of technical ability¹⁶. Closely related to technical expertise is the resource of knowledge. Planners, for example, are in a commanding position to know what the future impact of alternative policy proposals is apt to be. Not only do they have a wide range of studies at their disposal but their knowledge as to the correct procedures for obtaining Federal grant monies is also an important means of influence. Cities in need of funds (and most are) will pay close attention to those with proven ability to acquire outside fiscal resources¹⁷.

One final type of political resource is legality. All governmental officials have a certain amount of legality on their side by virtue of the formal powers which they possess. The mayor in a strong mayor-council form of urban government has a considerable legal resource due to the importance of the kind of public decisions he can legally make. Additionally, the council members themselves would possess extensive legal resources.

Knowledge of the distribution of stakes and resources relative to a planning issue is not a sufficient basis for predicting the role that individuals and groups will play in deciding that issue. All groups and individuals do not utilize their resources in an equally effective manner because of differences in the extent to which they will use the re-

sources they have and how effectively they employ those which they elect to use. Dahl made a useful distinction, on the basis of the above, between actual and potential influence.¹⁸ No groups or individuals will completely realize their potential influence unless they fully utilize all of the resources they have at their disposal. Generally, it is doubtful that there is ever a time when all individuals and groups with political resources are aware of their potential influence. There will always be potentially influential actors who, at any point in time, are not using all of their political resources. Determining how much of these slack resources will eventually be used will depend on the stakes involved in the outcome of a planning policy issue. Further, other intangible factors such as the ability to see how political involvement would further one's objectives coupled with the knowledge of how to use resources will contribute significantly to the determination of the actual use of resources¹⁹.

Predicting the political consequences of planning policy under the above set of circumstances is a difficult process at best. Any political analyst, be he a planner, politician or academician, would have great difficulty determining whose stakes would be involved in a particular planning issue. The difficulty of determining slack resources further complicates the prediction problem. As suggested by Clawson, the process of land development at any point in time involves an extensive assortment of vested interests²⁰. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to tell how those interests would be affected by a change in the process resulting from outcomes of new planning policy decisions. The unused political resources in the system can suddenly be used by those which have them with dramatic and unforeseen consequences.

The concept of slack resources is helpful in explaining the uncertainties of the politics of planning and in understanding the behavior of elected officials relative to plan-

ning issues. As an issue begins to take shape, the political decision makers will note who is and who is not involved. A knowledge of the individuals and groups with stakes in an issue who are not using their resources can influence an elected official's reaction to the planner's recommendation. Normally a politician will be reluctant to commit himself to a planning policy if the political consequences of his commitment are nebulous. Since the distribution of the costs and benefits of planning policy are often difficult to ascertain, there is apt to be a negative political environment for the implementation of planning proposals. Even when the costs and benefits are known, the potential opposition will often be stronger than the potential support. This is probably because the benefits of planning are often abstract and obscure or they are geared largely for future generations, whereas the costs associated with the implementation of planning policy are direct and immediate. Therefore, the probability that those who must bear the costs of a planning policy will organize for opposition is greater than the likelihood that the beneficiaries of the policy will organize to support that policy²¹. Thus, the existence of slack resources in the local political system will cause the political office holder to look unfavorably at those planning proposals which he associates with potential conflict.

A Rational Basis for Political Involvement in Planning

The stakes which individuals and groups have in a planning issue, their political resources and the way in which they use those resources provide a framework for analyzing the scope of political involvement and the conflict that may be generated by a given planning issue.²² In order, however, to understand why the stakes and resources involved in the planning process vary from issue to issue and from community to community, it is necessary to ask what factors

explain the variations in the stakes and resources that are affected by planning issues? Five factors have been chosen as most pertinent and causal in developing a framework for the present discussion. They are: The dimensions of planning policy, local political culture, the role of the planner, community power structures, and community socio-economic characteristics.

The Dimensions of Planning Policy

Planning differs significantly from other functions of local government. The more traditional activities, such as police and fire, have a clearly defined scope of activity; planning does not²³. The content of the municipal planner's work varies considerably from agency to agency. In short, planning policy can have many different dimensions. By considering the dimensions of planning policy as a factor in the basis of political involvement in planning, it is suggested that the nature of the planner's work itself is an important aspect of the politics of planning. For this reason the various dimensions of planning policy are presented and described in an attempt to uncover the nature of the affect of the planning function on political participation in the formulation of planning policy. There are four dimensions of planning policy which seem relevant to the intended purpose: Time, the subject matter of planning, the scope of planning decisions, and the nature of the public commitments which such decisions require.

All of planning is concerned with the future. However, some planning policies are directed to events which will occur almost immediately while other policies are concerned with various aspects of the more distant future. Thus, in terms of time, planning policy can be short, intermediate or long range. We can call the formulation of long-range planning policy "plan making activity". Short-range planning policy involves decisions based on policies which have already

been made and which will lead to immediate action. Intermediate-range planning policy is a relatively new creation of the planners which attempts to tie together in a programmatic way the idealistic activity of plan making with the more realistic problems of plan implementation — the matter of short-range planning²⁴. We will call intermediate-range planning "tactical plan making" for want of an acceptable term from the profession of planning. The time dimension of planning policy is best conceived as a continuum rather than these three categories. Politically, however, planning policy falls into one of the three classifications described above. Potential actors are most apt to become involved when the resolution of an issue will result in immediate action. Thus as the potential actors become active over an issue, the political stakes in that issue become clear. With this knowledge they can then assess the consequences of policies which result in immediate action. But plan making activity requires the formulation of policies which do not require action until some time in the future. This creates problems for the decision-maker. First, it becomes more difficult to determine what the immediate political consequences of his decisions will be. Second, it is hard for the politician to know what the future political implications of his decision will be since the whole structure of actors, stakes and resources will change. Thus, the time dimension has a considerable effect on the degree of political uncertainty connected with planning. For this reason the political acceptability of long-range planning policy will depend largely on the other three dimensions of planning²⁵.

The subject matter of plans is one of these dimensions and varies considerably depending upon the extent to which they consider social and economic development as a by-product. Additionally, physical plans differ in the extent to which they involve activities of other departments and agencies of

the government. Furthermore, the subject matter of the plan can go beyond physical development and cover practically everything the government is doing²⁶. Conceptually, we can classify plans along a continuum with plans that consider only physical development at one end and the policies plan at the other end.

Another dimension of planning is the scope of the decisions that are required by the plan. This dimension can also be described in terms of a continuum. At one end of this continuum would be the type of plan that calls only for marginal changes in existing policies. To illustrate: suppose we are looking at that part of the plan which deals with traffic. An incremental decision concerning traffic would be directed toward one or more specific traffic problems such as the daily traffic jam during rush hour at a particular intersection of streets. The solution might be to make some streets one way or to synchronize traffic signals. At the other end of the continuum would be the very broad sweeping decisions. Using the traffic example, a broad sweeping decision might require that the entire metropolitan area transportation system be changed by building new highways and mass transit facilities. Therefore, an incremental decision calls for only marginal changes in the status quo while the broad sweeping decision calls for extensive changes.

A final dimension of planning involves the nature of the commitments which the plan requires the elected officials to make. This dimension adds another continuum to our model. At one end is the very vague or general commitment; i.e., "The city will enact measures to study and solve the peak hour traffic problems". At the other end of the continuum are very specific commitments such as "The city will solve the peak hour traffic problem by rerouting the southbound traffic on Halstead through Vine and Cummins streets and... while synchronizing the four traffic signals from 5th to 8th streets...".

These latter three dimensions can be combined into a three-dimensional model that lies within the fourth dimension of time²⁷. In Figure IV-1, the three continua have been drawn with each bisecting one another at right angles. The combined model is enclosed in a cube. Any plan can be represented as a point falling within the cube. Each axis of the cube represents one of the continua discussed above. One axis defines the subject matter of planning. This axis is bounded at one extreme by the completely physical plan and at the other extreme by the policies plan. In reality, of course, these limits are only approached and in between them lie the more commonly investigated matters of "comprehensive" planning, economic planning, school planning, land use planning, tot lot planning, etc. Another axis defines the scope of decisions with one extreme indicating incremental decision making and the other extreme the broad, sweeping decisions. The third axis defines the continuum which illustrates the relative degree of commitment which will be required of political decision-makers if they adopt the plan. The bounds of this continuum range from very general to very specific commitments.

This cube diagram illustrates the range of different plans that could be developed. Theoretically, there would be an almost infinite number of combined positions along the three continua in which a plan may fall. For example, point A of Figure IV-2 represents the meeting place of points b, c, and d. A plan classified as A would be one dealing with all public policies, calling for very extensive changes and requiring very specific commitments. A plan classified as E (the meeting place of points f, g, and h) is at the other extreme. This plan deals only with the physical environment, involves only incremental decisions and very vague commitments. Point J, on the other hand, illustrates a combination lying somewhere in between points A and E. This plan, where f, g, and h meet, is one that strongly emphasizes the phys-




Figure IV-1. A Conceptual Model Depicting a Rational Basis for Political Involvement in Planning

ical environment, involves decisions that tend to be incremental and requires a moderate degree of specific commitments.

From this model, we can now begin to examine how the type of planning which the planning agency is doing influences the politics of planning. Plan A, the comprehensive policies plan, has the least likelihood of being adopted intact. In the first place, plan A exhibits the greatest potential for conflict. As the plan becomes increasingly more comprehensive, the number of people and stakes affected by the plan increases²⁸. Due to the negative bias in planning, greater political participation in the planning process is apt to mean less prospect for the plan itself remaining intact.

A second reason that the probability for the political survival of plan A is low, is that it raises many political




Figure IV-2. Typical Combinations of the Elements Contained in the Planning Policy Model

questions not answerable by either the planner or politician. All public policy is associated with a multitude of vested interests none of which can be determined until policies are changed. Thus, the political ramifications of a plan to change public policy is quite often an unknown variable. Politicians do not like making firm commitments in the absence of such knowledge. Therefore, comprehensive policy plans tend to receive a lukewarm reception from the decision-makers, since they must bear the burden of any adverse political consequences.

Plans which fall into the A category are not politically attractive because they tend to be difficult to ameliorate given the realities of our local pluralistic political system. Banfield and Wilson have argued that the American political system operates through bargaining and compromise²⁹.

However, this method of operation is incompatible with the comprehensive planners' ideal of implementing sweeping conceptions of the "public interest". Altshuler has suggested that the planner becomes an arbitrator among all the conflicting interests that are touched by the content of an accepted comprehensive plan³⁰. The plan, by definition, is based on a broad array of goals and objectives which presents the planner-arbitrator with two problems³¹. First, he must develop criteria that can be a basis for policies that will support the intended goals, knowing full well that his knowledge of the interrelationships among the policy areas is not sufficient for such a broad purpose. Secondly, the justification for having the planner in the role of arbitrator is contingent on the existence of at least a partial community-wide consensus as pertains to the goals in the plan. Therefore, conflict must be considered as minor disagreements over the means by which to achieve commonly held ends. Altshuler found, however, that in Minneapolis and St. Paul the planners were not even able to have a sustained discussion on which goals should be included in the plan³². Additionally, in a pluralistic political system, the planner is not likely to find agreement even if a public discussion of goals could be set up. Therefore, the planner cannot, according to Altshuler, justify an arbitrator's role for himself. Rather, the political decision-maker who can bargain and compromise to obtain commonly held goals and objectives should be the arbitrator.

Altshuler's argument applies mainly to plans which are classified in our model as A or those close to A. Plans of the E variety do not generate as much of a political problem because they are based on a limited set of objectives which can be more easily determined and for which consensus is more likely to be obtained. Thus, planning activities which do not involve immediate action, which cover a broad range of subject matter, which require sweeping changes and which

also require specific policy commitments from politicians are the least likely to be implemented. Such plans have the greatest potential for conflict, are full of uncertainties concerning their political ramifications and are the most difficult to reconcile given the character of our local political system.

Local Political Culture

Another factor which can affect the politics of planning is the political culture of a community. The term political culture refers to the expectations which the people in a community have relative to the things which government ought to be doing³³. Political culture, when applied to planning, affects the viewpoints of the residents of a community as pertains to planning being a function of government.

In the United States as a whole, planning is generally regarded as a proper function of local government³⁴. This, however, has not always been the case. Planning in earlier times was rejected as being inconsistent with the predominant liberal interpretation of freedom and democracy. Planning at the national level is still somewhat stigmatized by being associated with socialism or communism. At the local level, fortunately, most people today do not feel that planning is inconsistent with democracy. This attitude is probably due to the fact that local planning in its earliest stages was advocated by highly reputable people and was associated with political reform movements³⁵. In sum, planning at the local level was presented to the American people as a possible solution to the very visible and serious problems of cities which the private market system had not been able to control.

While the political culture of the United States generally accepts planning as a function of local government, the degree of support varies from community to community³⁶. Further, it is difficult to pin down the reasons for differences in political culture. Attitudes toward the planning function

may be shaped by such variables as the length of time the planning function has been established in a community, the experiences of the community's residents with planners and planning in the past, and the strength of community sentiment in allowing planners to do what they should do with a minimum of interferences. One hypothesis about local political behavior in relation to differences in political culture links socio-economic characteristics of the population to attitudes about the role of government³⁷. Banfield and Wilson argue that there are two kinds of discernable political ethos. One is derived from Anglo-Saxon Protestant values which the authors have termed a "public regarding" view of government. This type of ethos suggests that government should do those things which will benefit the community "as a whole". According to Banfield and Wilson, middle and upper-class people tend to have such an outlook. The other ethos has been termed "private regarding". It grew out of European political experience which did not include a heritage of independent political action. Those who subscribe to the private regarding ethos tend to look to government as a source of personal benefit. The authors hypothesize that in the United States the very wealthy aristocracy and the low-income groups generally approve of the private regarding ethos³⁸.

Some interesting implications for the politics of planning can be derived from the public and private regarding hypothesis. The profession of planning has as its basis the public regarding view of government. The plan is supposed to be a future conception of the public interest. Any planning policy that is contaminated by the influence of special interest groups is antithetical to planning theory. Therefore, if a community is largely composed of groups which subscribe to a public regarding ethos, the planning conducted in that climate will generally have a better chance of achieving its aims than in those communities where private regarding views are predominant.

The Planner's Role

The role which the planner chooses to play in the politics of planning can influence both the extent to which planning issues will generate conflict and the way in which those conflicts are resolved. The planner has several alternative roles from which to pick. He can play the role of a political agnostic who makes his recommendations strictly on a "professional" or technical basis without any thought about the political acceptability of his proposals. Another role he could assume would be that of confidential advisor to the political decision makers by shaping planning recommendations so they coincide with the politician's desire to be re-elected. Finally, the planner can be a political mobilizer, making decisions based on "professional criteria and then attempt to drum up political support from the community-at-large. By playing this role the planner is always trying to sell his proposals to the politician. Although some planners will play one of these roles to the exclusion of the others, most planners elect to play all of these roles at one time or another depending on the planning issue involved.³⁹

There exists no consistent normative theory of planning which could serve as a guide to planners in choosing one of the alternatives. For example, a survey of planning students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology indicated that 61 percent of those interviewed thought that politicians were "unprofessional"⁴⁰. The survey also indicated that the planning students thought the objectives of the planner and politician were far apart. Further, the students felt that planners were engaged in rational decision-making to serve society's interests, while the politicians were engaged in "irrational" decision-making to serve selfish interests.

Altshuler, in finding that planners in St. Paul and Minneapolis avoided conflict by sidestepping controversial issues, concluded that planners are caught in a dilemma

because of an inherent conflict between their attitudes and their tendency to equate successful planning with plan implementation. Their professional attitudes require that they should present the public with crucial alternatives, but they are afraid to risk political defeat by letting the public and the politicians know that there are technical uncertainties in the subject matter of their plans. Secondly, the planner is committed to a comprehensive plan which recognizes complex interrelationships among the consequences of planning policy⁴¹.

Planners and students of planning who have written about the role of the planner have not come to any clear and consistent conclusions. Although the traditional planning ideology tends to support the political agnostic view, more recent literature has suggested that the planner ought to be recommending alternative courses of action which are acceptable both to planning practice and to the politician's political career. Walker was an early advocate of this course of action⁴². Therefore, and as previously suggested by Altshuler, the planning profession has no normative theory to use as a guide in this difficulty.

Since there is no normative theory planners assume varying roles. The effect of playing one role or another on the politics of planning is not well established but some hypotheses regarding the anticipated effort can be presented⁴³. The political agnostic will generally have the least success in having his proposals implemented. Not only will he tend to ignore the needs of the politician but often he will be hostile to these needs. If his schemes call for broad sweeping changes and specific commitments from the politician without regard for that politician's needs, the planner will generally be ignored. Obviously, the planner who plays the role of political confidant will have a better chance of seeing his proposals implemented. This success may be due to the fact that the planning proposals are often altered

to such an extent that they will cause no ripples in the political waters. However, such success may also reflect the ability of the planner to come up with and sell realistic but meaningful proposals. The political activist's chances of success could go either way. By assuming the role of mobilizer, the planner places his job in jeopardy. In addition, the risks associated with alienating the political decision-makers in the process of playing the game of obtaining support for his program are great. On the other hand, many planners possess important political resources as has been discussed. These resources can make him very influential. However, few planners are playing the mobilizer role because of the risks and a lack of knowledge on how to use their political resources effectively.

Community Power Structures

The possession and distribution of political resources is a key element in measuring the influence of an individual or group over the formulation of public policy. Despite the fact that elected governmental officials have considerable formal powers which are important political resources, a number of studies have been made which stress the influence of non-governmental groups and people through informal means⁴⁴. Some of these studies of "community power structures" have underplayed the role of formal government to the extent that they have given the impressions that all decisions are made "behind the scenes" by a small elite group of people.

This description of local political behavior gained widespread attention through Floyd Hunter's study of Atlanta⁴⁵. He found that there were a relatively small number (40) of community influentials who used the government as a legitimate bureaucracy to carry out the decisions they had made. This finding became representative of a certain school of thought which contends that power structures are "monolithic". In other words, small influential groups make policy on all

important issues faced by local government. The findings of a study by Robert Dahl are considerably different than those of Hunter's and represent an alternative theory of the nature of community power⁴⁶. This theory holds that power is "polylithic". The proponents of this theory contend that different groups are involved in different policy issues depending on the nature of those issues. According to the polylithic theory, there is no single elite group that formulates all public policy but rather, a variety of private citizens and groups are influential in local decision-making. In this section we shall explore the relevance of these diverse findings to the politics of planning. Three questions are important to and will provide the framework for the following discussion: What is the structure of power in local communities? What is the relationship between the political power wielded by governmental actors and that power of the non-governmental actors? How would the structure of power in a community influence the formulation of planning policy?

Aside from a number of charges of inadequate research methods, differences in the findings of studies of local decision-making have been attributed to the distinct possibility that there are a variety of power structures in the United States⁴⁷. The level of economic development, the heterogeneity of the population, community size, and the strength of political parties are among the variables mentioned as reasons for why power structures would vary. This point has been emphasized even more clearly in a study of 166 community power structure studies conducted by Claire Gilbert⁴⁸. Figure IV-3 shows a portion of the results derived from this comparison. In this analysis, communities that appear to be dominated by "informals" correspond most closely to monolithic forms of power and those dominated by the "politicians" most closely to the pluralist theories.




Figure IV-3. Percentage of Cities Whose Participants In Upper Levels of Power are:

Source: Claire Gilbert, "The Study of Community Power", in The New Urbanization, eds. Greer, et. al. (New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 1968), p. 230.

The picture is clearly one of community power structures which vary according to population. However, most studies have concentrated on a single community thereby creating a lack of comparative data upon which to base a strong theory of community power⁴⁹.

There are a few generalizations which may be deduced from the findings of the various power structure studies. One is that only a very small percentage of the population participates in the formulation of public policy of any sort. This has held true even in those communities where the power structure has been described as polyolithic. In Dahl's study, the total number of influentials for all the issues he chose were less than one percent of the populace. The fact that

so few people participate in public policy formulation has led some observers to wonder whether the old monolithic-polyolithic argument has much meaning. A second generalization involves the range of types of power structures that exist at the local level. It appears that there is no single power structure in American society. Mann has concluded that perhaps the most reasonable hypothesis is that there exists a continuum of power structure types with Hunter's findings representing one end of the continuum and Dahl's the other⁵⁰. At both extremes the number of influential people in relation to the population is very small.

A second important question about power structure is: What is the relative importance of the governmental and non-governmental actors in the community decision-making process? Although a lack of comparative analyses precludes a definitive answer, several studies of single communities suggests various possible relationships. If a community has a highly monolithic power structure, it is probable that the ranking elected officials would be a part of that structure. Elected officials could also be important figures in a polyolithic system. The elected officials automatically possesses important political resources which when connected with his high public office only tends to enhance his influence in the process of public policy formulation.

Non-governmental actors can indirectly influence public policy by using effectively their political resources on issues in which they have important stakes. This relationship between the public and private actors is essentially what Dahl found in New Haven. However, it is also possible that such indirect and selective influence can be employed by a closely knit "power elite". A hypothetical, but rather typical example of this is the formidable political resource of money as utilized by financial leaders, in particular the bankers. Mayors of municipalities which are heavily dependent upon these institutions to meet their financial obliga-

tions, have been known to have looked out for the interests of the bankers when making a decision. Thus indirectly the bankers influenced public policy.

A third type of relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors is where private interests make public policy to serve their ends and use the public officials to make this policy legal. Hunter's findings in Atlanta indicated that non-governmental actors were exercising this type of influence. Actual proven cases of this pattern of power are rare. It is possible, however, that some municipalities are run by a "power elite". For this reason the strong, private, elite decision-makers should be included in the list of alternative relationships between governmental and non-governmental actors involved in local politics.

The above discussion suggests the likelihood that there are a range of different power structures from monolithic to pluralistic. It was also indicated that the control of governmental decisions by non-governmental groups and individuals varies from direct and absolute control to the situation where elected officials have complete latitude in formulating public policy. The question of importance now is the relevance of these observations to the formulation of planning policy. There are four areas in which power structure might influence planning decisions. First, the distribution and actual use of political power can directly influence planning policy. Secondly, power structure can hinder or encourage citizen participation in planning. Third, and as it affects public planning policy, the users of power can make developmental decisions through the private market. Finally, current aspects of decision-making are partly determined by past decisions. Therefore, an earlier distribution of power could be highly significant in determining the type of planning policy currently being considered.

The direct influence of power structure on planning decisions is the most obvious type of relationship between

the distribution of political resources and planning policy formulation. An excellent example of this relationship can be found from the theory behind the formation of the citizen planning commission⁵¹. The idea of having the planner responsible to a citizen commission, was originally based on the assumption that every community has a group of generally "respected and influential" citizens. It was felt that these citizens would be better able to sell planning proposals to the politicians than the planner himself. Thus, the citizen commission was established under the assumption that power structures are monolithic. If a small group is really making all the important public decisions in a community, then it is likely that the planner will be more successful if he can get the support of that group. Thus, when a citizen planning commission is working in practice as it should in theory, planning policy is being directly influenced by the distribution of political power⁵².

Citizen participation in planning is considered highly important by most professional planners. This ideological importance was institutionalized by making citizen participation a part of the workable program which is required by the Federal government as a prerequisite for obtaining urban renewal funds. Further, citizen participation has been strengthened relative to its continued inclusion in the planning process by passage of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974⁵³. Therefore, the general topic of citizen participation in planning provides another link between power structure and planning policy. Traditionally, citizen participation has meant that the planners would get "interested and informed" groups of citizens together and explain to them what planning involves. Planners have viewed these sessions primarily as a means of educating the public on the benefits of planning generally, and of the plan which has been prepared, specifically⁵⁴. However, citizens have rarely participated directly in the making of plans. Their

participation has come well after the plans were underway and has usually been limited to a small segment of the community. Thus citizen participation has generally occurred after the fact and has involved only a few "key" members of the community⁵⁵.

Citizen groups which may directly influence planning are generally made up of people who are ideologically committed to the worth of planning. Examples of such groups are the civic associations and booster clubs. Members of these organizations tend to support plans and programs which aim to improve the metropolis as a whole. Other groups strictly represent economic interests; i.e., chambers of commerce, businessmen's associations, and real estate organizations. They look at planning proposals in light of the economic interests which they represent.

These various citizen organizations do not always agree with one another on planning issues because they have different stakes in the outcome. If citizens are really to participate in planning, conflict among groups points out the question of how citizens can be effectively utilized in the planning process. Each group's perception of the issues and problems, objectives, knowledge and experience will differ thus involving competition among the participating citizen elements. Each of these elements is attempting to get its particular values reflected in the plan. The complex web of established and ad hoc citizen groups will often be a fundamental part of the community's power structure. The nature of citizen involvement in the planning process, therefore, can directly influence planning policy decisions. Where power is highly centralized, small and singularly purposed citizen groups will be least effective. Groups will have difficulty in forming and presenting their demands effectively if these demands contradict the interests of the established center of power. Under more polythitic political systems, citizen groups will have a greater chance of success since

there will be more opportunity to find others who will be willing to pool their resources for a common end.

Thus far the discussion of the relevance of power structures to the planning process has been concerned mainly with the potential outcome of immediate conflict situations. If we examine long-range development decisions, there are some additional considerations. One consideration refers to the fact that many, if not most, of the decisions which shape community development are made outside of the public planning process⁵⁶. Generally speaking there are four groups which, in one way or another, make decisions which have a significant impact on development. These include public decision-makers, private firms, developmental intermediaries (such as bankers, lawyers and real estate brokers) and the private citizen. Location and spatial expansion decisions of private firms have a substantial impact on the character of a community. Intermediaries such as engineers, various consultants, lawyers and real estate brokers are the technicians who actually advise and help implement the decisions made by the private firms. Private citizens continuously make decisions about where they will live and shop or how they will move about the city which, when treated as a whole, have a considerable impact on local development patterns. Through the use of his acquired knowledge in the form of an educational role, the planner can enhance his own power by helping to guide these decisions. Furthermore, the actions of private firms, intermediaries and individual citizens impose a significant constraint on development decisions which are made through public policy. Over the long run, this fact decreases the importance which we can attach to a community power structure that exists at any time. Thus, the intermediaries set significant limits on what the public planners and the power structure can do.

Mann has suggested a second consideration in our evaluation of the importance of power structure to long-range plan-

ning policy⁵⁷. He argues that the importance of the concept of power structure to planning can be overstressed. Discussions of power structures usually leave out the time dimension of community decision-making. Yet community development takes place as a result of a whole series of interrelated decisions which are made over a considerable span of time. Given the perspective of time, influence over the outcome of decisions is only a part of the total process of planning policy formulation. Therefore, over the long run, the distribution of political resources at any given time may not be a very important element in determining planning policy.

Both of the considerations above suggest that the importance of community power structure as a determinant of planning policy can be greatly overstressed. This is particularly true when the development of planning policy over a period of time is analyzed. On the other hand, the distribution and use of political resources in a community can be a key element in determining how the political system will react to specific proposals made by the planner.

Community Social and Economic Characteristics

The nature of the social and economic characteristics of a community is an additional determinant of political involvement in planning. In Chapter II, when this idea was introduced and partially discussed, it was shown that different kinds of municipalities in metropolitan areas are faced with different planning issues. To a large extent, these issues define the task of the planner. His goals and objectives address themselves to the issues and problems confronting the community. Further, since these issues and problems are strongly influenced by community characteristics, they also influence the actors, stakes, resources and strategies that become involved in the planning process.

Social and economic characteristics influence political

involvement in planning in other ways. The relationship between these characteristics and planning issues means that both the content of the plan as well as the daily implementation activities of the planner will, in part, be influenced by the social and economic characteristics of the community. Furthermore, as was suggested earlier in this chapter, the aspect of local political culture that is concerned with planning may be linked with the social and economic characteristics of the people who reside in a given locality. Thus, for all of these reasons, community socio-economic characteristics are important determinants of the nature of political involvement in planning.

Summary

A key aspect of the formulation of planning policy is the generation and management of either actual or potential conflict. The political process of managing conflict involves a transformation of human values into legally binding public policy. Since all groups and individuals in our society do not share common values, planning and politics cannot be separated. The manner in which the planner's technical and value judgements are molded into public policy depends on which actors become involved in the decision-making process, what stakes they have in the outcome of that process, the political resources which they possess and the way in which they utilize them. Further, the interaction of actors, stakes, resources, and strategies is greatly influenced by metropolitanism. This not only makes the process of metropolitan planning difficult, it also compounds the nature of the conflict which the planner must confront and, in some instances, prevents his being able to differentiate among the types of political interests that will be involved in the planning issue at hand.

An attempt was made to generalize about the kinds of

circumstances which are apt to produce stakes, and thus involvement, in planning policy formulation. Some ideas concerning these circumstances were developed which dealt generally with the nature of the politics of planning. Subsequent analysis showed that the level of political involvement in the planning process varies widely from issue to issue and community to community. On the basis of several case studies, personal observation, and reasoning, hypotheses were postulated to aid in explaining this variation. Further research is needed to test the reliability of these hypotheses and to develop them in greater detail. Generally, however, political involvement in planning varies due to differences in the dimensions of planning policy, the role played by the planner, the power structure in the community and the socio-economic character of the community. These generalizations help provide a deeper understanding of the politics of planning.

Urban Political Systems: Theoretical Perspectives

The emphasis of this chapter has been to determine how various political factors influence the formulation of planning policy in a metropolitan area. We noted that the planner today must cope with planning issues which have been generated by metropolitanism. They must meet these issues in a context of rapid social change in which low-income groups and minority groups are demanding that their priorities and values be given the same weight as those of all other elements of society. Planners today face a more complex environment where the policies of one municipality affect other municipalities and where planning, of any type, has an immediate and profound effect on the whole socio-economic fabric of large regions of this country. As previously alluded to in Chapter II, these changes have generated some rethinking of the entire planning process, thus raising a number of theoretical issues which, when resolved, may change the nature of

the planning process considerably. As pertains to the subject matter of this chapter, one theoretical issue involves the need for a normative theory of urban political systems which could be used by the planner as a guide in dealing with the complex issues of a metropolis.

To visualize a general framework for examination of urban political functions in a metropolitan context would be an impossible task were it not for the availability of the concepts of systems analysis. The urban political system, as defined, encompasses those interactions primarily related to the "authoritative allocation of values" internal to urban society⁵⁸. "Authoritative" implies allocations that are held to be legitimately binding on society; in other words, those backed by governmental power. "Values" include the whole gamut of goods, services, power, and ideological or social satisfactions that government may allocate. This approach permits one to sort out the wealth of factors involved with inputs, outputs, structures, and processes of metropolitan politics. Figure IV-4 presents a highly simplified scheme for visualizing the urban political system.

The figure suggests, in the first place, that urban politics is an open system: that is, one strongly influenced by inputs from its environment. (Its environment includes all those interactions not included within the urban political system itself.) Demographic, social and economic events in national society and within the metropolis itself not only are conditioning factors, but generate and shape demands upon urban government. Some of the effects of environmental factors, particularly of urban growth itself and concomitant migration and industrialization, upon political demands and upon the governmental characteristics that respond to them were pointed out in Chapters II and III. One major impact of the urban environment is to raise rapidly the total volume of demands upon government. The complex content of those demands increases both the difficulty of response to them




Figure IV-4. A Model of the Urban Political System

and the needs for certain types of skill and organization.

Within the urban political system, the actors involved in expressing demands on government and in competing for political power are shown on the input side of the diagram. These generally include, as was described in this chapter, various governmental and non-governmental actors to include political parties, interest groups, and unstructured crowds. David Easton has suggested a shortcut by positing "demands" and "support" as variables that comprise the relevant aspects of input activities⁵⁹. In other words, one need ask only what kinds of demands these actors put on urban government and how they generate patterns of support or opposition for government in general and for policy responses in particular.

This chapter pointed out that the relative roles of the various input participants in shaping demands vary considerably from area to area. Initiation of urban-service demands more often rested with politicians in office and bureaucrats than with non-governmental groups. In many cases, however, mass demonstrations and interest groups had an important impact on mobilization of support or opposition to particular planning policy issues. Where the generators of support or opposition were not aggregated in coalitions, it was suggested that the chances for governmental inertia were increased.

Governmental structure is represented in the middle of the diagram in Figure IV-4. This is the segment of the urban political system that was the focus of attention in Chapter III. Within the diamond-shaped box fall the activities of the various central and local authorities that produce the outputs of urban government. The structural relationships within urban government can be visualized on two intersecting dimensions: that of metropolitan organization and that of vertical intergovernmental relations. This research has disclosed the close interdependence between events on these two dimensions. Organization of urban functions on the metro-

politan level depends, in part, upon the distribution of governmental roles on the vertical axis as was illustrated in Chapter III. Clearly, if major powers remain at the top, for example, a mixture of local authorities does not serve to integrate urban functions at the metropolitan level. In such a case, central functions would have to be integrated at the metropolitan level to achieve that end. Therefore, the structural aspects of metropolitan organization included departmental arrangements in addition to interlocal cooperation, special authorities, and metropolitan government. In all cases, the key variable being examined was the degree to which governmental interactions were integrated at the metropolitan level or were segmented in separate functional or geographic whirlpools of decision making.

The vertical dimension was analyzed in Chapter III, which identified several of its components—distribution of purposes or public service responsibilities, distribution of processes or governmental roles, distribution of financial resources, and patterns of control and communication. These components were related to the formal structural ties among the tiers of government—ranging from a layering of separate governments (ending in independent local governments) to a hierarchy of field administration, with three intermediate types identified.

The findings indicated that vertical interagency relationships are as dynamic and interdependent as those on the metropolitan dimension. This interdependence can be accounted for, in large part, by the prevailing distribution of roles, which generally finds central authorization of an important proportion of funds coexisting with local operations. The flow of influence is in all cases reciprocal, with the relative intensity of the upward and downward vectors subject to considerable variation. The findings also indicated that most of the changes made on this dimension in the course of energetic urban-development efforts (i.e., high-volume res-

ponse to a high load of demands) involved not as much intensifying the flow in one direction or another as increasing roles and resources all along the vertical line.

The intensity and scope of interactions on the vertical dimension with those on the metropolitan dimension determine the degree to which urban functions are integrated or segmented. Totally fragmented government could be posited as one extreme and visualized as an unconnected set of isolated special agencies or policy subsystems scattered throughout the box, each responding to separate sets of demands and depending upon separate sources of support. Conversely, totally integrated government would find all the actors ranged along the two lines with maximum flow of communications carried along both. All demands and support fed into the system would be aggregated and, in the process, weighed and interrelated to produce a comprehensive and complementary set of outputs.

The above contrast suggests, however, a relationship between demands and governmental structure: The more interdependent the demands, the more coordinated the interactions within the structure must be in order to respond to all of them. The relatively high interdependence of urban problems is readily apparent. Clearly, when one group demands sidewalk space for walking and another group calls for sidewalk space for selling, both cannot be satisfied by completely independent sets of action. This relationship is a fairly easy one to work out, however, by bargaining or fiat. But demands for urban housing, transportation, and jobs raise more difficult problems. Coordination required in an urban area is not simply between demands of different groups, but also between different, and not always complementary, demands of the same groups. This kind of relationship cannot be worked out merely by bargaining between groups, for it requires intellectual and technical operations within the government structure as well. Thus, the role of analytical

planning relative to that of bargaining will increase with the degree of response to complex and interrelated demands of this type.

It is important to note that the separate portions of the whole diagram represent not different persons or institutions but conceptually different types of activity. Bureaucrats and elected officials not only populate the governmental structure box, but also are represented on the input side. To a large extent, their values and quests for power generate demands and support with which the system must cope. The importance of "administrative politics" was noted in Chapter I. To the degree that the government structure gives advantages to certain official participants, it has a feedback effect on the inputs. First, there seems to be a relationship between some aspects of structural decentralization and the tendency of local officials to generate demands for action on metropolitan-wide problems, and vice versa. And, third, the degree to which the bureaucracy is granted formal authority independent of political direction may raise its role in defining desirable standards for urban life.

The resources of urban government are depicted in the diagram as the foundation of the government structure. Not only do these resources provide the parameters of the structure's capability to handle demands, but the structure of authorities itself influences the level of resources. Some of these resources were discussed in Chapter III. However, it was pointed out that both the resources devoted to urban government and their distribution relative to the distribution of demand-response ultimately determine the capability of the system to respond to urban problems. Similarly, financial resources depend in part on the ability of governments within the metropolis to maximize their own revenues and in part upon the ability of urban interests to claim funds in federal allocation processes. Administrative procedures are, in fact, shaped not only by the rules of one administrative entity,

but also by the vertical relationships within the specialized bureaucracies. Environmental factors also have direct effects upon resources, as well as upon demands and support for the system. The influence of cultural and educational traits on personnel resources was suggested, for example. The links between the general state of the economy and public finance are, of course, direct.

The outputs of the political system are proximately shaped by the interactions within the government structure that produce plans, authorizations, and operations bearing on the metropolis. These are represented at the right side of the diagram. Plans here include formal plan documents as well as official policy statements, which although they do not alter the physical environment, may alter the psychological and political environment and thereby influence demands and support flowing into the system in the future. Government plans that promise to improve urban housing may create or reinforce demands for such improvement, or if unfulfilled over time, they may sustain apathy and cynicism. Planning itself means far more than plan documents that are categorized here as outputs. Planning, like bargaining, is a process or style of interaction among the authorities within the structural box.

The interrelationships among plans, authorizations, and operations will be discussed in Chapter V. It is clear at the outset, however, that these are not one-way processes, although some planners and administrators may dream of situations in which decisions are directly deduced from plans and operations are deduced from politically formalized decisions. It has been shown, however, that sequential decisions, as they take place over time, alter the choices represented in the best of plans. Moreover, operating management encompasses a wide range of decisions that themselves may alter the intended impact of major authorizations. The degree to which the operating bureaucracy diverges from the thrust of political authorizations — or to the degree to

which rule-application agencies become competing rule-making agencies—varies considerably.

One concern of this research has been to study the impact of governmental structure and patterns of official interaction on political outputs in the urban setting. Because of the interest in the pace and quality of urban development, this study has focused upon the ramifications of structure for innovative and realistic plans, speedy and comprehensive authorization of programs, and efficient operations. These output characteristics are functions, however, of all the other components in the system as well. Hence, it will be no simple task for future research to clarify the cause-and-effect relationships—or, more accurately, the reliable correlations—in urban political systems.

What finally reaches the urban public are the manifestations of governmental outputs. These are, essentially, the stakes for which many participants in the political system were competing. Some of these, such as investment and construction, shape the physical environment. Others, such as public-service production, distribute commodities to urban citizens. Pronouncements influence the attitudes of the public. Taxes and subsidies, in effect, redistribute values, monetary or otherwise, among segments of the public. And regulation controls the relationships among groups and constrains their freedom of action. Some legal measures, of course, directly change the structure of government and its resources⁶⁰.

Therefore, the "feedback loop" in Figure IV-4 represents the continuous dynamics of the urban political system, for today's outputs will influence tomorrow's environment, demands, support, structure, and resources. Some of these influences are intended by the producers of the actions when shaping them. Many of the outcomes are unanticipated, however. The more complex and changing the environment, the greater the information and analytical technology required to foresee the

results of governmental action. Given the limits on both, there is always an element of uncertainty and readjustment in urban government. As has been noted, internal arrangements to expand information flow (e.g., certain types of decentralization, statistics collection, research and planning, interagency communication, etc.) can increase the ability of the actors to identify and deal with complex variables and, therefore, to reduce uncertainty as to the outcomes of their actions.

In the long run, the change wrought in the urban environment, by government stimulate new demands, expectations, and patterns of support that feed back into the system. Conversely, lack of change wrought by government may sustain the status quo and reinforce public apathy, but in light of the monumental growth of urban problems, sooner or later pent-up demand is likely to burst through into the system, unless political channels are very tightly controlled. The degree of feedback and the multiplicity of sources of demand will be directly related to the degree of pluralism in the political system as a whole.

This image of the urban political system highlights the enormous research tasks confronting the urban scholar, for very little is really known about the interactions that comprise it within a single system. There are as many ways of selecting segments of the system and looking at them as there are students of the subject. This research has found sufficient evidence to conclude that government structure is not irrelevant to output. It is a prism that may refract political forces in any one of several directions.

Notes

1. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), pp. 372-380.

2. Norton Long, "Planning and Politics in Urban Development", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 25, no. 4 (November 1959), p. 168.
3. One excellent reference which should be read by anyone interested in this subject is Planning and Politics, Uneasy Partnership, edited by Thad Beyle and George Lathrop. The author considers the article by Deil S. Wright, "Governmental Forms and Planning Functions" must reading for all advocates of metropolitan planning.
4. Non-governmental participants are those individuals and groups who are not a part of the local government but who discover that particular planning decisions can potentially affect them in some way.
5. Francine F. Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 14-22.
6. Three studies have been relied upon for this purpose: Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), Chapters II, III, and IV; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in An American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), Chapters IV and V; and, J. Clarence Davies, III, Neighborhood Groups and Urban Renewal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), passim.
7. Alan Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), Chapter I.
8. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area-wide, vol. IV, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 3-11. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Governmental Functions.)
9. Martha Derthick, Between State and Nation (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), pp. 195-204.
10. Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1958), pp. 148-163.
11. Robert Cassidy, "St. Louis Tunes Out the Blues", Planning, vol. 40, no. 3 (March 1974), pp. 14-20.
12. Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 14-20.

13. Sayre and Kaufman, City, p. 42.
14. Graham Wootton, Interest Groups (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 45-72.
15. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, pp. 54-58.
16. One area where technical knowledge has not had an impact in terms of obtaining federal monies has been the Department of Housing and Urban Development's housing program. An interesting discussion of this failure is found in Anthony Downs, Urban Problems and Prospects (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970), Chapters 4, 5, and 6.
17. Sheldon Plager and Joel Handler, "The Politics of Planning for Urban Redevelopment: Strategies in the Manipulation of Public Law," Wisconsin Law Review (Summer 1966), pp. 724-775.
18. Dahl, American City, pp. 271-275.
19. Alan Campbell, "A Political Science Approach to Planning Change", Planning Socio-Economic Change (Raleigh, North Carolina: Agricultural Policy Institute, 1964), pp. 57-69.
20. Marion Clawson, Suburban Land Conversion in the United States: An Economic and Governmental Process (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 101-109.
21. David Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co., 1969), pp. 120-129.
22. It should be noted here that a single planning policy proposal may actually raise a number of separate issues to a variety of different actors.
23. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 33-52.
24. The original idea and the major parts of the framework for intermediate-range planning is credited by the planning profession to the following work: Martin Meyerson, "Building the Middle-Range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 1956), pp. 58-64.

25. International City Managers' Association (ICMA), Principles and Practice of Urban Planning (Washington: The Association, 1968), pp. 379-387.
26. Such plans would be what Fagin and others have called the "policies plan". It would consider the quality of education, the nature of social welfare services, etc. See Henry Fagin, "Organizing and Carrying Out Planning Activities Within Urban Government", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 25, no. 3 (August 1959), pp. 109-114.
27. Ranney first postulated the usefulness of a cube diagram in visualizing the relationships and their extent relative to the influence of planning type on the politics of planning. The ensuing discussion introduces a modified version of that cube the investigation of which forms the basis of political involvement in planning issues. David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis, pp. 142-144.
28. Although a very narrowly conceived plan can generate intensive conflict, that conflict will tend to center around a specific issue, while the more comprehensive plan will generate conflict over a number of issues.
29. Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press and Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 202-203.
30. Altshuler, Political Analysis, pp. 299-332.
31. ICMA, Principles and Practice, pp. 349-360.
32. Altshuler, Political Analysis, pp. 84-143, passim.
33. Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 58-60.
34. ACIR, Performance of Urban Functions, pp. 211-217.
35. James G. Coke, "Antecedents of Local Planning", in Principles and Practice of Urban Planning, eds: William I. Goodman and Eric C. Freund (Washington: International City Managers' Association, 1968), pp. 15-19.
36. Oliver Williams, "A Typology for Comparative Local Government", Midwest Journal of Political Science (May 1961), pp. 150-164.
37. Banfield and Wilson, City Politics, pp. 59-60.
38. For a critique of the Banfield-Wilson hypothesis see

- Raymond Wolfinger and John Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government", American Political Science Review (June 1966), pp. 545-561.
39. Francine F. Rabinovitz, City Politics and Planning (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 112-117.
 40. Francine F. Rabinovitz, "Politics, Personality and Planning", Public Administration Review (March 1967), pp. 18-24.
 41. Altshuler, Political Analysis, Chapters VII and VIII; also see p. 392.
 42. Robert A. Walker, The Planning Function in Urban Government (2nd ed.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), passim.
 43. For a more detailed discussion, see Peter Hash and James Shurtleff, "Planning As a Staff Function in Urban Management", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 20, no. 3 (Summer 1954), pp. 136-147.
 44. A good annotated bibliography of the power structure literature between 1950 and 1962 may be found in Charles Press, Main Street Politics: Policy Making at the Local Level (East Lansing: Institute for Community Development, Michigan State University, 1962).
 45. Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953), passim.
 46. Dahl, American City, pp. 333-367.
 47. It is not within the purpose of this research to perform an analytical critique of the methodology and techniques utilized in the various community power structure studies. For a critical analysis of a variety of power structure studies see Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and, Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-16.
 48. Claire Gilbert, "The Study of Community Power: A Summary and a Test", in The New Urbanization, eds. Scott Greer, et. al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1968), pp. 222-245.
 49. A notable exception is Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, The Rulers and The Ruled (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964). In this study four communities are compared.

50. Lawrence D. Mann, "Studies in Community Decision Making", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 30, no. 1, (February 1964), pp. 58-65.
51. See the previous discussion in Chapter III and the references cited there.
52. Charles Adrian and Charles Press, Governing Urban America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 313-315.
53. Under Title I of the Act, the previous categories of community development programs, e.g., urban renewal, water and sewer grants, Model Cities, rehabilitation loans, public facility loans, open space land, neighborhood facilities, urban beautification and historic preservation programs are consolidated. Funds in the form of block grants are allocated on a formula based on population, overcrowded housing, and poverty (counted twice), to cities of more than 50,000 population, and urban counties.
54. James Wilson, "Planning and Politics: Citizen Participation in Urban Renewal," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1963), pp. 242-249.
55. Davies, Urban Renewal, pp. 139-151.
56. Clyde Wingfield, "Power Structure and Decision Making in City Planning", in Administrative Questions and Political Answers, eds. Claude Hawley and Ruth Weintraub (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 226-232.
57. Mann, "Decision Making", pp. 60-64.
58. This phrase and several subsequent concepts have been derived from David Easton, Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), passim. See also Kenneth L. Kraemer, Policy Analysis in Local Government, A Systems Approach to Decision Making (Washington: International City Management Association, 1973), pp. 131-137.
59. Easton, Political Life, pp. 76-115.
60. Kraemer, Policy Analysis, pp. 43-44.

CHAPTER V

TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING

Planning for whom, what, when, where and how is the most important and, at the same time, the most vexing set of development issues faced by local planning agencies in the metropolis. To gain an appreciation of the sense of importance that is attached to the task of defining development goals and objectives, it is only necessary to examine a few of the many definitions of planning and accompanying descriptions of the planning process.¹ Central to all of these is the notion of process and of goal orientation. Planning is viewed as a series of related actions and decisions that are organized around and moving toward the accomplishment of predefined objectives. The goals and objectives themselves are viewed as the cornerstone of the planning process, for, in theory, they constitute the framework for public and private decision making.

While the definitions and descriptions attest to the theoretical importance of defining development objectives, planning practitioners will readily attest to the difficulty of establishing a set of operational community goals. Their skepticism is understandable, for there are many unanswered and perhaps unanswerable questions regarding the definition of development objectives. How, for example, can planners encourage citizens to be concerned with the shape of their community at a point some 20 or even 10 years from now? How can conflicts between competing interest groups be resolved? Is it possible for a community to move beyond a local legislator's conception of the public interest? Can it be assumed that legislators will make decisions that contribute

to the accomplishment of long-range objectives, even when these decisions may conflict with more immediate demands? In short, is it possible to define development objectives and, once defined, can they be implemented in a meaningful way?

These are indeed complex and difficult questions to answer. Such difficulty accounts, no doubt, for the fact that many planning programs have, in the past, virtually ignored this element of planning. There is, however, some evidence which indicates that planning agencies are attempting to remedy this situation.²

This chapter will discuss and analyze the concept of normative planning as an areawide planning process of policy analysis for the management of urban change in metropolitan areas. Prior findings of this research have borne out several points pertinent to an affirmative conclusion as regards the original hypothesis — the current theory and practice of urban planning are inadequate for combating the challenges posed by the forces of metropolitanization even when coupled with local government reorganization strategies. The crux of the evidence and discussion supporting this conclusion are contained in Chapter III. In essence, the functions associated with areawide planning require an areawide governmental basis. Chapter IV, however, pinpointed what was alluded to in Chapter II. The resolution of metropolitan planning issues into planning policies is a politically-charged and conflict-laden endeavor involving highly fragmented and multinucleated structures of semi-independent groups and organizations in both the public and private sectors. As this chapter will illustrate, traditional urban planning processes are incapable of handling such policies planning procedures.

In support of the above, the purpose herein is to examine the theory of urban planning and analyze its traditional style in relation to its achievements. From

this analysis, several corollaries for restructuring the planning process into a normative framework will be attempted in conjunction with suggested strategies of governmental reorganization for the metropolis. The incorporation of strategies for political intervention, responsibility sharing and change-management are viewed as essential elements within the constructs of this framework. Procedures for the establishment and placement of a Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority within the recommended structure of an areawide government will be posited. The Authority's functions in relation to the normative planning framework will be identified and discussed. Finally, the roles of State and Federal governments in initiating the necessary incentives, controls and legislation required for implementing these strategies of metropolitan reform will be elucidated.

The Concept of Policies Planning

American planning programs are undergoing close scrutiny and concomitant transformations largely resulting from a recognition by the profession that their past performance in formulating and implementing large-scale policies aimed at ameliorating urban social and economic problems has been ineffective at best, and nonexistent at worst.³ Despite the expenditure of millions of dollars over the past fifty years to produce a myriad of comprehensive plans for urban development, few cities in the United States have been developed or substantially redeveloped in accordance with the plan. Attempts to require comprehensive planning in federal housing, transportation, and community development programs have been less than successful.⁴ Academic curricula dedicated to teaching plan-making are being questioned and repudiated by a sizable element of the profession and its critics.⁵ The "noiseless secession from the comprehensive plan" is forcing planners to redefine their goals and

objectives and to search for new roles and functions.⁶ Alternatives range from national environmental and physical planning, through a wide variety of social, economic, and technical planning specialties, to neighborhood and minority group advocacy. Concepts, styles, and methodologies run an equally broad gamut.⁷

Increasingly within the profession is being argued the point that planners can perform an important role as urban policy analysts. With the increasing complexity of urban decision making, political leaders and urban administrators are demanding from planners pragmatic assistance with policy formulation and implementation. A recent statement by Herbert Gans depicts the nature of this calling:⁸

...cities want advice on how to choose the right goals and the most effective policies for every function of government, and similar advice is being sought by all institutions and groups who seek to frame their goals and policies in a deliberate manner from Federal agencies, civic groups and protest organizations to corporations and semipublic institutions.

Underlying the pressures to transform planning into a policy science is a widely held assumption that planning can bring order and rationality to urban policy making. Friedmann recently challenged the profession "to undertake the courageous and systematic evaluation of societal performance and to identify the strategic points for massive innovation in the guidance of the system."⁹ Bolan argues that planners, operating within the behavioral parameters of the community decision making process, must adapt their functions to the procedural steps of urban policy making: structuring and defining proposals, identifying the properties of alternatives, structuring the decision field, and engaging in and implementing decisions.¹⁰ Altshuler predicts that new missions will be required, "the purpose of which will be to provide men who have emerged as potentially important

decision makers with some broad planning perspectives and a capacity for systematic analysis of policy options."¹¹

Policies planning, or some derivation of the term, is being used with increasing frequency in the literature of planning. Many planning reports are coming to be called "policies plans", and the subject matter of policies planning is the topic of several articles about planning.¹² Frequency of use, however, does not mean that there is common agreement as to the nature and purpose of policies planning. Although there are planning reports which are called policies plans, and there are a few definitions of the phrase, there appears to be no general agreement as to its meaning. The differences of opinion are, in some cases, only minor disagreements centering around questions of terminology or emphasis. In other cases the differences appear more basic, the result of fundamentally different approaches to the subject.¹³

Stuart Chapin, in his analysis of the relationship between planning and policy, made the following observation concerning the different meanings ascribed to the concept of policies planning:¹⁴

Some view these policies plans as something akin to a statement of general principles for planning, and they are thus formulated before plans are developed. Others consider them to be embodied in the plans themselves, and when a plan is officially adopted, the proposals contained in the plan become official urban land use policies. Still a third usage considers them to be statements of the directions in which the urban area should move in order to achieve the objectives of, and implement the proposals contained in, a plan. For example, in this sense policies might take the form of general specifications for zoning, urban renewal, and such.

Quite apart from the traditional philosophy of comprehensive planning that sought to devise a long-range ideal end state for metropolitan development in the framework of a synoptic master plan, policies planning seeks to deal with

pressing problems of urban life by influencing the substance and direction of on-going public decision making. Policies planning is action-oriented rather than plan-oriented. It attempts intervention rather than mere prescription. Policies planning is concerned with making an incremental impact on national as well as local policies affecting the proper allocation and quality of areawide services in addition to monitoring those policies used specifically to secure a balanced rate and distribution of metropolitan growth. It involves the organization and evaluation of the programs as well as policy design. Therefore, policies planning is the management of metropolitan change.

The above descriptive interpretation of the concept of policies planning should not be misconstrued as the final word regarding an eventual definition of that phrase. Others more knowledgeable than the author will find fault with the intended meaning herein. Further, a definition of the concept appears to be premature at this point, given the often acknowledged disadvantages of attempting theory formulation and hypotheses testing within the static constraints of consensus and precision.¹⁵ For purposes of this chapter, this assessment of the concept of policies planning is posited as sufficient for encompassing the intentions of many prior worthwhile efforts and is thus deemed suitable for any further discussions as regards the development of a normative framework for metropolitan planning.

There is little question that present concerns for developing a concept of policies planning and subsequent strategies of policy analysis will continue to have a profound impact on the traditional planning process: on the preparation and significance of the comprehensive plan, on the interaction of planners with government officials and private citizens, on implementation tools and techniques. Further, the characteristics of urban policy making, as depicted in Chapter IV, will largely determine the nature of the required

modifications to the concept and approaches of planning and thus, are central to an assessment of the implications for the planning profession. Because of their vital importance in formulating a broad framework of normative planning for metropolitan areas, the following summary of these characteristics is warranted.

1. Policy making and thus policies planning are inherently political rather than deliberative processes. As processes of political interaction, policy evolves from a process of interorganizational conflict over a wide variety of values, criteria, ends, means, and interpretations of rationality.¹⁶ Through political interaction and social adjustment, the decisions and priorities of the participants in policy making are ratified, altered, compromised, or rejected. Indeed, policy making often transcends deliberative problem solving; as a process of political interaction, it is more complex and distinctly different from individual decision making.¹⁷

2. Policy is formulated and implemented through fragmented and multinucleated organizational structures composed of formal and informal actors in both public and private sectors, and through a complex system of delegation of responsibility and control. If New Deal policy making taught any lessons, one was the difficulty of controlling either the evolution of policy proposals through legislative enactment or the implementation of policy through administrative management.¹⁸ Power resources are fragmented and widely dispersed. Points of leverage are multiple and decentralized. Policy is formulated and implemented by a multitude of organizations with highly specialized personnel, information, technical expertise, analytical skills, and influence resources. Each group pursues its own perceptions of its interests and its own conception of the public interest. A potentially large number of them gain veto or or delaying power over enactment of urban policy proposals

and carve out domains or spheres of influence over program implementation.¹⁹

Once enacted, policies must be implemented through a highly decentralized governmental structure.²⁰ Discretionary authority, regulatory control, allocational responsibility, and approval powers are fragmented through systems of inter-agency and intergovernmental delegation. Regional development policy is implemented through a quagmire of inter-governmental hybrids.²¹ Further, the reticulate pattern of delegation and authority extends beyond government into the private sector. The policy boards of the Model Cities and Economic Development District agencies are composed of local special interest groups, business and labor representatives, civic and service organizations, as well as local, State, and other government officials. In the traditional sense of administrative responsibility, Federal departments providing urban development assistance cannot be held accountable for the outcomes of policies they are assigned to implement. They must rely increasingly on State and local government officials to define local problems, formulate appropriate policy responses, and interpret and implement Federal guidelines. Lines of power and responsibility are intertwined by interdepartmental agreements, delegate agency mandates, and inter governmental contracts, most of which are difficult to enforce formally and have little legal standing.²² Enforcement comes through informal pressure and manipulation. The ability to guide, let alone plan in a comprehensive fashion for metropolitan development policies, is highly complicated and narrowly constrained by delegation.

3. Policy problems are complex, amorphous, and difficult to define concisely. Urban policies planning is limited, moreover, by political parameters on defining the problem. Problems become the focus of policy making to the extent that specialized groups and coalitions can bring public attention to them. Each interested participant places a

different emphasis on a different component of the problem or attempts to redefine the whole problem in terms of a part.

4. Problem perception, policy planning, political response and program implementation are characterized by long lead and lag times. Comprehensive analysis and coordinated control of policy programs are further constrained by the long lag and lead times inherent in political intervention. Lags develop between the emergence of a problem and public recognition. Acknowledgement of a problem's existence does not assure allocations of public resources for its solution; lags exist until proponents can mobilize a coalition of support, resolve conflicts with opponents, and gain consensus on appropriate policy responses. Also lags occur between the proposal of policies and their legislative enactment. Additionally, long leads occur between the planning and organization of policy programs and the identification and evaluation of their effects.²³

Furthermore, the conditions under which policies and programs were formulated change during both lag and lead times. Perceptions and definitions of the problem, degree of involvement, personalities, and the stakes associated with anticipated outcomes change; the strength of demands and support of sponsoring and opposing interest groups shift. The problem or issue may be partially or totally displaced from public attention.

5. Systematic analysis and program evaluation are complicated by the difficulties of determining real policy output. Dror's distinction between the nominal output of a program (reports, projects, rules, trained manpower, etc.) and the real output (substantive effects of policies on conditions they were designed to correct) has significance for policies planning.²⁴ Ultimately a value judgement is required to decide the worth of the programs resulting from policy making: systematic analysis and quantitative

evaluation must yield to political and social subjectivity. In the same view, determining how much of a policy appropriation should be assigned to each component program needed to carry out the intentions of that policy is purely a matter of administrative judgement. No mathematical computations or maximizing formula can solve this problem.²⁵

6. Facts, information, and statistics used to analyze policy alternatives are subjectively interpreted through preconceived specialized interests. Even if "objective" indicators of "optimal" courses of action could be determined the data would not be treated objectively. Not only the substance of policy but facts and statistics also become the subject of debate and conflict.²⁶ Quantitative data are rarely interpreted by participants independently of their role perceptions, subjective expectations, preconceived interests, and ideological predispositions.²⁷

7. The number of possible alternatives for ameliorating policy problems is indeterminate. Alternatives evolve through processes of political interaction. Traditional planning theory requires systematic evaluation of alternatives in order to make "optimal" choices.²⁸ Yet, in reality, the choice of alternative means is dictated by the possibilities evolving from political interaction rather than from deliberative, a priori, design and analysis. Alternatives are gradually invented out of compromises among participants with different perceptions of the problem, interests, and criteria.²⁹ Delineation and evaluation of alternatives is complicated, moreover, by the fact that groups participating in policy making rarely perceive their goals clearly or define their objectives explicitly. Goal formulation is often situational, that is, dependent on expectations of what can actually be achieved under given political conditions at a particular point in time. As expectations change, goals are altered. Ends become means: Attainment of one set of goals may merely pave the way to pursue another set. Thus, the

number of possible permutations and combinations of feasible or potentially feasible alternatives can be enormous. The alternatives given priority depend in part on the actors drawn into policy making conflicts and on the strength of their influence.

Evaluation and choice are twice confounded by substantive and political spillovers. Initial policy conflicts often expand into intricate networks of secondary conflicts over values ideology, and socioeconomic and political consequences. Spillovers result from and are related to policy problems. Participants in policy making often come into conflict over questions that have little to do with the substantive content of the problem. They become enmeshed in arguments involving personal political ambitions, personal and organizational prestige, control over funds and other resources, and ideological doctrine.³⁰

8. Each actor involved in policy planning, formulation and implementation has a limited evaluation capacity. When the number of alternatives is large, the ability of any participant in policy making to evaluate them comprehensively is restricted. In reality, as Simon notes, decision making often reduces to a choice between two alternatives: "doing X" or "not doing X".³¹ "Not doing X" may represent the whole set of possible alternatives that decision makers lack the resources, interest, information, or power to evaluate. These courses of action may be considered vaguely in terms of the opportunity costs of rejecting "doing X", or considered serially and incrementally only if alternative "doing X" is rejected, or if it is accepted and later proves to be ineffective.³² But if "doing X" is considered satisfactory to the participating interest groups, alternatives may never be explicated.

9. Policies planning is done under conditions of uncertainty, risk, incomplete information, and partial ignorance of the situation in which problems evolve, the resources of

involved groups, and the effectiveness of proposed solutions. Professional planners and public administrators have done little better than legislators in comprehensive policy analysis. Studies of the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1962 — a law requiring that Federally assisted highway projects be the result of a "cooperative, comprehensive and continuing planning process"—have indicated that the Federal Highway Administration lacks the political power to impose comprehensive analysis requirements.³³ State, local and metropolitan planning agencies lack the information, political resources, and analytical ability to comply with the area-wide planning provisions of later transportation programs as well as other Federal programs.³⁴ Attempts to formulate Model Cities guidelines to allow maximum freedom for analysis and planning by localities failed miserably. As one former Model Cities Administration deputy director so aptly complained, "Most of the cities didn't understand the process but were willing to play our silly little game for money. What was meant as a challenge, a prod, was interpreted as a regulation, a cage. Regulations you can relate to; freedom is something else."³⁵

Each of these nine characteristics of urban policy making imparts an important implication as regards the serious modification of the urban planning process. To encourage a redirection of the planning profession's energies aimed more at the management of metropolitan growth, an effective normative framework of skills and knowledge is needed to allow for the interaction of planning and politics on an areawide basis. Research, analytical techniques, and skills required for prescriptive plan-making are not adequate for policy planning. As policy analysts, planners must develop and adopt a view of the planning process that is substantially different from that of classical comprehensive planning. While present planning processes focus heavily on substantive urban problems, few, if any, recognize the

necessity for interfacing planning with the policy making process. Yet, as has been adequately illustrated in this research, planning issues in the metropolis generate conflict; their resolution and the proper management of social, economic, and physical change are intrinsic to the concept of policies planning.

Traditional Planning: An Overview

To a considerable extent, the traditional methods of city planning have been carried over from the work done in private corporations, architect's offices, and single-purpose government agencies.³⁶ These methods were brought to the profession by the architect, landscape architect, and civil engineer—early dominant forces in the planning movement.³⁷ These methods are well suited to a unitary setting, i.e., the single client with the single site, in which they were refined, but they have not been as applicable to the complex and ambivalent city. The classic practices were noted in such factors as basic consensus regarding the goals of the organization, ability to predict the future with considerable precision, and centralized control over the resources needed to achieve the goals. Such elements are certainly more characteristic of private or voluntary organizations than of democratic local governments.³⁸

The essence of the traditional approach to planning has been to view the city and suburbs as a large design project. The community is thought to have a spatial, plastic form that can be grasped and reduced to manipulation and presentation by graphic means. Planning, according to this view, is the process of forming a picture of a future physical pattern and developing the necessary control measures to move the community toward that pattern. The objective is to mold the community in a manner consistent with the map of the future, and the goals, sometimes stated

but often only implicit in the map, are convenience, order, efficiency, economy, and beauty.³⁹

Typically, the urban planning effort begins with a perceived need to plan. This perception has as its basis the difference between the conditions of life currently held by the perceptor and those conditions defined as "better" based upon his set of values. In a broad sense, the exploration, definition and development of the various sets of values held by the public defines the public purpose. The public is made up of those people directly affected by the plan and is termed the client constituency of the planner so as not to limit the planning effort to the more restrictive sense of public; i.e., governmental planning. The effort then considers methods of identifying the goals and objectives of this constituency and attempts to measure their relative importance. These formulized and measured sets of values serve as the conceptual basis for specific planning endeavors.⁴⁰

The planning process then runs sequentially through a series of steps or phases investigating, preparing, and evaluating proposals deemed desirable and feasible based upon the enunciated goals and objectives. These phases consist of plan organization, inventory, data analysis, forecasting, design and evaluation of alternatives, plan implementation and monitoring of the impact of the plan on segments of the area. In reality, the distinctions among these phases are both conceptual and operational, with due regard given to feedback and feedforward elements which are inherent with the administrative aspects of the process.

With the phase of plan organization begins the operational nature of planning activity. Together with the goals and objectives of the client constituency, plan organization consists of a series of four decisions utilized to delimit the planning study area and thus nest the substance of the plan into a hierarchy of planning

activities from the most general to the most specific. The first is the decision to plan and this results in a formal structuring of the decision makers (policy committee, advisory committees, etc.) and the preparation of a study prospectus. The second is the decision to design a study and this results in resource allocations. The third decision results in the preparation of procedural or operational manuals as deemed necessary for the proper conduct of the study. The fourth decision examines the feasibility of the study as a whole and results in a decision on whether or not to proceed with the inventory phase of planning. In practice, some of these decisions will run together but they are always nonetheless implicitly or explicitly made.⁴¹

The urban planning effort continues with an extensive survey of existing conditions and predictions of the number of people, cars, jobs, etc., that might be expected within the time range of the final plan. Studies are made of the existing land uses, the social and economic characteristics of the population, the economy of the area, the housing stock, the circulation system, and the area's utilities and facilities. The studies are for the most part quantitative descriptions and projections, but, to a lesser extent, they deal with the qualitative features of the system.

Once the studies and forecasts are completed, the future estimates of people, vehicles, households and employment are converted into the planner's primary common denominator—acres of land needed to accommodate each use. The conversion from people (or jobs or whatever) to land is generally based upon existing areawide ratios and modified by national averages and standards documented by specialists in various fields.⁴² The next task is to distribute these future land requirements and establish alternative designs that will accommodate the anticipated growth. The criteria used to determine appropriate locations for each category

of use are based upon the existing pattern, intuition and the judgement of specialists.⁴³

Upon completion of these various pictures of the future, each alternative is evaluated by the planners in accordance with sophisticated criteria that are deduced from prior statements of goals and objectives.⁴⁴ Their recommendations and proposals are then documented in the form of a "Comprehensive Plan" and presented for acceptance to the planning commission. Rarely will the commission reject their agency's proposals.⁴⁵ The commission then uses it to "advise" the policy makers—the chief executive, the legislative body, and department heads—as to the proper actions they should take. It is, of course, well known that those who are being advised do not always agree with the advice.⁴⁶

It is easy to criticize the traditional planning approach, particularly in the highly abbreviated form presented here which serves to exaggerate the shortcomings. Nevertheless, this summary adequately points out many of a number of oversights and oversimplifications that have severely limited the usefulness of this approach as an adjunctive device with areawide decision making: It focuses on two-dimensional, physical plans; it is more concerned with quantitative problems than with policy formulation and analysis which are intrinsic factors impacting on the overall performance of the system; and it produces a static end product without determining how the area gets from "here" to "there" or from "now" to "thence".

Comprehensive planning is prescriptive rather than interventional. The plan-making approach stresses objective, synoptic analysis, the search for endless numbers of alternatives and a combination of "best" choices as amplified by a published (not necessarily implemented) long-range master plan for growth. Administrative details of "routine" decisions were relegated to politicians and

bureaucrats. Unfortunately, long-range comprehensive plans and systematic policy scenarios have largely been ignored in a political system that renders rational, comprehensive evaluations of urban policy highly improbable and synoptic policy changes nearly impossible.⁴⁷

It must be pointed out, however, that the traditional approach has been, and with modifications, will continue to be instrumental in improving the metropolitan environment. The pace and scale of metropolitan development are such that it becomes essential for someone to study the consequences associated with fitting together the disparate parts to form a functioning whole. Sooner or later someone has to make a decision concerning the size of a park or the location of a highway. Metropolitan areas are mappable, and a picture of the future is, when correctly used, a necessary and useful planning tool. The traditional methods are particularly useful in planning for the isolated, small and medium-sized urban areas, or the well-to-do suburb where there is a steady growth rate, plenty of room for expansion, adequate development resources, and widespread agreement concerning goals. To reiterate, however, with the possible exception of "New Towns", where land may be in single ownership, resources are nearly unlimited, and the planner isn't "bothered" with problems of existing development, no metropolitan area in our nation exhibits these utopian characteristics.⁴⁸

It should also be pointed out that traditional planning practices derive their heritage from, and were appropriate to, a period of American history in which the profession of planning was a reform movement. The prevailing situation was one in which privately supported and design-oriented planners, working in a consensus environment of respected community leadership, could do little more than prepare a plan and hope that their vision of the future would stir others to take appropriate actions. These practices come

from a period in which it was thought that respected members of the community could intelligently discuss a problem and arrive at a "correct" and tenable solution, or that planners could resolve value conflicts through technically rational means. Further, many of the concepts and approaches of comprehensive planning were derived from a period in which the planners knew even less about the functions of an urban area than they do today.⁴⁹

Normative Metropolitan Planning

We are, obviously, planning today within an entirely different context. Planners are involved and working in a different political and social environment, facing new types of problems, and acquiring greater knowledge of how the metropolis functions. These changes demand new or revised approaches and styles to the art of planning.

There are a few indications that planners are considering the development of new, or revised, strategies and philosophies as regards the conceptual basis of urban planning on a metropolitan scale.⁵⁰ The emphasis of these efforts centers around defining and operationalizing the "normative" elements of planning—those elements that describe the milieu of "where are we going" and "by what means will we get there". The comprehensive plan has been, for the planner, a technical exercise, like fitting the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle together. For technical planning to be effective, however, it is necessary that there be a definite framework circumscribing the ends being pursued and the policies by which they are to be achieved in addition to a clear understanding of the implications that will surely evolve from the enforcement of these policies. In far too many instances, planning agencies have been pursuing goals that have relevancy only within the planning profession, or they have had to assume community goals. The planning staff has rarely had the guidance it needs to

effectively carry out its technical responsibilities.⁵¹

Normative metropolitan planning is the process of establishing rational or reasonable ends for a metropolis given the disparate heritage of its environment.⁵² It involves determinations concerning the objectives which will guide subsequent political actions. It involves making decisions concerning the scope and content of political action, decisions which must ultimately be based on an established value system of the various interests making up the area's fabric. Normative metropolitan planning develops the broad, general basis for action, whereas technical planning is concerned with specific, established purposes and the procedures to be employed in achieving these purposes.

Most normative planning in the metropolis is done by the elected officials and their appointed administrators. To date, the planning profession has tended to remain either aloof from or selectively circuitous to involvement in this vital process of goals formulation and policy analysis as regards the pathing of alternative future courses of action for the metropolis. This tendency explains, to a considerable extent the continuing dilemma of frustrations and failures encountered by metropolitan planning agencies in attempting to implement plans conceived outside the realm of the politically-charged arena of policy making.⁵³ Further, it serves to point out why the planning process is not effectively integrated with the political stages of policy analysis and plan making. The reluctance of planners to change their point of view regarding their involvement with politics has resulted in disparities and tensions between political actions, uninformed by areawide planning considerations, and comprehensive plans, generally void of a sufficient recognition for the various participants in metropolitan development that will surely levy their resources of influence and power against proposals deemed not

to be in their best interest. In short, the friction and conflict that exists between areawide planning and urban political systems might be relieved considerably if planners and decision-makers would adopt a strategy, albeit a process, of analyzing the implications of proposed policies and their accompanying actions on the social, economic, and physical development and redevelopment schemes deemed necessary, by both parties, to assure the public of an eventual betterment of their habitat as expressed through statements of goals and objectives.

The question of central importance to this research concerns the role of the metropolitan planning office. Is it a department that is limited to technical planning, or do its functions extend to normative planning? On the basis of the evidence and conclusions posited and analyzed in the previous chapters of this research there is little doubt that a metropolitan planning department has a unique and dual role to play in the affairs of areawide government. The metropolitan-based planner exists in a middle zone lying somewhere between the politician (the normative planner) and the bureaucrat (the technical planner). The planner is a bureaucrat, in part, by virtue of his position in government as an administrator of programs which have been instituted by the politicians. Further, he has a special competence and training which makes him invaluable in matters concerning the responsibilities of the politician—the formulation of areawide goals and objectives and the analysis of proposed policy actions in response to perceived needs of the public.

One of the key activities of a planning agency is its participation in the process of goals and objectives formulation. It has already been mentioned that the politicians, in response to public pressures, are able to establish adequate short-run goals. Strong arguments for going beyond these minimal, short-range goals were cited.

In the first place, the public influence which helps shape goals is not evenly distributed. Certain groups will exercise greater influences on the mechanisms of the political system than will other groups. Further, when influence tends to be equally shared by competing interests, the outcome of the conflict is likely to be a weak compromise. Finally, political decisions concerning the public interest are made only when opportunities arise. There is generally no systematic or comprehensive evaluation of long-term goals.⁵⁴

For these reasons, and others soon to be discussed, the metropolitan planning agency should participate in the normative element of planning. The development of general goals for the area should result from the interaction of three groups: (1) the public and its voluntary organizations; (2) government as expressed by the elected representatives and their appointive administrative officials; and (3) the professional and technical aids and consultants who staff urban planning offices.⁵⁵

Goal formulation is, however, only one of several core activities which raise planning from the level of a technique to one that is concerned with both ends and means. Other activities include coordination, plan formulation, assistance to other interest groups and public agencies and policy analysis. Taken together, these activities and their components comprise a basic framework for the establishment of a responsive planning body within the structure of a metropolitan government that recognizes a political interaction view of policies planning.⁵⁶

Historically, most of the normative work of planning agencies has been carried out under the label of "policies planning". While there is a range of opinion concerning the exact nature of policies planning, it essentially is the preparation of a set of general statements that define the direction and character of future development and set forth the actions necessary to attain the desired development. The

policies set the broad network for action and form the basis upon which more detailed development decisions are made.

By way of comparison with the end-state plans described above, the policy statements are relatively permanent. Whereas the end-state plans set forth proposals and designate sites, the policies would only set forth the concepts, principles and precepts that would guide those who are responsible for making proposals. For example, if a plan designates a particular area in the CBD for multifamily housing, once the housing is built, or once it becomes obvious that the housing can not be built (due to changing economic conditions or some other unforeseen circumstance), then the plan becomes outdated and useless as a guide for community decision making. On the other hand, a clearly stated policy, such as "make the CBD a dominant feature of the metropolis by enhancing it as the center for commercial, residential, and cultural activities", remains in effect regardless of what happens to the housing and similar proposals.

Policy at this level is, quite properly, the concern of the public and its elected representatives, although the planning agency would interact in proposing, analyzing and evaluating alternative sets of policies. To be effective, the completed statements of policy should be officially adopted by the legislative body of the metropolitan government. Although there are strong arguments against the adoption of plans, these arguments apply more to the traditional master plan with its high degree of specificity.⁵⁷ Adoption of the policies in the form of a "policies plan" does not commit the metropolitan government to any particular recommendations, but it does commit it to take actions, whatever they may be, that are consistent with the policy guidelines.

Policies planning is a process of establishing ends and determining the means by which ends can be achieved. In many planning agencies, the ends are established without any consideration for the guidelines necessary to achieve them. A

policies plan is a statement(s) of the general intentions of the city and thus would serve as a guide for daily decision making on the part of public officials, administrators, and citizens. A policies plan would contain reasonably detailed guiding principles but not specific proposals. For example, a policies plan may state the principle that "public housing should be scattered throughout the city on sites that contain no more than 100 units". The policies plan, however, would not contain a map siting a half-dozen possible public housing projects nor would it recommend that a 100-unit development be constructed next year at the corner of Fourth and Oak.

Many of the kinds of policies that would be included in a policies plan already exist in every community. But they exist in various places and generally in different forms. The policies exist as explicit statements in comprehensive plans; they are implied in plan maps and in the various "planning standards", they exist as "rules of thumb" in government agencies, and they are embodied in the guidelines that control the decisions of various boards and commissions. Policies planning seeks to bring these policies together, resolve conflicts between them, and add new policies where appropriate. By consolidating these policies there is a greater assurance that all the individuals and agencies who make decisions affecting community development will be operating within the same framework.

An integral part of policies planning is the analysis of isolated components of metropolitan problems. Policy planners must indicate how resources can be mobilized and focused on remedial aspects of these problems in such a way that urban areas can be moved gradually away from unsatisfactory social and economic conditions. Policy planners must delineate those alternatives upon which a variety of interests can act jointly and seek ways of binding together some of the disparate participants in policy making to promote mutual cooperation along lines of specialization and common interest.

Therefore, a component of policies planning is the diligent search for ways of reconciling differences among specialized interests, where possible, and evaluating compromise positions, bases for mutual exchange, incentives and instruments of manipulation and persuasion.

A political interaction view of policies planning would define one of the planner's roles to be that of identifying factors central to the formulation of strategies for the management of metropolitan change. Strategic factors are those which, when controlled properly—in the right form and at the right place and time—will aid in establishing a new system or set of conditions that meets the purpose.⁵⁸ Policies planning must search out limiting factors that inhibit desired social change and identify the types of complementary factors needed to enact and implement appropriate programs or controls. Given the complexity of the pluralistic political system inherent with the metropolis, the policy planner must focus on calculating the costs of pursuing alternative courses of action or taking no deliberate action. By explicating the losses that could be incurred by urban interests from the lag time between socio-economic change and the public response to that change, strong incentives might be provided for the formation of effective coalitions to reduce their losses from inaction, delayed action, or inappropriate action. In a very real sense, policies planning would be an adjunctive process of facilitating adjustment among competing interests within a multinucleated governmental structure, to encourage policy outputs of marginally better quality when measured against the status quo.⁵⁹

Contributions of a Normative Approach

Prior to describing the characteristics of normative planning in greater detail, it will be useful to set forth the benefits of policies planning and to summarize the pressures and changes in the planning context that have

created the need for a mechanism of this kind. The following paragraphs attempt to identify those benefits felt to be associated with the proper adaption of urban planning to a broader framework of normative planning.

Improved Citizen Participation. The essential and definitive character of the policy statements facilitates public understanding and public participation in the planning program. In some ways it is misleading to suggest that traditional planning practices have restricted the degree to which citizens could participate in local planning programs. While it's true that the transition from a goal to a precise and detailed plan makes citizen involvement more difficult, there is nothing between the general abstraction, which everybody should agree with, and the finished product; i.e., there is a void in the area where citizen debate would be most fruitful. The argument is, however, slightly misleading since it has only been during the last few years that most citizens cared enough about planning to become involved in the debate over a planning issue. Planning was generally regarded as an intellectual nicety, an abstraction that only rarely touched the lives of most citizens. Therefore, it wasn't important whether the planning approach was conducive to public participation.⁶⁰

This is, of course, changing as the public increases its awareness and acceptance of the idea of planning. This is not an insignificant trend, for planners have had a long history of viewing the future as a luxury. They have been called upon to tackle more and more public problems, and in so doing they have affected the lives of more people. As was pointed out in Chapter III, the large amounts of Federal aid that are poured into urban areas have been a major factor in changing planning from an academic exercise to something that may directly affect the lives of metropolitan citizens. As long as plans meant nothing, or as long as the time lag between plans and projects was long, citizens had nothing to

lose by supporting the "idea" of planning. But as plans rapidly become projects, citizen interest and their ensuing involvement is no longer casual or academic.

The increased public involvement in planning issues has highlighted the existence of multiple urban life styles, with distinct goals that vary widely between different social and economic groups. Most metropolises are witnessing a substantial increase in the number and variety of voluntary organizations, all of which are demanding a voice in the affairs of government. Church congregations, slum residents, property owners associations, welfare recipients, civil rights groups, and others are all anxious to make their views known to city hall. In fact, direct involvement in the affairs of government by groups that have heretofore had no public voice is being institutionalized by such programs as the War on Poverty, where the poor are represented on advisory councils and where legal aid may be provided to help the poor in their struggle against, not only loan companies and landlords, but also against welfare departments and departments of urban renewal.⁶¹

Normative planning is a response to the public demand that they be allowed to participate in the planning process. The policies planning aspect of normative planning would enable the public to see the relationship between the general and the specific. It would encourage them to enter the process at a level between incomprehensible goals and detailed development plans. At this level it would be easier to discuss and evaluate development alternatives, and it would be easier for those groups opposed to the officially endorsed policies to present their own suggestions or alternatives. Normative planning provides no guarantee that the public will become involved, but it greatly encourages their involvement by shifting attention from design details and specific proposals to the more essential characteristics of the future community. Areawide

debate, for example, would be focused on the pros and cons of alternative principles that could be used in locating public housing units (concentrated in one area, dispersed, large developments, or small isolated projects) rather than on what "that" particular development is going to do to "my" neighborhood. The latter debate will undoubtedly come later, but it will be easier, perhaps, to handle if some guiding policies have been publicly agreed on ahead of time.⁶²

Involving Public Officials. The lack of public interest in planning has, quite logically, been paralleled by a similar disinterest on the part of elected officials. Public officials, aware of the interest of their constituents and recognizing the potential impact of major development decisions, can no longer "permit" planning to exist outside their purview. Further, they, like their constituents, find the traditional approach to planning unacceptable to their normal conduct of decision making. They are charged with the responsibility of making major decisions on the basis of a recommendation premised on a plan which they had little or nothing to do with and approved by a planning commission whose ability to interpret the public interest is at least open to question.⁶³ Despite the rhetoric of planners, the futuristic and detailed land use plan is not an adequate guide for decision makers. While it may guide the deliberations of the planning commission it has been of little use to city councils. The comprehensive plan is a product of the traditional planning process and, quite characteristically, all the decisions that comprise its make-up are made by the planners. Public officials can either make the decisions that the plan demands or they can ignore them and be labeled an advocate of "non-planning." As was previously discussed, planning is an "either-or" proposition for the public official. Either they accept the advice or they don't. As a result, policy makers are forced into untenable positions where they must agree in principle with

the advice and then try to defend a justification for a contrary decision. What is needed, of course, is a system which guides the people who will be making future decisions instead of a system that controls all future decisions by prescribing in detail what the future should be.

The normative planning process would enable elected officials to specify, in principle, what they as representatives of the community want. A policies plan would serve as a directive to the areawide planning department, as well as to other agents concerned with the environment. Under an arrangement of this kind there is a greater likelihood that specific proposals will be politically realistic and thus may stand a better chance of fulfillment. A policies plan would also serve as a reference point for a legislative body. A city council could evaluate specific proposals in light of its previously adopted statement of policy. Further, the ease with which a policies plan and its contents could be reviewed by the public and its representatives facilitates and encourages participation. The brief and essential statements of policy can be reviewed without having to grope through the maps and proposed projects of a conventional plan.

Increased Coordination. In response to the many new and complex problems that are characteristic of metropolitan areas, local governments have been increasing the number and variety of their programs. As described in Chapter III, these programs are increasingly cutting across traditional departments lines as governments focus their attention on poverty, juvenile delinquency, employment and urban renewal. These programs require an interdisciplinary approach, and frequently planners find themselves on committees established for the purpose of solving this or that problem. They work with professionals in other disciplines, which exposes them to new concepts and different perspectives and thus forces them to articulate what their role is in helping to solve

the problems being considered by a community in the metropolis.⁶⁴

The interdisciplinary approach (sometimes referred to as the systems approach) to metropolitan problem-solving is one of the changes that has brought planners into closer contact with social and economic issues. Regardless of the outcome of the debate concerning the proper scope of planning, it is clear that practicing planners must give greater consideration to non-physical problems. As planners became involved in the poverty program, urban renewal, and the Model Cities program, they showed a greater appreciation for the fact that a service or program may be far more important than the building in which it is housed. This experience has proven to be instrumental in coercing planners to recognize that physical plans have relevance only to the extent to which they encourage or restrict the attainment of social and economic objectives. A recent and most controversial example of this is the question of school location. In light of the larger social issues that have been raised, the traditional standard of a quarter-mile service radius is being reevaluated.⁶⁵

Coordination has always been one of the functions of a metropolitan planning agency, and the policies plan would serve as a useful device for achieving increased levels of coordinated action. Again, the essential character of the policy statements constitutes the major advantage of the policies plan. Coordination is not a matter of solving jurisdictional disputes between differing parties or forcing action toward a mutually agreed upon end. The policies plan is the statement of the desired end, and the desired coordination will be achieved if all agencies concerned with development will act in accordance with the principles set forth in a policies plan.

Conventionally, the planner's role of coordination was assumed to extend only to those agencies and organizations directly involved with the physical urban area. However, as indicated above, the growing importance of non-physical and program planning adds a new dimension to the problems of coordination. Urban analysts who consider the conventional separation of the metropolis into social, economic, and physical packages an intellectual handicap that has hampered the progress of local governments argue that the policies plan would be an ideal integrative tool. The majority of all planning agencies do have a rather limited area of concern, but there are indications that this area is being expanded. As it does expand, effective coordination will, of necessity, begin at the policy level and not at the level of specific plans and programs.

Normative planning can also be used as a coordinative tool in another context—it can be used to coordinate the activities of individual local governments in multi-jurisdictional metropolitan areas. As previously argued in Chapters II and III, metropolitan planning agencies are rarely backed with the proper authority needed for carrying out their proposed projects. They cannot dictate to the governmental units that make up the area, but they can try to get each unit to agree "in principle" to the desired character of the area. Each unit knows what the others are attempting to achieve. Naturally there would be no guarantee that any given unit will abide by the agreed upon normative framework. This can only be assured through an areawide government charged with the proper authority and power for ameliorating conflicting local desires. But this normative approach would undoubtedly be more realistic than the "grand scheme" concept which presents a threat to local autonomy.

Achieving Consistency. A great deal of prior planning efforts were spent trying to estimate and forecast variables used in preparing futuristic plans to the last decimal point. Yet even a terse comparison of actual urban development to the plans or predictions of 20 or even ten years ago, demonstrates that many of these efforts to anticipate the future have been wasted time. Metropolitan areas change often and in unpredictable ways. Large shifts in population, changes in the economy, and technological advances all combine to make the future highly enigmatic. The fact that change is a feature of our society does not rule out the possibility of planning. In fact, it makes planning all the more necessary. It does, however, rule out the feasibility of adhering to detailed and rigid plans.

Part of the planner's respect for the future comes from changing perceptions of the metropolis. The development of new techniques of analysis and the use of computers to handle vast amounts of data have shifted attention away from "supplies" of people, goods, buildings, and wealth to the "flows" of information, money, goods, and services. The interest is in how the urban system works rather than in what it is. One of the most difficult problems in the next few years will be to reconcile the theories of interaction with the comprehensive plan. Reconciliation must come, for it is impossible to think of the metropolis in dynamic terms and plan for it with a static document.⁶⁶

The policies plan in the normative approach would be expected to cover a great range of future and unforeseen questions. The policies plan would not be made obsolete by an error in a population projection, since it sets forth principles and relationships to apply when new growth occurs or to the process of redevelopment. The policies plan is a frame of reference that lends consistency to development decisions. Since the emphasis is on relationships or interaction, the policies plan has the potential for making planning more action-oriented.⁶⁷

Relating Plans to Land Management. Concern for the relationship between plans and land management has served to highlight the inadequacies of the traditional, unitary approach to planning. It has long been a major doctrine of planning that land use controls—one aspect of an overall land management program—should be in accordance with a comprehensive plan. This was not a difficult charge to fulfill when the controls were as precise and rigid as the plans. In the case of zoning, for example, the plan was in fact little more than a preliminary zoning map. However, with the introduction of devices designed to make zoning more flexible—performance standards, floating zones, planned unit development, density zoning, transfers of development rights, and others—the static land use plan becomes irrelevant. The controls have responded to the need for flexibility far more quickly than have the plans.⁶⁸

Largely because land use controls are more flexible there exists an even greater need for an outside reference point. The city councils that must enact the legislation, the individuals and boards that must administer it, and the courts who are asked to judge the legislation and its administration need some point of reference to see if the results of their actions are in keeping with the desires of the community. The possibility of arbitrary or uninformed action on the part of any or all of these groups is diminished if there is a clear statement of policy that outlines community objectives and identifies the means by which these objectives might or should be achieved.

In summary, the changing character of the metropolitan planning context has reinforced the need for a normative approach to policy analysis and policies planning coupled with the technical rigors of the conventional comprehensive planning ideology. Increasingly, metropolitan planning agencies will find that they cannot function in this broader context without some method for combining policies

planning into their technical programs that attempt to manage urban change.

Elements of a Normative Framework

Normative metropolitan planning is being advanced herein as a broad instrument of metropolitan reform involving two related aspects of change: (1) the integration of policies planning with technical planning to be administered by a Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority (MPDA); and (2) the reform of America's local governmental system into a more responsive and accountable areawide general purpose government of which the MPDA would be a vital part. This section of the research will describe a normative framework to accomplish changes in the theory and practice of metropolitan planning. The latter change, dealing with suggested forms of metropolitan government, will be the subject of the next section. It has been substantiated elsewhere in this report that both of these changes are necessary first steps in correcting for the chronic social, economic and physical inequities plaguing our nation's metropolises.

The elements of a normative planning approach can best be described by interpreting them through the more familiar components of a traditional planning program within the various stages of the comprehensive planning process.

First, there is the research and policy analysis element. This step acknowledges the need for an understanding of the characteristics of public policy making. Although the subject has been explored considerably by the social sciences, little thought has been given to manipulating processes of political interaction so as to plan urban policy more effectively. Research is scarce on the relationships among the policy making structures, the characteristics of the policy making process, and the techniques of interaction and knowledge needed by policy planners to manage urban change and to design strategies of intervention. The attempt in

this stage of the normative framework is to ascertain the categories of skills, knowledge and processes needed by policy planners to intervene effectively in urban policy making. A conceptualizaion of this element is presented in Figure V-1.

Adaptive adjustments among groups seeking to influence policy through tacit interaction strongly characterized the evolution of urban development legislation during the 1960s.⁶⁹ Indirect adjustments often take place without direct communication among policy making participants, either because they cannot or do not want to communicate with each other. Instead, each actor takes an action that he believes will avoid or resolve conflict on the basis of what other actors might do or what they have done in the past. In some cases, this action is based on intuition, rapport, "second guessing", or mutual recognition of a desirable goal. In others, it occurs from uncoordinated reactions to the same conditions of a problem or identical perceptions of the same problem.

A planner attempting to use intervention techniques to guide urban policies through analysis, formulation, and implementation must understand processes of small group decision making, organizational behavior, intragroup dynamics, and interorganizational interaction. Central to such an understanding would be the determination of answers and relationships for the following typical questions: Are adaptive, noncentrally coordinated processes of interaction more successful in implementing policy proposals than techniues of direct coordination? In what types of planning issues are they least effective? Can groups be induced to mutual agreement by third parties? How do these techniues influence the content of policy proposals? Would they affect the structure and dynamics of conflict resolution? If so, how severe would the effect be on preventing policy proposals from being implemented?




Figure V-1. Skills and Knowledge Needed in Urban Policy Making

The structure of policy making involves hierarchies and networks of specialized groups linked together in intertwining decision chains.⁷⁰ Nested throughout these decision chains are coalitions which create and take part in areas of influence over specific types of issues and programs. Enacting a policy often requires that mutual consent be obtained from the sphere of interests composing an organized area of influence. Indeed, failure to seek approval from the clientele of an established program may activate a coalition of opposition to plans calling for policy changes.⁷¹ To deal effectively with these decision chains in urban policy making, planners must possess skills of persuasion and manipulation in addition to capabilities for designing tactics of influence peddling and client analysis.

Policy conflicts are settled through processes of reciprocal exchange, negotiation, intermediation, and bargaining. The complex agency arrangements characterizing urban policy implementation force the use of exchange-bargaining techniques between proponents and opponents of urban assistance policies. Past failures to negotiate settlements among disparate groups—Federal departments, State and local agencies, clientele, target groups, and political factions—has led to serious complications in implementing planning programs. Thus, mediation and negotiation skills become important for planners involved in compromising relationships in urban policy making. Knowledge of organizational behavior, processes of conflict resolution, socio-political exchange tactics, and the planning and design of strategies are tools needed for providing a means of assisting political and administrative decision makers in testing alternative policy proposals and political tactics.

Building coalitions is essential to the management of conflict. Ultimately, urban policies evolve from compromises among groups possessing sufficient power and resources to persuade other actors of the necessity for a particular course of action. Incentives and inducements change both the

parameters of decision making and the consequences of policy alternatives to interested groups. However, the use of incentives requires entrepreneurial experience. Skills in organizaional leadership, advocacy planning, resource mobilization and coalition management are essential to this element of policies planning in a normative framework.

The second element of normative metropolitan planning is the policies plan—that element which defines the basic policies to be used in guiding subsequent planning efforts. The plan would contain a range of policies and would be used in the preparation of a comprehensive plan as well as for preparing and administering shorter range programs, plans, and ordinances. This policy range can conveniently be compared to the distinctive elements of a trip in the metropolis—defining the destination, selecting the route, and choosing the mode of transport.

The first and most general level of policy is defining the "destination" or objectives. At this level the policies would deal with questions concerning alternative forms of development, rates of growth, character of the economy, desired levels of public services, and intensity of development. The objectives at this level are found in one form or another in most plans. They are really statements that say "we would like to . . ." or "wouldn't it be nice if" However, standing alone they are of relatively little use in guiding action by the community.

The next level of policy is the "route" which specifies in general terms the way by which the destination can be reached. Specifically indicated would be the kinds of actions that could be used to achieve the objectives. In any metropolitan area, there would be a variety of ways available to achieve desired outcomes. These can be determined by citizens committees, metropolitan councils, or regional planning commissions. The planning professionals would assist in pointing out all the alternatives feasible to the area.

It would be reasonable to expect that the area and its components would pursue all of these directions, but differentiate as to the emphasis placed on each of these alternatives.

The third level is the choice of "transport mode". Policies at this level would be still more detailed and could be readily translated into specific design proposals or action recommendations. They are, in essence, implementing policies. Because of the detail contained in these policies, the technical judgements of professional planners become more important.⁷²

Examples of third level policy, such as those depicted in Table V-1, cover a range of specificity. Some are in the form of standards, others can be translated into standards, and others are simply an indication of support for a particular idea or principle. Some can be acted upon immediately and others require further study to see if the ideas presented are feasible. Potential areas of conflict that were not apparent at the first and second policy levels become apparent here. For instance, the policy with respect to parking areas may be in conflict with the policy of increasing the development density. The parking policy may have to be modified so as to permit or encourage all parking to be in garage structures. Also, while not indicated here, this level would include policies relating to assessments and taxes, levels of community services, and other items of public concern that would conceivably affect development.

An array of policies, such as that shown in Table V-1, illustrates what it is the area wants and how they intend to go about achieving it. It begins to reveal the "price" that must be paid for achieving the end. Initiation of a Federally supported urban renewal project may be too high a "price" (not necessarily in dollar terms) to pay in order to clear the deteriorating sections of the area. In that case, the community may decide to drop one of the possible policies.

Table V-1. A Hypothetical Example of One Aspect of a Metropolitan Policy for a Particular Area of Concern 73

- I. First Policy Level: The area decides to make the central business district (CBD) a dominant feature of the region.
- II. Second Policy Level:
 - A. Make the CBD more accessible.
 - B. Make the CBD the center for a variety of activities.
 - C. Improve the physical appearance of the area.
 - D. Make the CBD more competitive relative to other retail centers.
 - E. Increase the intensity of the land uses in the area.
- III. Third Policy Level:
 - A. Make the CBD more accessible.
 - 1. Support regional highway projects that will bring traffic to the CBD, and at the same time, provide a by-pass route for through traffic.
 - 2. Provide enough parking in the area so that no major institution or enterprise will be more than ten minutes walking time from a parking area.
 - 3. Actively support a regional organization that is now considering the feasibility of developing an areawide mass transit system.
 - B. Make the CBD a center for a variety of activities.
 - 1. Give top priority to the central area when selecting sites for public office buildings.
 - 2. Provide support for the development of high-rise luxury housing in the central area.
 - 3. Encourage the development of a cultural center in the central area.
 - C. Improve the appearance of the area.
 - 1. The city should work with downtown merchants in preparing a sign ordinance.
 - 2. Eliminate the deteriorating sections of the area through urban renewal.
 - 3. Encourage developers to provide plazas or other forms of open space by granting them density bonuses.
 - D. Make the CBD more competitive.
 - 1. The regional council supports the idea of a hierarchy of commercial centers and will discourage the development of a shopping center large enough to be competitive with the CBD.
 - 2. Feasibility studies will be required for all shopping center requests.
 - E. Increase the intensity of use in the area.
 - 1. The zoning ordinance should be revised to permit higher densities in the area.
 - 2. Every effort should be made to consider the feasibility of transferrable development rights as an incentive for creating a proper intensity and use mix.

If this hierarchy of policies was compared with a set based on the idea of minimizing the importance of the central area or of devoting the central area exclusively to commercial uses there would be a greater opportunity to compare possible outcomes. Further, if these policies were officially approved by a governing body they would serve as a guide for preparing a central area plan, and they would be used in guiding the daily decisions that boards, departments, administrators, and private citizens make that have an impact on areawide development.

The example in Table V-1 relates to only one small component of the metropolis. Additional sets of policies should be adopted for all the other types of development issues that a metropolitan area might face. As discussed in a previous chapter, regional planning agencies have used this procedure for illustrating various forms of regional growth--satellite cities, dispersed development, concentrated development, and star-shaped growth. These plans are useful as informational and educational devices, and the better ones may serve to unify governments and individuals and encourage them to take action consistent with the plans broad outline. Often, however, several of the alternatives merely serve as "straw men" and an intelligent public is forced into selecting the one that the planners recommend. Furthermore, many of these regional schemes do not carry the policy questions down to the level that is meaningful to most citizens. There is no indication of the second and third levels of policy that are to be employed. However, the idea of presenting regional patterns of development in terms of policies with accompanying illustrative maps is sound even if the execution of the idea falls short of ideal.

In developed regions there is little opportunity to experiment with regional forms. Policies for these areas would have to be limited to more conventional types of concern such as: density of development, distribution of commercial and

employment centers, the appropriate mix of transportation, the range of housing choice, and the character of the economy. These major issues would be translated into the more detailed policies. As regards the contents of the plan, it should contain enough policies to cover every typical or imaginable problem that occurs in metropolitan development. This means policies concerning the location of all types of uses, the relationships between uses, the nature of the communications system, and the character and density of development.

The first requirement, therefore, is that a policies plan contain a full range of policies. The second requirement is that these policies be general rather than specific. This is perhaps the most difficult aspect of developing a plan. As has been indicated, the policies can range widely in degree of abstraction and detail. If the plan contains only the most general policies, then it is useless as a guide to decision making; and if it contains policies that are too specific, then the guiding value of the policy statement is lost. Thus, there is a delicately balanced mid-level policy that is essential for the plan to be effective.

This mid-level, unfortunately, creates another problem—that of conflict between policies. Usually there is little conflict between policies at the most general level. Similarly, little conflict exists among specific policies in, say, a detailed development plan. The plan may, of course, generate controversy, and development may not occur in the manner envisioned by the plan, but the plan itself is internally consistent. At the middle levels, conflict between policies is, practically speaking, inevitable. To argue that there should be a policy to cover all situations and that all policies should be mutually exclusive so that no overlap or conflict exists between them, is to underestimate the complexity of the development process. Some conflicts can

be eliminated simply by removing one or two policies that are contradictory. Indeed, that would be one of the main purposes of defining the mid-level policies—to identify the conflicts. However, in many instances, overlaps will occur that cannot be resolved. Individuals make personal decisions on the basis of a number of guiding principles (policies) and when the principles are in conflict they make judgements as to which one will apply. Public, like personal, decisions are not made on the basis of strict deductive reasoning. The democratic system is set up in order to make equitable judgements in resolving conflicts among guiding principles. The fact that conflict exists is not an argument against adopting policy statements. The policies help to clarify the nature of the conflict and to place it into a perspective that simplifies the problem of resolution. To be effective then, the policies must be aimed at the mid-level, between platitudes and specific plans and recommendations.

The third element in the normative metropolitan planning framework is the general plan. This is the element which is derived from the policies plan and which consists of specific long-range recommendations. It specifies general locations and suggests needed projects. It should be stressed at this point that many general plans, particularly the ones prepared during the last ten or so years, contain the policies that would be a part of a policies plan. They are separated here only to stress the importance of the policies step in the planning program.

As the literature contains many excellent discussions pertaining to the development of the general plan concept, the functions of the plan, procedures for preparing and using the plan, the requirements as regards plan subject matter and form, and the setting for the adoption and implementation of the plan, it is not deemed necessary to the purpose of this research to capsulize and consequently

distort over fifty years of work by the profession.⁷⁴ Table V-2 adequately depicts the nature of the general plan and shows the heavy dependence of the plan on the outputs of the policies planning phase in the normative framework.⁷⁵

The fourth element of normative planning on a metropolitan scale would be the preparation of a detailed area-wide development plan. The purpose of such an instrument would be to translate the general plan into middle-range programs and plans that could be used by decision makers in preparing a metropolitan capital improvements program for a period of from five to 10 years. In essence, this element is an adjunctive part of the comprehensive plan in that it should spell out financially just how the general plan recommendations are to be realized in terms of a "capital needs list."⁷⁶ The priorities for scheduling capital improvements in accordance with the areawide development plan would, of course, come from the policies plan. Thus, the development plan element of normative planning would, on a metropolitan scale, attempt to bridge the chasm that exists between disparate developmental policies at the local level which are stop-gap in nature and the long-range comprehensive plan for the future as envisioned by the planners. The development plan would link, in a middle-range manner, measures needed to deal with current problems with long-range proposals in support of the policies plan.

The capital needs list should consist of two major parts. The first would be a capital improvements schedule listing all improvements to be undertaken within the planning period of 20 years or more. Drawn from this schedule would be the customary five to 10 year capital improvements program of which the first year would be the capital improvements budget. The second major element in the capital needs list would be the "planned projects reserve." This would include those improvements which suggest themselves in the plan as being desirable but unlikely to be undertaken because of

Table V-2. The Urban General Plan

The Uses of the Plan

POLICY DETERMINATION: Enables the council to consider and agree (a) upon a definite set of policies that will be used to govern the future physical development of the area, and (b) upon a general physical design for the area showing how the policies are to be carried out.

POLICY EFFECTUATION: Enables the council to view every specific project upon which it must act against a definite framework of desirable long-range development for the entire area.

COMMUNICATION: Enables the council to convey its long-range physical development policy to the citizens and to leaders and executives of government, civic, and business organizations; enables constructive debate and stimulates political action.

CONVEYANCE OF ADVICE: Enables the council to receive recommendations concerning physical-development matters from the planning commission and other advisors in a coherent, unified form.

EDUCATION: Enables the representatives of the council to educate themselves and others concerning the physical-development problems and opportunities of the area and the relationship of these problems and opportunities to the social and economic issues involved.

Characteristics of the Plan

If the General Plan is to serve the five uses defined above, it should have the following ten characteristics:


SUBJECT-MATTER CHARACTERISTICS

1. G.P. should focus on physical development.
2. G.P. should be long-range.
3. G.P. should be comprehensive.
4. G.P. should be general, and should remain general.
5. G.P. should clearly relate the major physical-design proposals to the basic policies of the Plan.

CHARACTERISTICS RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL PROCEDURES

6. G.P. should be in a form suitable for public debate.
7. G.P. should be identified as the council's plan.
8. G.P. should be available and understandable to the public.
9. G.P. should be designed to capitalize on its educational potential.
10. G.P. should be amendable.

Table V-2. Continued



present financial, legal, or other obstacles. These improvements would be catalogued as part of a planned projects reserve for completion beyond the time limit set by the comprehensive plan or earlier if new resources become available. New sources of revenue, private bequests, State and Federal grant programs and changes in legislation could activate such improvements and advance them to the capital improvements schedule, the capital improvements program and ultimately to the capital budget.

This is an appropriate technique for insuring that all comprehensive plan proposals are presented in documents which will fit them into the capital improvements programming process. Whether they are kept in a category labeled "planned projects reserve" or maintained in the listing of deferred projects is immaterial. It is important, however, that they be carried along and considered annually as part of the capital improvements review by the metropolitan government.

For many politicians and businessmen the comprehensive plan is too remote to seem real. For planners, on the other hand, ameliorative measures, which attack symptoms rather than basic problems, are too piecemeal and too hastily considered to seem worthwhile. The concept of a middle-range areawide development plan is a compromise measure that would relate immediate problems to future expectations thus permitting coherent policy effectuation. This type of plan preparation would require detailed, timed and controlled programming of governmental policies for private as well as for public actions. Detailed cost estimates of private as well as public development, and specific administrative and legal measures to carry out the programs would have to be worked out.

Long-range comprehensive plans commonly reveal a desired state of affairs. They rarely specify the necessary courses of action needed to achieve that desired end state. Because

of their long-range nature they cannot do so. The areawide development plan, in contrast, would indicate the specific changes in land use programmed for each year, the rate of new growth, the public facilities to be built, the structures to be removed, the private investment required, the extent and sources of public funds to be raised, the tax and other local incentives to encourage private behavior requisite to the plan. The development plan should be acted upon each year and made an official act for the subsequent year, similar to the procedures currently used to place the capital improvements budget into law. Revised yearly it would become the central guide to a land use control system, to public budgeting, and to appropriate private actions to achieve directed community improvement.

The final element in the framework of a normative metropolitan planning process is the action element. This is the stage in the process where funds are allocated, ordinances enforced, and programs implemented. To orchestrate all of the activities described previously in the normative framework requires a program of strategies that goes further than the simple concept of policy implementation. Such a program must, of necessity, be broad and have as its primary directive the objective of implementing planning and policies, not just plans. Planning policy implementation is a far more subtle and difficult process than plan implementation; it is concerned with the exercise of influence and power, and it aims at guiding the development of the metropolitan area in accordance with the substantive policies derived and adopted in the policies planning stage.

A second criteria for such a program is that it cannot be separated from either plans or policies making. Friedmann has stated that "the idea that planning and implementation are two distinct separable activities dies hard."⁷⁷ The implementation methods that are available to the metropolitan planning agency will inevitably shape, through feedback, the

kinds of planning and policies programs they will construct. Taking Friedmann's advice seriously would require metropolitan planning agencies to move simultaneously on both the planning and implementation components of their programs. To exaggerate the point, the agencies would have to work backwards on occasion; i.e., they would have to determine the implementation methods available to them and then formulate their planning programs accordingly. This more balanced approach is likely to be more effective than preparing plans that depend on nonexistent implementation powers.

Because the planning agency should be systematic and comprehensive in thinking about its implementation activities, it should group and classify implementation methods into different types of strategies. What is meant by the use of the term strategy is essentially the concept defined by Bolan, and forwarded by So:⁷⁸

Strategy is viewed here as a related group of methods (at times they can be tactics, tools, or techniques) used by the planner in attempting to persuade government officials and others that governmental policies and plans ought to be influenced by the information, criteria, and values which he (the planner) is specifically able to bring to bear in carrying out the same objective.

The advantages of this type of approach are that: (1) there is more emphasis on the goal of the strategy; (2) it can be seen that the same method may contribute to more than one objective; (3) there is a greater likelihood that gaps in strategies can be identified and corrected; and, (4) there is greater attention given to the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various strategies.

In preparing an implementation program, it is conceivable that the planners would make use of many different strategies. In general, however, these strategies would be of two types: persuasive and mandatory. Persuasive strategies can be

placed in a broad framework of seven categories: "the classic method;" gaining and strengthening allies; systematically collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information; cooperating with different types of governments and agencies, especially regionwide planning and development agencies who make crucial decisions in shaping the region; improving the opportunities for coordination as regards intergovernmental relations; concentrating on ad hoc problem solving; and indoctrinating and educating public officials and the public on the "worth" of metropolitan planning as a desirable activity for solving problems on a cooperative basis. The literature is replete with descriptions of the salient characteristics of each of these persuasive strategies and, therefore, those efforts will not be duplicated here.⁷⁹ It is important to point out, however, that these strategies should be used in combinations rather than singly. Typically, these strategies are not mutually exclusive; to pursue the advantages of one strategy (or two) over the advantages to be gained by using most or all of them on a selective basis, would result in accruing no advantages at all.

Perhaps the outstanding feature of all these implementation actions is that they are based upon persuasion. As such they depend very strongly upon the personality of the planner and his acumen as a salesman. The fact that such serious substantive planning issues as those previously described may well hinge upon the personal abilities of the participants rather than on the issues themselves is a bit paradoxical. Such, however, is the nature of the political system.

Implementation powers beyond persuasion are of three kinds: Mandatory referral, institutional change, and development power. Each of these powers are generally derived from state enabling statutes and thus afford an agency with legal powers which enable it to require that others adhere to

its policies and plans. To date, however, these compulsory powers have been granted to only a few metropolitan planning agencies.⁸⁰ Perhaps this trend will change in the future, but regardless of what happens, each of these powers is deemed important to the makeup of an implementation program.

Mandatory referral is a statutory provision granted to a metropolitan planning agency for the purpose of requiring that any plan or change of plan must be referred to the regional agency for its consideration and recommendations. It is important to note that only the referral is mandatory; it is usually not mandatory to follow the agency's advice. The best example of this device is A-95 review which was previously discussed in Chapter III. Additionally, the States of Maryland, Connecticut, New York, Florida, and Minnesota either preceded the Federal government in conferring mandatory referral powers or have followed closely in their footsteps.⁸¹ Of these States, Minnesota is perhaps the leader in terms of the number of powers which they have vested with the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area.⁸²

The Council, in addition to its Federal metropolitan review powers, may review certain land acquisition grants, plans of independent agencies, plans of municipalities, and interstate highway system disputes. While in some cases the Council's comments are advisory only, on Federally funded projects it has the power to actually approve or disapprove if the proposal is for an open space land acquisition program funded under the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, HUD, or the Minnesota Department of Conservation. Special district agencies must also refer their plans to the Council. These special districts include those controlling sanitary facilities, airports, mosquito control, transit, county park reserves, hospital districts, a library district, a conservation district, a soil conservation district, and watershed districts. The Council not only has the power to review plans but it can also order certain types of agency plans to be suspended.

The Council further has the power to review the plans of municipalities, including major amendments to existing plans. These plans must have a "substantial effect on metropolitan development" and, it is important to note, include major industrial and commercial centers as well as public facilities plans. The Council can also comment on disagreements between the state highway department and local municipalities on plans for interstate freeways. The state highway commissioner may refer the dispute to the Council, and its opinions are advisory only.

In addition to its referral powers, the Council may intervene on behalf of the metropolitan area in annexation and incorporation proceedings conducted before the Minnesota Municipal Commission. Also the Council may bring measures to the legislature concerning tax equalization, pollution abatement, local services consolidation, and land acquisition. Further, the Council is moving toward development power.

The Minnesota State legislature gave the Metropolitan Council significantly greater powers during the 1969 session that are clearly more far-reaching than the powers of any other metropolitan planning agency in the nation.⁸³ First, the Council obtained power to be more directly involved, and at an earlier period, in development controls within three miles of the new regional airport. The Council can adopt criteria and guidelines for land use and development within this area and local governments must adopt controls within the guidelines. Second, and of even greater significance, the Council can now appoint the members of two seven-member boards which would build, acquire, and operate a metropolitan sewer system and open space recreational system. Each board would carry out the policies and plans prepared by the Council. In effect, the Metropolitan Council is directly and powerfully involved in shaping metropolitan growth and development through a subsidiary agency.

While efforts to change the basic governmental framework for planning and development decision making may in a sense be an institutional change strategy, this type of effort is so important and, as previously discussed, so fundamental that it deserves separate discussion. By institutional change is meant changes in the legal powers, methods of governance, ways in which functions are integrated, and organizational structures created which go considerably beyond having the metropolitan planning agency merely be a quasi-governmental advisory board. The next section addresses needed changes within the context of a normative framework and posits recommendations to support the changes.

The Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority

Central to the development of an areawide implementation program is the need for institutional change stimulated by the new flow of Federal funds into metropolitan areas. The most immediate and most fundamental contribution the Federal government can make toward the solution of metropolitan problems is to stimulate the creation of representative and politically responsible policy making bodies in the metropolitan areas, genuinely capable of making decisions on controversial issues and to stimulate these authorities, once created, to move toward their own state legislatures.

This effort to "mate" a Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority (MPDA) with a state legislature is so necessary to an effective attack on metropolitan problems that it is worth underscoring, from the beginning, the ways in which the concept departs from the predominant assumptions about metropolitan problems, and their solution:

1. "Planning" is only part of the problem. While there are no shortages of plans in urban areas, there is, however, an insufficient amount of ability to come to formal, binding, and satisfactory agreement on complex and

controversial public policy issues. An ability, in other words, to make decisions and, concomitantly, a need for a governmental structure at the areawide level competent to carry out those decisions.

2. Federal funding, by itself, is not a solution. Areawide authorities, capable of making controversial decisions are essential to using available Federal dollars well. In addition, the metropolitan authority must be able to open up, through state legislative action, new tax sources to tap the great wealth that exists in the metropolis, taken as a whole. The assumption that only the Federal government can tap this wealth is untenable. The fact is that elected officials from the suburbs who sit in the national legislature have been just as unwilling to vote these funding programs as have the suburban-based elected officials who sit in the state legislatures.⁸⁴

3. The Federal government will need to look outside the framework of its own agencies and programs for the most meaningful solutions: The metropolitan problem is more a problem of local government organization than one of re-organization of Federal administrative agencies, and their grant-making or revenue-sharing procedures.

4. A radical change will be required in the present direction of Federal policy as regards the structure of metropolitan planning organizations. To date, areawide agencies have been required and assisted on the fundamental principle that what is to be represented are units of government, rather than people. The problems of the metropolis are, however, not the same as, and certainly larger than the problems of the local government units which they encompass. True community decisions that will be the basis for state legislative action, require more than a consensus among local government officials—they require an areawide policy making structure that essentially represents the people of the area.

5. The traditional emphasis, in the Federal government's relations with States and localities, on relations with governors and mayors will have to change to include a new emphasis on a metropolitan, rather than a municipal, definition of the "city". The 1970 census has made it plain that the national administration can no longer deal simply with the central city and believe it is effectively relating to urban problems. Increasingly, it will have to deal with urban areas as a whole. The problem is that urban areas are not presently organized to be dealt with as a whole.

6. It will be necessary to abandon most of the old stereotypes about "cities" and "suburbs". Not all central cities are poor, black, and Democratic. Not all suburbs are rich, white, and Republican. Properly represented in an appropriately structured areawide body politic, the various parts of the area will combine and recombine from issue to issue.

While the strategy of using the leverage of the Federal government to bring together a representative areawide authority with a state legislature is relatively untried, there are some compelling arguments to support it. Constitutionally, the principal warehouse of powers that are critical to the solution of metropolitan problems is the state legislature. Federal officials and State governors can entice, propose, criticize, threaten, and perhaps punish. But it is the legislature that must act. It is the legislature that controls the land use laws, the tax laws, the school aid formula, the municipal aid formula, the building codes, the system of criminal justice, the funding of public programs, and, in many cases, the limits on the levies of local units and the salaries of local officials. It may be partially incorrect to say, but it appears on a logical basis that much of the "urban crisis" is in the state legislatures.

The key to this warehouse is the establishment of consensus within the metropolis and its constituent communities as to what is wanted. State legislators, to include those from outside the metropolitan area, are frequently unwilling to act constructively on matters of less than statewide scope in the face of substantial disagreement within the area most immediately affected. Therefore, no solution for metropolitan problems through legislative action is probable without a mechanism for shaping a consensus at the regional level.

The mechanism, in turn, must have political validity. An "advisory" mechanism is not sufficient. Nor is a consensus developed solely among local officials, or solely among civic groups. The legislature will, inevitably, and can, legitimately, throw up against any such proposal the same basic question raised, for example, by federal highway officials, when asked to tie their projects to metropolitan plans: "What do these projects represent, politically?" Thus political validity requires that the consensus-making mechanism be (1) statutory, and (2) representative, in its system of voting, of the geographic areas constructed on an equal-population-district basis.

Together, the MPDA and the state legislature should move toward a reorganization of government at the metropolitan (regional) level on the basis of the following principles:

1. That the need is not for the consolidation or abolition of local governments and their functions, but for the capable handling of functions felt by the local area to be essentially areawide in character.

2. That the issue is not whether a metropolitan government is to exist, but whether the metropolitan government that does exist is to be controlled on questions of basic policy, by an authority genuinely representative of and responsible to the people of the area.

3. That, in bringing existing and proposed regional planning arrangements and special-purpose districts under control, what is critical to abolish is not their existence, but their independence. Typically, these agencies do a masterful job of planning and building the component parts of the system to which they are assigned. The problem is their unwillingness to be coordinated, either with each other or any general development policy for the region.

4. That the critical need is for the creation of a metropolitan policy body that would have truly effective control over specialized agencies through an ability to control their membership, their planning and their finance. On the basis of the findings in this research, such a body must meet at least the following specifications: (a) it must be a multipurpose instrument capable of dealing with the relatedness of metropolitan problems; (b) it must be a democratic instrument—it should be politically accountable on an areawide basis; (c) the new instrument must be decentralized in terms of both decision making and administration—it must share the power it helps to create; and (d) the new instrument should encourage some sense of local community by not disrupting cultural, traditional, or geographical ties in existing municipalities.

The formation of metropolitan governments would be one necessary strategy for accommodating impending growth in a way that does not permanently harden the present metropolitan pattern. However, a reorganization of the system of local finance to balance needs and services is warranted if the present inequitable fiscal pattern in the metropolis is to be corrected.

Historically, the Federal and State governments have had to carry the burden of ameliorating the fiscal disparities among metropolitan jurisdictions. Apart from special districts and occasional use of payroll taxes and charges for services, metropolitan machinery to permit local

jurisdictions to share a regional tax base or otherwise provide transfers among local jurisdictions in a metropolitan area has been lacking.

A promising way for resolving the problem of fiscal disparities in metropolitan areas was advanced by the Minnesota legislature in 1971.⁸⁵ The State established a system whereby all local governments in the Minneapolis-St. Paul region must share all new and improved nonresidential tax bases. The local jurisdiction where the new or improved commercial or industrial facilities are located is allotted 60 percent of the tax base these facilities create. The other 40 percent must be shared among all the jurisdictions within the metropolitan area according to a formula based primarily on the projection of the region's total population in each jurisdiction, and to a lesser extent on the jurisdiction's fiscal need.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, in its 1971 Annual Report, characterized this action as both ingenious and desirable. The appraisal of the ACIR was highly optimistic:⁸⁶

This pioneering effort should help to break down the barriers between central city and suburbs, and between suburbs and rural areas. It reduces the incentives for fiscal zoning and the flight of industry and large commercial ventures to lower-taxed suburbs—two of the most stubborn obstacles to an orderly urban growth policy. It admittedly is a modest beginning—one which partially shares the tax base through a method that is partially on an equalizing basis—but it is a first step accomplished without creating either a new tax or a new agency.

Burdens and services would both, therefore, tend to be less disparate among the parts of the region. Further, the present system of local finance, which is a major obstacle to achieving orderly urban development, would be diminished. Base-sharing, because it works with the taxable valuations of existing local units, is certainly a preferable

alternative to the imposition of a metropolitan taxing district.

Our metropolises, particularly with the advent of revenue sharing, are imperatively in need of redesign. The proposals described in Chapter III and the principles, criteria and instruments of reform summarized above are testimonials to this fact. But this redesign will take time, and time favors the continuance of the problem rather than the development of solutions. What is needed now is an areawide instrument, fashioned to the specifications above, to begin the tasks of implementing metropolitan planning and development strategies. Although the connotation described herein has been an instrument rather than a government, general-purpose metropolitan government could be the instrument for carrying out the metropolitan planning and development strategy if it met the above specifications. What follows is a proposal for such an instrument.

It would be an elective Metropolitan Planning and Development Authority (MPDA). Since it would be an instrument capable of dealing with the relatedness of regional problems which are highly influenced by national and statewide strategies of planning and development, it should be largely financed by State governments with additional incentive monies available from the Federal government. The Federal money would be tied to some strong and sizable strings relating to such matters as representativeness, environmental protection, and priority attention to the widening of choices and options for the poor, near-poor, and minorities. The Federal government would seek to induce States to create the MPDAs through the energetic use of fiscal carrots and sticks. This could be incorporated into the legislation of special revenue sharing as a requirement for any Federal funds to do planning on a metropolitan scale. However, where the States did not do so, the MPDAs should be considered as a direct creation by the Federal government.

The MPDA would serve as the primary delivery mechanism for all Federal programs in the following categories anywhere in its area; housing and community development, transportation, environmental protection, and economic development. It would supplant such present mechanisms as local housing authorities and redevelopment agencies as Federal funding channels. It would function as a secondary delivery system for Federal employment and service programs aimed at helping localities meet needs generated by its planning policies and development decisions.

The MPDA would have the powers of eminent domain and supercession of local building and land use regulations with respect to specified types of areawide decisions. Inter-community problems which are not metropolitan problems would be dealt with through the powers reserved for the community districts. The MPDA would not be granted home rule powers: The Decision on the functions to be undertaken, the form of organization (not to be confused with the structure being outlined here), and the financing authority would remain with the state legislatures. Furthermore, in assigning functions and responsibilities, the legislatures must carefully confine the Authority to areawide functions only (or on a shared basis) and must carefully delimit the responsibilities of the Authority to the analysis, planning and implementation elements of the previously described normative planning framework. The construction and operation of facilities is not the responsibility of an MPDA; policies planning, issue analysis, plan making, and areawide coordination are their responsibility.

The MPDA would be comprised of equal population community districts somewhat smaller than the central cities and larger than the smallest suburbs. Each district would elect its own governing board and officers. These district boards, in turn, would choose delegates to form the areawide MPDA governing board. Officers of the MPDA would be chosen

in an areawide general election, would serve on a full-time basis, and would be paid salaries consistent with attracting and retaining high caliber public officials. Members of the districts should be paid at per diem for their services. Both the areawide and district offices would have interdisciplinary professional staffs. While it would be up to the state legislatures to undertake the provisions for the election of members to the MPDA governing body, it is highly recommended that the requisites for membership on that body would limit office holders to overlapping six-year terms that would be staggered over a set of elections. Further, the qualifications of each member should be sufficiently high to allow only those persons capable of thinking in real depth, and with considerable freedom, about the fundamental issues of metropolitan development to be selected for possible office on the board.

The first step in the creation of an MPDA would be the establishment of a metropolitan commission composed of local elected officials, Federal and State representatives, and citizen members. The citizen members would be chosen through areawide general elections. In structuring the position of Commission Director (or Chairperson), it is important to clearly distinguish the two fundamental issues involved. One is the question of the office itself; the other is the question of the method by which the individual is chosen for that office.

1. It is essential that the office exist clearly as a leadership office, and not simply as an additional duty imposed on one of the Commission members elected from and continuing to represent, one of the community districts. The Director would continue as a voting member representing and serving the area as a whole, and must be free of the potential conflicts of interest that would arise if he were also the representative of a district. Precisely what role the director would need to play, to maintain an appropriate

emphasis on at-large considerations within the deliberations of the Commission, would become clear only as the area gained experience with its Commission.

2. The Director must be a resident of the metropolitan area and selected by the Governor of the State with confirmation by the Senate. This would emphasize the character of the office as a leadership post, representing the area as a whole, in relation to a Commission partly elected by districts. It would clearly focus responsibility for the selection of the individual who would occupy the office. Further, it would continue a meaningful tie with the State government, on both the executive and legislative sides, thus affording maximum opportunity for the coordination of metropolitan programs and those State programs with which they would be closely involved.

As relationships become settled, and as the responsibilities of the Commission expand, the need for a political leader directly responsible to the people of the metropolitan area may dictate a shift to direct election of the Director. This would also open up an opportunity for a reorganization of the metropolitan governmental structure into a more conventional legislative/executive relationship. However, given the present stage in the evolution of areawide governments, the addition of an elective position at the metropolitan level is a bit premature.

In recognition of the differences between areas, many decisions about the MPDA's structure would be left to the Commission, but within overall Federal and State guidelines containing strings such as those cited above. Included in these decisions would be such crucial matters as the size of the community districts, the distribution of powers between the district and areawide levels, and the powers of the areawide officers in relation to the board of district delegates. The guidelines, in each case, would have to be firm enough to protect the presently powerless. In the

matter of district versus areawide MPDA powers, for example, no district should be allowed to veto the development of lower-income housing allotted to it through the areawide development plan. Also, the areawide officers should have sufficient checks on them to prevent their becoming "metropolitan czars."

Thus, in one sense the MPDAs would be interim instruments to implement areawide policies and development strategies while the process of making far-reaching decisions about the Federal structure, to include those about metropolitan governance, goes on. However, in another sense, they would be precursors to the formation of general-purpose metropolitan governments. As they continue about their work, they would become increasingly involved in operational as well as developmental activities, if only to administer what they had planned to be built pending the creation of broader and more permanent metropolitan governmental entities. Conceivably, one possible outcome could be the evolution of MPDAs into metropolitan federations, or other forms of general-purpose metropolitan government. However, this need not be the intention to justify their creation. MPDAs are needed in any case to undertake the urgent task of reshaping the American metropolis.

Summary

The two proposals described above are not dissimilar concepts. The development of a normative framework for metropolitan planning is aimed primarily at expanding the scope of planning to bring it more in line with the characteristics of those problems, issues and participants involved with the development of a metropolis. It is a policies instrument that neither replaces the comprehensive plan nor attempts to predetermine the goals that will be translated into the plan. Normative planning centers its attention on coordination, on achieving action, and on

expanding the policies base for more relevant decision making. Normative planning is a policies instrument that becomes a tool for guiding metropolitan growth.

The creation of an MPDA as an interim measure until the processes of decision making with regard to a form of metropolitan government are completed, is essential to the proper conduct of policies planning. On the basis of the evidence and conclusions contained in Chapter III, no current form of urban government or planning agency is capable (in terms of legal power, fiscal resources, manpower, and political representation) of effectively conducting the tasks of normative metropolitan planning as previously outlined. The performance of each element in normative planning requires an authoritative agency, such as the MPDA, that can work with State, Federal and local interests in resolving matters of conflict that would normally be the responsibility of an areawide government. Indeed, the concept of the MPDA, as outlined herein, was conceived from an analysis of each of the elements in the normative framework with one theme in mind: Who or what is best for handling this element as well as the relatedness of each of these elements?

Many persons, particularly those involved in planning, government and land development, may find these proposals antithetical to the more popularly held norms and publicized characteristics of our time: distrust of government, decentralization of government functions, racial and ethnic separatism, rising suburban power, the rout of liberal reform, the counterrevolution against rising expectations, etc. Perhaps others will find these proposals extravagant and grandiose. They will argue for the achievements of past consolidations of change noting the need for accepting any further change in only small and incremental dosages. They will warn against upsetting (perhaps frightening) the public with large initiatives of reform and thereby preventing any change at all.

It is tempting to squelch all of these arguments with the contentions that these proposals are both necessary and entirely in scale with this nation's metropolitan domestic needs and problems. And, moreover, that they would work, as incremental metropolitan reform has and will not. However, beyond these contentions, there are other, and perhaps more compelling reasons, for why the proposals outlined here are necessary and achievable.

First, these proposals represent a kind of economy of scale as regards change. Most of the reforms of the past thirty years have been too small, particularly in conception, to make a difference. Mechanisms to reform governmental institutions have been and will continue to be attempted. But, the reform of metropolitan government is only one aspect of the reform strategies needed to improve the abilities of metropolitan areas to govern themselves. Present planning approaches to the solution of metropolitan problems are archaic and ill-structured. The scope of planning must be expanded to move urban planning out of the quagmire of its traditional physical orientation into the broader framework of policies planning and urban analysis. Thus, metropolitan reform means more than government reorganization; each service function within government must be examined in much the same way as the institution when questions of change are posited. The proposals herein are entirely within the context of this mandate and are, therefore, deemed more adequate reform instruments than are their precursors. Prior attempts at reform, being "undersized" at birth, were more vulnerable to the rigors of legislative processes which all mechanisms of change must undergo in our American political system.

The American public, being neither ignorant nor naive, is highly unlikely to continue shelling out public money for the application of a bandaid to treat a cancer. They are far more likely to respond to a sense of new direction for the nation than to seemingly endless appeals to rally against

specific problems. The proposals suggested here represent a means for such a new direction in the areas where so much of the nation lives. Its success, however, would require astute leadership from both the State and Federal levels of the nation's political system. The executive branches of these levels of government would have to place metropolitan reform very high on their agendas for both the States and the Nation. They would have to convince state legislatures and the Congress to use their appropriations in far more purposeful ways, even beyond the concepts of revenue sharing schemes.

The resistance offered to these proposals by local and State levels of government might not be as much as one might imagine. The States would be afforded a means by which to grasp many of the crisis-scale problems of metropolitan areas, which have become perennially abrasive and divisive problems for them. The cities, on the other hand, would wind up with more, rather than less, Federal money through the trading of development funds for service funds. As discussed in Chapter II, it is the citys' operating budgets rather than their capital budgets that are causing their current fiscal emergency. Needed development programs within their boundaries would be accomplished through the MPDAs. Thus, the real loss to city hall would be the power that comes with control of Federally funded development programs. In return, city hall would be relieved of problems which are impossible to solve within their jurisdiction. It would be difficult to conceive of a mayor, manager or commission that would not gladly accept the trade.

The issue of power redistribution in relation to the urban blacks partially parallels the situation of the city executive, since moving into city hall is their primary political objective at the moment. Additionally, the creation of an MPDA would offer new ladders to power, with rungs emanating from within their communities. Their determination and pride to improve these communities, which

is the most hopeful prodigy on the current urban scene, would be more likely to produce results under an MPDA concept than in the present context which yields only frustration as long as the really substantial resources and opportunities are on the other side of the metropolitan wall. The white poor and near-poor groups in the cities would benefit in a similar fashion. Since one major policy of the metropolitan area would be to encourage and promote the enlarging of housing and jobs, racial and class conflicts would be lessened in direct relation to the increased opportunities.

The suburbs, which share a stake in the stability of metropolitan society, and thus in the survival and revitalization of the cities, would receive tangible benefits denied them by the present condition of metropolis—better and more transportation and recreational facilities, cleaner air and water, and a more rational arrangement of the focal points of their lives. Further, as noted earlier, many so-called "suburbs" are sharing increasingly in the problems labeled "urban". An MPDA would enable them as well as the cities to deal with these problems, and perhaps help prevent their spread to those suburbs so far spared.

The prospects for the creation of MPDAs, who can engage in comprehensive policies planning and the guidance of metropolitan development, is not only dependent upon imaginative leadership and political management, it is partially dependent on the development of tools needed to better understand relationships between service functions and to weigh the costs and benefits of a variety of new public programs. Normative planning depends also on the attitudes of the planning profession towards defining or redefining its responsibilities. For a variety of reasons, however, this theoretically important step in the advancement of the profession has often been neglected. Significant changes in the methodology and context of planning demand that planners devote more of their time to charting future

directions for the metropolis. Planning can no longer afford to be a process that simply accommodates the inevitable. Conscious efforts are being made to change and reform the urban system and its means of governance. To be a viable part of this change, planning must become more policies-oriented and allow for the interaction of the public and their elected officials as a part of this orientation. The proposed normative framework for metropolitan planning is presented herein as one such step along the way to this objective.

Metropolitan Government: A Matter of Choice

The creation of MPDAs is viewed in this research as an alternative mechanism that would serve as a stepping stone toward the eventual adoption of a general-purpose areawide government. It is, therefore, only an interim measure and should not be construed as a substitute for the need to continue the debate and investigation into desirable forms of government for the metropolis. Ultimately, MPDAs should be converted into governmental bodies in order to permit the integration of other urban services with those services to be performed by MPDAs. Only through a broadly based government at the metropolitan level could such an integration be achieved. Further, such an integration is necessary if truly efficient and economical service is to be provided to the residents of a metropolis for all urban functions, not just planning-related functions.

The achievement of a government for the metropolis involves many issues and questions. Two issues are of importance to this research as regards normative metropolitan planning. One issue involves the form of areawide government that would best accommodate the service functions of government for a metropolis in accordance with various criteria of efficiency, equity, accountability, and effectiveness; the other issue involves the nature of

functional assignment techniques and the relationship between functional responsibility and the sharing of power. This last section will discuss and analyze these issues because of their importance to the transformation of MPDAs into metropolitan governments. Much of what will be discussed relies on the comparative analysis of alternative structures contained in Chapter III. However, this material is viewed as a necessary extension of that discussion to arrive at some conclusion(s) concerning which, if any, form of areawide government best serves the interests of metropolis.

Functional responsibility in a federal system is naturally diffuse. No single level of government bears the sole responsibility for the delivery of any domestic function. As a result, the concept of today's federalism is a cooperative venture. However, while cooperation is a characteristic of urban federalism, it is difficult to come by in the daily performance of a function. The underlying rationale behind this phenomenon is relatively simple to identify; the resolution is not. What is shared in federalism is power, and the sharing of power is not an easy task, be it among individuals or governments.

The debate over the proper assignment of urban functions arises in the context of formulating alternative arrangements that would in effect have to share power. This debate is more than just a technical controversy over which level of government is best suited to perform various functions;⁸⁷ it is also an argument about the ends of government, as well as the means, values, and benefits associated with such ends.⁸⁸ Further, it is an issue that involves preferences about the scope and exercise of power at all levels of government. Essentially, then, the assignment of functions question hangs on expectations and attitudes as to how power can be allocated to various levels of government in a way that satisfies the mutual interests of the many publics involved in the division of power—local, metropolitan, State, and national constituencies.⁸⁹

Sharing Power Over Functions

Power is frequently divided in an urbanized federal system. However, it is rarely allocated on a purely functional basis. Instead, certain aspects of single functions fall within the jurisdiction of one or more levels of government. Thus, if a function is to be effectively performed, it frequently must be within a collaborative framework which permits jurisdictions to play distinct, but interlocking roles.

This sharing of power over functional responsibilities contributes largely to the dynamic nature of the federal system. Several reasons support this contention. First, the American public perceives different values to various levels of government.⁹⁰ Thus, local government may be associated with the values of freedom and choice. State government, with its regulatory capabilities, might represent order, while the national government may be favored for effective public expenditure policies.⁹¹ Therefore, different governments would assume different roles in the performance of these functions depending on the values attached to those functions. For example, over time the national government would become more important in matters relating to income redistribution, States would play an advanced role in the amount and quality of land development, and local governments would experience renewed demands to provide more and better human resource services. In brief, when public values concerning the nature of a function change, responsibilities concerning the service delivery of that function may shift.

Secondly, the sharing of power contributes to the viability of the federal system since jurisdictional conflicts will arise over the relative importance of the various components of a particular function. As a case in point, in land use control, local governments may stress the development aspects of the function while the regulatory

aspects of the service—environmental control or low-income population dispersal—may be the concern of higher levels of government.⁹² Because the various levels of government have jurisdiction over different functional components, they often attempt to change the relative emphasis of these sub-functions. As this occurs, one or another level of government may become more or less important in the performance of a function.

Finally, the sharing of power is a source of dynamism because of the desire of each level of government to maintain its continuing role in the performance of a function. Sometimes governments will attempt to carve out areas of exclusive functional control. As was previously discussed, the States' rights and local home rule movements are perhaps the most prominent cases of this tendency. In other instances, the contest takes the form of whether a unit of government will not be a party to a multi-level program such as those characterized by the debates over Federal block grants in recent years.⁹³

These various jurisdictional tensions have, on occasion, produced new mechanisms and procedures for the performance of an entire function, or portions thereof. Yet, consistently, the various levels of government still exert influence over these new mechanisms and procedures. Issues of funding, representation, and operating powers usually are formulated in a manner that furthers, advantageously of course, the interests of affected units of existing government.⁹⁴

As federalism is basically a system of shared power over common functional responsibilities, an analysis of where such responsibilities should be lodged is related with defining the general roles of various levels of government rather than attempting to enumerate their specific functional responsibilities. Unfortunately, the theory of federalism offers no a priori rationale for even a broad division of functional assignments. As Davis has stated:⁹⁵

. . . the federal principle does not prescribe any physical, moral, or qualitative conditions for the distribution of functions. It is indifferent to the precise content of the division, and it argues that there is no a priori principle by which a distribution of functions could be affected. The definitive element of the federal state is simply in the form of the division, not its substance; in the creation of a specific kind of jural relationship between law-making authorities, not in the material quality of the functions vested in the general and regional governments.

The problem of functional assignment in a federal system, then, is the subject of considerable political debate over the substantive dimensions of a given function, as well as over the general nature and extent of governmental power at all jurisdictional levels. At the same time, federalism is concerned with the rules by which functions are allocated, though it is silent with regard to a particular substantive formula for allocating such functions. The basic theme of federalism is that any durable allocation of functions must guarantee, to some degree, the joint agreement of the several parties involved in or affected by an assignment decision.⁹⁶

Considerable research has been conducted by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations on conceptual considerations in the assignment of functions.⁹⁷ The latest Commission report, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide, concluded that there exists myriad patterns of substate functional assignment, most of which are ad hoc and unsystematic. Consequently, the Commission felt that a major task in future attempts at metropolitan reform would be the development of more comprehensive and systematic policies for the assignment of functions to areawide and local governments. The Commission added that the dimensions of this task would require a consideration of (1) criteria or rules for functional assignment; (2) an

appraisal of the procedural and structural means of allocating or reallocating functional responsibilities; and (3) an understanding of the exact nature of the functions, sub-functions, and activities to be assigned. To determine how functions are or might be allocated in a substate context, the Commission noted the following:⁹⁸

1. Functions and component activities are allocated and periodically reassigned among Federal, State, and local governments as well as among different types of local government. Presently, human resource services such as health and hospital, welfare, and higher education are centralized at the county or State level, while the bulk of physical development and public safety services, such as police, fire, sewerage, housing, urban renewal, parks and recreation, are provided at a local level.
2. Policies which have a significant impact on the allocation of functional responsibilities include intergovernmental aid programs that channel categorical or block grant monies to preferred jurisdictions; the development of new-style Federal and State districting mechanisms that have assumed components of certain functions; and the availability of different structural and procedural means for changing or conditioning functional assignments.
3. Assignment criteria are a main component of a performance of functions policy. Four main guides emerge as pivotal considerations: economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness. (The specific assignment criteria are indicated in Table V-3.)
4. Assignment criteria complement or conflict with one another. Clearly all criteria cannot be achieved simultaneously in a functional assignment. Equity demands often conflict with those of economic efficiency. Similar conflicts arise between components of the administrative effectiveness and the political accountability standards. At the same time, however, many sub-components of these criteria complement one another. Public sector competition and citizen participation are

Table V-3. Criteria for the Assignment of Functions

1. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are large enough to realize economies of scale and small enough not to incur diseconomies of scale, (b) to jurisdictions that are willing to provide alternative service offerings at a price range and level of effectiveness acceptable to local citizenry, and (c) to jurisdictions that adopt pricing policies for their functions when appropriate.
2. EQUITY: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are large enough to encompass the costs and benefits of a function or that are willing to compensate other jurisdictions for the service costs imposed or benefits received by them, (b) to jurisdictions that have adequate fiscal capacity to finance their public service responsibilities in a manner which insures interpersonal and inter-jurisdictional fiscal equalization, and (c) to jurisdictions that are able to absorb the financial risks involved.
3. POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY: Functions should be assigned (a) to jurisdictions that are controllable by, accessible to, and accountable to their residents and (b) to jurisdictions that maximize the conditions and opportunities for active and productive citizen participation.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS: Functions should be assigned to jurisdictions (a) that are responsible for a sufficient number of functions and that can balance competing functional interests, (b) that encompass a logical geographic area for effective performance of a function, (c) that explicitly determine the goals and means of discharging assigned public service responsibilities and that periodically reassess program goals in light of performance standards, (d) that are willing to pursue intergovernmental means of promoting interlocal functional cooperation and reducing interlocal functional conflict, and (e) that have adequate legal authority and management capability to perform a function.

Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Areawide, vol. IV, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 99.

mutually compatible as are economies of scale, geographic adequacy, and management capability. Decisions about which criteria and sub-criteria are significant in a function, then, affect not only assignment decisions, but also the manner in which the particular public service will be delivered.

5. Assignment criteria do not unequivocally favor delegation of functions to any particular level of local government. Thus, political accountability favors allocation of functions to smaller, local jurisdictions while equity often demands the attention of larger, more encompassing units. Elements of economic efficiency and administrative effectiveness favor delegating functions to both local and regional units. A central problem, then, is the determination of which criteria are most important in the delivery of a particular service. At the very least, however, assignments which patently violate most or all of these criteria describe the general principles that should be weighed in developing a balanced and rational assignment of functions policy.

Thus, the mandate for the functional assignment process at a substate level is anything but clear. As indicated, the creation of MPDAs would involve questions centering on whose responsibility it is to perform a variety of urban services at a metropolitan scale. Because of the vague and sketchy procedures available, it appears that this will be a most difficult and politically volatile process. The use of ACIR's criteria may be of some comfort. However, a note of caution is in order. Delineating a set of assignment criteria, other than the status quo, with its strengths, weaknesses, and trade-offs often requires a new focus. For example, must public goods necessarily be assigned along strict functional lines or could their provision focus on common activities. The problem is that a public good, such as police protection, has no operational content. Rather, police protection is a wide and complex array of inter-related activities that differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Much of the current thinking on reorganization

assumes that the provision of public goods is solely a functional process. However, there is no evidence to support the implication that either centralization or decentralization must assume a functional rather than an activity format.

Another problem is the existence of politically sensitive trade-offs inherent in any allocation of public activities to various governmental units. If each activity, or set of related activities were to be delegated to some jurisdiction (not necessarily already in existence) based on some specific set of criteria, we could well evolve a system of government more complex and irrational than the one we presently have. In short, the whole may well be different than the sum of its parts.

In general, these four criteria and their subcomponents focus on either the level or type of government to which a function is to be assigned. Thus, some of the criteria argue for areawide or State provision of a function and others for local provision of a service. Still other criteria argue for certain types of governmental units to perform the service at an areawide or local level. Table V-4 indicates the relationship of the various criteria subcomponents to the issue of functional assignment.

In practice, these criteria argue for the assignment of certain activities regionally and others locally. But since many functions have subcomponents that are of an areawide or local nature, they frequently argue for local or areawide assignment of these subcomponents (see Table V-5). In short, functions and activities can be assigned to local, areawide and State units of government on the basis of these ideal assignment criteria.

Table V-4. Assignment Criteria and Their Relationship to the Level and Form of Government to Which a Function Should be Assigned⁹⁹

Criteria Subcomponent	Level of Government		Type of Government
	To Which Function is Assigned		
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY— Economies of Scale	Areawide or State		Technically Proficient
FISCAL EQUITY— Economic Externalities	Areawide or State		Technically Proficient
FISCAL EQUITY— Fiscal Equalization	Areawide or State		Authoritative
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS— Geographic Adequacy	Areawide or State		Authoritative
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY— Access and Control	Local		Cooperative
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY— Citizen Participation	Local		
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY— Service Competition	Local		
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY— Public Pricing			
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS— Management Capability			
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS— Legal Adequacy			
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS— General Purpose Character			
ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECTIVENESS— Intergovernmental Flexibility			

Table V-5. Hypothetical Assignment for Components of Functional Activities

Activity/Component	Areawide	Shared	Local
PLANNING			
Intelligence	x		
Forecasting	x		
Plan Formulation		x	
Operation Review		x	
Liaison/Coordination	x		
FINANCING			
Revenue Raising		x	
Revenue Distribution	x		
Fiscal Control		x	
Budgeting			x
STAFFING			
Selection			x
Recruitment		x	
Training	x		
Appointment/Removal			x
ADMINISTRATION			
Supervision	x		
Management Analysis		x	
Productivity Analysis		x	
Technical Assistance	x		
STANDARD SETTING			
Formulation of Rules		x	
Rule Interpretation	x		
Rule Adjudication	x		
Rule Evaluation		x	
Rule Amendment		x	
Rule Enforcement			x
ENFORCEMENT			
Investigation	x		
Inspection	x		
Licensing	x		
Certification	x		
SERVICE DELIVERY			
Operations			x
Construction			x
INFORMATION			
Record-Keeping		x	
Communication		x	
Data Collection		x	
Reporting			x
Public Relations			x

Table V-5. Continued

Activity/Component	Areawide	Shared	Local
EVALUATION			
Fact-Finding	x		
Public Hearings		x	
Testing/Analysis	x		
Consultation		x	

Source: ACIR, Governmental Function and Processes: Local and Areawide (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 10.

At the same time, however, application of these assignment criteria is not an easy task. These standards are not always mutually compatible or easily ordered. Many functions (i.e., social services and land use controls) have differing elements of political accountability and fiscal equity, for example. The first criterion would argue for local assignment of the service; the latter for regional or State assignment. It is not always completely clear, then, which level of government should be accorded the responsibility for the service. Much depends on how important each criteria is in the delivery of a particular service.

Functional assignment criteria offer a normative guide to a more effective allocation of service responsibilities among State, areawide, and local jurisdictions. Considerations of economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness are prominent issues in functional assignment debates. Simultaneously, the urgency of the allocation issue is highlighted by numerous pressures; local fiscal disparities; nationally sponsored areawide programs; the emergence of stronger State bureaucracies; and continued emphasis on human resource service decentralization. A systematic assignment policy and process involving all levels of government is needed.

Such a policy would permit a more reasoned and manageable apportionment of service responsibilities among State, area-wide, and local governments. However, prior to the development of such a policy is the need for creating general-purpose areawide governments. As previously alluded to, the options are many; the choice is another matter.

Alternative Governmental Structures

Despite the fact that the theory of federalism does not indicate criteria for the allocation of functions and powers among different types and levels of government, various political, economic, and administrative theorists have developed different governmental models which can be related to the assignment of service functions. As discussed in Chapter III, a number of metropolitan areas have attempted structural and procedural changes which typify one or another of these approaches. The discussion to follow will review the theory of these governance models in relation to the need for balancing criteria of assignment and service responsibilities among State, areawide, and local jurisdictions.¹⁰⁰

There are three distinct governmental alternatives for functional assignment. In general, they vary to the degree that they espouse centralization or decentralization of functions, powers, and activities between local and regional governments. One school of thought favors a decentralized or polycentric approach to the reapportionment of service responsibilities. Another favors a consolidated form of government, which provides both local and areawide services. Still another school favors a two-tier federation with a formal division of responsibilities between areawide and local jurisdictions.

Polycentric/Decentralized. The first governmental system, exemplified by the writings of Bish, Warren, and Ostrom, argues against a preordained or centrally determined division of responsibilities in metropolitan areas. Instead, they have detailed the virtues of an ad hoc, bargained approach to structuring functional assignment.¹⁰¹ The approach has both local and regional jurisdictions, but the regional units have no formally delegated functional responsibilities. Rather they assume functions that are transferred to them by underlying local governments or that they perform for constituent units by contract. Consequently, the polycentric method for assigning services involves the market method of allocating functions to different levels of government. Functions—local, areawide, and State—are provided only by the governments that choose or are sought out to perform them.

Polycentric forms of service allocation are described as having several benefits, including (1) increased responsiveness to individual public service demands, (2) greater levels of political control, (3) more efficient production of public goods, and (4) more durable cooperation in the provision of such goods.¹⁰²

Polycentricity improves responsiveness to consumer needs, so the argument runs, because a citizen is able to choose among a number of local governments to satisfy his preferences. Tiebout's argument indicates that the consumer, by his spatial mobility, is able to choose that jurisdiction which provides the approximate mix of public expenditures he desires.¹⁰³ Moreover, communities themselves may follow a strategy of structuring their service outputs in such a way as to attract or repel various types of citizen consumers. In this way, both citizens and local jurisdictions interact to match the supply and demand policies relating to public goods. As a result, the fragmentation of metropolitan areas is a central factor in allowing citizens to articulate their public service demands.

Fragmentation produces other, primarily political benefits as well. Citizen access to local government is expanded and interest in the delivery of local public services is heightened.¹⁰⁴ In essence, fragmentation permits governmental organizations to be formed around natural and viable political communities. Within a polycentric system of governance, citizens feel that they can both influence and control the political system and not be alienated from its workings.

These theorists further maintain that under such a system, services are apt to be provided more efficiently. They argue that the process of service delivery competition tends to create better knowledge of how public goods might be more effectively produced. Metropolitan fragmentation permits, in their views, a better distinction to be made between the production and provision of public goods, with regional units competing in the production of services and local units bidding for different packages of such services.¹⁰⁵ Though they concede the fact that there are some difficulties with this division, they find that smaller jurisdictions can withhold their purchases of goods until larger units comply with their service demands.¹⁰⁶

Finally, these analysts contend that governmental fragmentation need not prevent areawide needs from being met. Where common benefits exist, they argue, local units will seek to cooperate in joint ventures. Where jurisdictional conflicts arise, cooperation will ultimately occur as a result of either intervention by the State or the courts, or bargaining among affected jurisdictions to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement. Thus, the polycentrists acknowledge that interlocal cooperation cannot always be achieved voluntarily. But they take the stance that powers and responsibilities should be liberally distributed in a metropolitan governance system. In that way, local governments can be both independent and interdependent and that metropolitan conflicts can be duly resolved by bargaining, appeal

to higher jurisdictional authority, or the imposition of controls by actors external to metropolitan local governments.

In summary, the commended virtues of the polycentric system of functional assignment include:

1. The protection of jurisdictional and individual independence in the performance of urban functions;
2. The responsiveness to the diverse public services demands of a metropolitan community;
3. The emphasis on bargained and cooperative coordination of functional activity;
4. The creation of an open system of multiple access to areawide and local jurisdictions; and
5. The emphasis on experimentation and incremental progress towards areawide governance.

Consolidation. A second approach for distributing service responsibilities places all regional and local functions under a single consolidated unit of government. In this fashion, a unified government directly performs areawide services throughout its jurisdiction and administers local services through decentralized local service districts. The State performs those functions that the consolidated unit cannot manageably administer. Contending that fractionated government is the root of the functional assignment problem, consolidationists argue that governmental unification will produce (1) economy in government, (2) greater public service integration and coordination, (3) greater popular control over public service delivery, and (4) more efficient administration and equitable financing of public services.¹⁰⁷

Consolidationists place only second-order importance to local governments. They contend that the existing local government structure splinters the responsibility for resolving areawide problems that essentially are indivisible in nature.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, they argue that local governments

will rarely cooperate in undertaking areawide responsibilities since they are reluctant to surrender their jurisdictional prerogatives. In short, local governments cannot be expected to allocate scarce resources or adjudicate conflicting interests to achieve workable metropolitan programs on a disinterested or long-term basis.¹⁰⁹ Hence, as they view it, local governments will rarely cooperate in a fashion that would make either polycentric or other related forms of government work.

Consolidationists contend that a key indication of the ineffectiveness of local government activity is the extreme variation of local capabilities in handling complex service problems. Surveying the governmental landscape of most metropolitan areas, they have found governments with inadequate fiscal and personnel resources, with circumscribed boundaries and only limited management capability to identify and resolve most of the urban problems facing them.¹¹⁰ Further, they point to the legal, structural, and fiscal limitations which prevent these governments from taking a cooperative and comprehensive approach to solving metropolitan problems.¹¹¹ Consequently, the lack of effective power among local governments prevents them from adopting effective areawide solutions to most metropolitan problems.

Lack of effective local government, they contend, also reduces meaningful popular control over regional decision making. Citizens have access only to their own local governments and cannot readily influence decisions outside the scope of their locality. The proliferation of overlapping independent functional units, they point out, frequently prevents priorities from being chosen among competing services and further complicates the issue of political accountability.

Therefore, consolidationists urge the creation of institutions involving a single metropolitan government that would plan and implement high-quality, coordinated, regional

and urban services according to the dictates of an areawide political process.¹¹² In essence, they do not believe that local voluntarism would produce workable solutions to metropolitan assignment problems. Seeing localism as an unnecessary veto to regional action, they argue for a unified metropolitan government.

To sum up, consolidationists claim that unified metropolitan government would result in:

1. More efficient production and management of urban services and an end to disparate service levels in a metropolitan area;
2. The creation of a democratic regional process which will allow a metropolitan citizen to have greater access to and control of regional decision making;
3. The development of comprehensive and coordinated programs in accordance with an explicit metropolitan plan; and
4. The abolition of interlocal functional conflict.

Federation. A third method apportions legal responsibilities between general-purpose governments at two levels. Proponents of a federated or two-tier approach to the assignment of functions hold that most metropolitan governance systems lack an authoritative general-purpose political process at the areawide level and have an ineffective one at the local level.¹¹³ They contend that there is too little centralization of areawide responsibilities, overcentralization of some local ones, and too little coordination of both. Unlike polycentrists, federationists do not regard unregulated public service competition as a virtue of the metropolitan policy. Rather, they see a need for authoritative regional decision making which affects both areawide and local jurisdictions. They desire more decisive and less voluntaristic coordination of metropolitan policies and programs.

The main features of a federated approach to metropolitan governance are (1) an aversion to the functionalist approach to assigning local and areawide responsibilities, (2) the creation of a general-purpose unit of limited areawide government, and (3) the development of concurrent power relationships between local and areawide units of government.¹¹⁴

The single most common theme of the federationists is the avoidance of a purely functional approach to the assignment question. Contending that the solution to the metropolitan governance problem is not through ad hoc assignments of regional functions to various regional bodies, they argue that the higher tier of government must do more than provide minimum areawide services and facilities. In their view, it must determine priorities among regional functions, provide a forum for conflict resolution in the metropolitan area, and coordinate local decision making below the areawide level.¹¹⁵

To structure metropolitan political power adequately, federationists urge the creation of a general-purpose areawide government which can provide regional services and serve as a focus for an areawide political process which will debate, decide upon, and implement metropolitan policies. By taking a generalist rather than a functionalist approach to structuring an areawide level of government, they claim that metropolitan policies will be determined by a general-purpose government rather than State or Federal governments. Metropolitan bureaucracies, therefore, would be more in tune with local and regional public service needs.¹¹⁶

Federationists further stipulate the need for concurrent power relationships between areawide and local governments. They hold that a key to effective functional assignment is the sharing of power over functions rather than a division of functions. This sharing of power would enable local and

areawide governments to negotiate the implementation of metropolitan policies.¹¹⁷ The local citizenry could promote beneficial regional policies, restrain harmful ones, and, in general, have better access to the entire system of metropolitan government than they would have under either a polycentrist or consolidated format. The concurrent power relationships, in their view, would facilitate a more manageable allocation of functions and might help promote greater equity, representativeness, and responsiveness in metropolitan political systems.¹¹⁸

In summary, proponents of a two-tier federation approach claim that it will:

1. Encourage local rather than State or Federal determination of metropolitan policies;
2. Give the citizen greater and more regular access to the areawide decision making process;
3. Insure political rather than administrative solutions to areawide problems;
4. Create less tolerance for local policy decisions that have unfavorable metropolitan ramifications, and for areawide policies that are highly detrimental to local communities;
5. Permit systematic and coordinated rather than ad hoc solutions to metropolitan problems; and
6. Foster a consensual and planned division of labor among areawide and local levels of government.

Some Comparative Findings

Each of the three governmental arrangements for administering local and areawide services exists in one form or the other in one or more metropolitan areas, with the first being the most prevalent. All three obviously reflect different political preferences for the assignment of local and areawide services. Generally all three models, to a

greater or lesser degree, meet some of the ideal assignment criteria already enumerated. Further, in each of the three models of metropolitan government there are divergent and similar theoretical dictates relating to the formulation of metropolitan policy and the assignment of functions. In summary, the comparative theoretical aspects of the models is discussed as follows.

Multiple decision making centers exist in both the polycentric and federated models; i.e., citizens and communities have considerable access to the nerve centers of decision making in these systems. Political access in the federated governmental model is to a general-purpose areawide unit as well as to a local jurisdiction. Thus, when used effectively, it has a more extensive impact than under the polycentric scheme where access may only be to a special-purpose unit of government or to a local government which has, at best, only a limited voice in regional concerns.

Citizen control of matters requiring a metropolitan forum of decision making appear to be more direct under the federated and consolidationist forms of metropolitan governance. The polycentric system usually displays no mechanism for the direct accountability of affected constituencies in matters of areawide importance and decision making.

The federated approach to areawide governance incorporates formal, comprehensive power relationships between local and areawide units; informal, functional ones exist in the polycentric system. Previously designated functional assignments occur in the federated model, while functional assignments in the polycentric model are ad hoc and often unplanned in nature.

Both the polycentric and consolidated models make claims to greater efficiencies as regards the delivery of services to their constituencies. In the polycentric scheme, citizens only consume those services that they desire while in the

unified approach, service duplication is avoided. Additionally, both make claims that their approaches provide economies of scale in the production of public services. On the other hand, however, service adequacy is more likely to be an aim of the federated and consolidated models where minimum and uniform levels of service would be more apt to occur. A polycentric system theoretically displays more uneven governmental capabilities among local and diverse areawide units and invites superior levels of government to assume and concomitantly to assure service adequacy through functional grants or legislative mandate.

Intergovernmental conflict is theoretically greatest in the federated approach to metropolitan governance. Polycentric models place a premium on functional cooperation whereas intergovernmental tension naturally exists in federated models where local and areawide responsibilities affect one another. On the other hand, the federated instrumentality is capable of adjudicating intergovernmental conflict more effectively than the polycentric approach. In the federated arrangement, the areawide tier of government is in a position to mediate conflict among local units, whereas in the polycentric situation, conflict resolution would either be lacking or come from actors outside the metropolitan political process.

The federated and consolidated models would be more likely to strengthen processes of metropolitan decision making than would the polycentric scheme. In the former, a general-purpose governance process encompasses the entire metropolitan area and priorities among the various functional requirements in a metropolitan area can be established. In the federated approach, standard-setting would be the responsibility of the areawide tier of government while a consolidated government would be naturally inclined to provide uniform levels of certain services.

Theoretically, service equity may be better achieved in both the federated and consolidated systems of government. Equalization of revenue capabilities might occur in a consolidated governance system while such a task would be the responsibility of a second tier of government under the federated model. Certain service inequities could occur, however, in a consolidated model where different neighborhoods were accorded different servicing treatments.

In summary, the above discussion and analysis regarding the comparative findings of several theoretical perspectives concerning three models of alternative governmental structures, implies the following generalistic tendencies about each: (1) polycentric models seem to be voluntaristic, functional, non-redistributive and consensual in nature; (2) consolidationist models are non-voluntaristic, comprehensive, potentially redistributive, and hierarchial in nature; and (3) federated models are non-voluntaristic, comprehensive, potentially redistributive, and negotiative in nature.

The discussion herein would indeed be deficient if an adequate analysis of any empirical research were not conducted to validate or refute the previous theoretical findings. Unfortunately, very little empirical evidence exists that would afford analysts with comparative data on which to evaluate the pros and cons of these various strategies that have been employed to achieve areawide governance and effective areawide delivery of services. Most of the findings are merely descriptive accounts of practical perspectives regarding the development of operational criteria for the creation of alternative governmental structures that would improve the abilities of local and metropolitan areas to govern themselves.¹¹⁹ As such, the forwarding of conclusions on the basis of these operational dictates is a hazardous if not purely speculative adventure. Nonetheless, some recent findings of an empirical nature are worth noting.

The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) recently conducted empirical research on the above three forms of alternative governmental structures as they relate to governmental functions and processes in an area-wide and local context.¹²⁰ All of their conclusions are much too voluminous to include in this discussion. However, their comparative empirical findings about the performance of the three forms of metropolitan governance can be summarized as follows:

1. Metropolitan conflict was, in general, resolved by external intermediaries in polycentric governmental systems. Federation governments displayed intensified political conflict; indeed, the presence of a federated structure appeared to have exacerbated some metropolitan tensions. By way of contrast, political conflict appeared to be somewhat muted in consolidated structures.

2. Political access, according to ACIR, did not appear to diminish in federated and consolidated governmental systems. Individual political access in both the consolidated and federated approaches increased because access to an areawide governmental authority could be attained.

3. Overt popular dissatisfaction with the functional assignment system appeared to be lowest in polycentric systems. In the federated and consolidated arrangements, lower-tier governments and both urban and rural minorities on occasion felt disaffected with the new systems.

4. Of all the political systems, the polycentric appeared to be the least able to increase service levels, except for those functions that were administered by regional special districts. Consolidated systems all exhibited higher levels of service expenditure after their formation. More importantly, however, they were frequently able to find new external and internal revenue sources to finance these increased outlays. Further, elimination of service duplication was most pronounced in both the consolidated and federated systems.

5. The degree of adequacy of service was most noticeable in the consolidated and federated governmental models. In both of these arrangements, many but not all areawide services were financed on an areawide basis. Depending on the service in question, rural or urban areas frequently received higher levels of services after a reorganization of government. On the other hand, wide variations in the levels of service provided by polycentric systems continued to be predominant. Both federated and consolidated governmental systems, however, still experienced some demands for service decentralization.

6. Service equity was rarely achieved in polycentric systems; in the federated and consolidated governance schemes, fiscal equity was often, but not always, achieved. In fact, in some of the latter systems, ACIR reported that service redistribution became the dominant theme of public goods provision.

In summary, the preceding discussion of the pros and cons of three models of metropolitan government for dealing with the problems of the assignment of functions and the formulation of metropolitan policies reveals that, at least in terms of the authority, efficiency, equity, and accountability criteria, comprehensive reforms involving general purpose local governments appear to offer the most promising approach. Federation and consolidation all score well on the accountability, equity, and authority measures and moderately well on efficiency. In comparison, the polycentric approaches fare well on both authority and efficiency but poorly on equity and accountability..

At the same time, however, it is clear that while major structural reforms may be the most desirable, they are also the most difficult to achieve, especially on a nationwide scale. As was pointed out, the applicability of some of these strategies is limited. Consolidations, for example, appear to be most appropriate for small and medium-sized

metropolitan areas. On the other hand, the most fertile ground for federation is an urban or rural area having a weak county government and few special districts. None of these institutional alternatives can readily cross State lines. In short, no one local strategy appears to be viable across the country.

Local official opposition, voter apathy and ignorance, and State constitutional and statutory restrictions have hampered most efforts to restructure and consequently redirect local governmental systems. As a result, the production and delivery of areawide services have been met largely through a patchwork arrangement designed to respond to problems crossing jurisdictional boundaries through procedural adaptations and the creation of new mechanisms without seriously disrupting the local government institutional and political status quo. However, from the evidence presented herein, (what little there was to document), the tensions and problems in the present pattern concerning the assignment of functions are not being remedied by these piecemeal approaches. Further, the evidence indicates that perhaps the choice of a hybrid form of areawide governance is more palatable than the major reforms of federation and consolidation. Unfortunately, less than conclusive data exists that could suggest what form this hybrid arrangement would take. In the meantime, the problems continue and the matter of choice becomes more confounded.

Concluding Observations and Recommendations

The foregoing examination of some theoretical and empirical perspectives are regards the restructuring of metropolitan local governments still leaves unsettled the question of the prospects for widespread action in that direction. Clearly, however, existing local government arrangements, which have been patched and repatched in piecemeal fashion, are critically unsuited to meet the needs of our nation's

metropolitan societies. Whether in ways suggested by the Committee for Economic Development, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations or through other approaches, effective steps toward the reordering of existing arrangements so as to achieve more effective, equitable, and responsible institutions that can govern our metropolises are urgently needed.

Related to the need for action as regards metropolitan reform are the issues and problems associated with the present, piecemeal system of functional assignment. The present functional assignment system reflects little consistency as to the proper servicing roles of State, area-wide, or local governments. The structural and procedural deficiencies of most State-local governmental systems prevent a wholesale sorting out of functional responsibilities among different levels and units of government. This, in turn, has created an assignment system that is continuously centralizing or decentralizing functions without any real thought being given to the appropriate servicing roles of various governmental levels and units. Consequently, most services are not delivered in as efficient, effective, equitable, and accountable a fashion as they might be if there were a systematic functional assignment policy.

The use of functional assignment criteria, such as those previously discussed, would offer a normative guide for a more effective allocation of service responsibilities among State, areawide, and local jurisdictions. Further, as indicated in the previous analysis, these criteria are partially reflected in the polycentric, consolidated, and two-tier governmental arrangements that exist in substate areas. Considerations of economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness continue to be prominent issues in various functional assignment debates. This research has identified that a systematic assignment process involving Federal, State, and local gov-

ernment is needed. Such a policy would permit a more reasoned and manageable apportionment of service responsibilities among all levels and forms of governments.

As previously described in Chapters II and III, the profession of planning has been centrally involved with the many efforts to reform the process of governance in metropolitan areas. Yet, the theory and methodologies of planning are in need of an overhaul. The traditional comprehensive planning process is too narrow in scope, too end-state and plan-making oriented, too divorced from the political process of decision-making, and too concerned with the intricacies of quantitative problem solving than with the rigors of policy formulation and analysis which are major determinants in the planning for and guidance of metropolitan change. In essence, the contention that planning is ineffective because it lacks an adequate areawide institutional basis is largely fallacious. This research has demonstrated that the improvement of planning performance on both a local and regional scale requires more changes than just those associated with governmental reorganization. It requires conscious efforts to integrate planning with decision making, and to rethink the theory and practice of planning, in addition to continuing past efforts and present attempts at reforming the nature and types of metropolitan government.

To this end, a normative framework of metropolitan planning has been proposed. Its basis lies in the integration of an improved planning process with the political stages of policy analysis, policies planning, and planning policy implementation. Its contributions would be the improvement of citizen participation in planning, the involvement of public officials in the planning process, improved coordination between and among the increasing number and variety of governmental planning programs, the lending of consistency to development decisions, and improvement of the relationship between plans and land management.

Five elements comprise the basic structure of normative metropolitan planning. As previously explained, these elements are intertwined in a manner that precludes planners from continuing an isolationist view from politics despite the long heritage of their conventional roles and responsibilities. These five elements — research and policy analysis, policies planning, general plan-making, metropolitan development plan-making, and metropolitan planning policy implementation — will require expanded and new approaches to the art of metropolitan planning. Further, the roles of planning education will need to be broadened and perhaps be in need of a complete realignment since many of the skills, knowledge, and techniques implicit with the recommended normative approach are nonexistent in the curricula of planning schools. In short, the challenges to the profession of planning for the 1980's will require a rethinking and maybe a reorientation of traditional values and beliefs as regards its roles and responsibilities. But if challenge is not a standard component of the planner's job, then someone should rewrite the position specifications.

To adequately carry out each element in the normative approach to metropolitan planning would require a general-purpose areawide government that contains within its structure a metropolitan planning agency and supportive staff. This research has identified, however, that the debate, much less the decision making, with regard to a form of areawide governance for our nation's metropolises is still in its infancy. It will take years, perhaps generations before the issues and problems with government reform are ameliorated to the liking of the debators. Yet, metropolitanization continues and with it the precipitant problems of imbalance between public needs and the adequate production and delivery of goods to service those needs.

To combat this dilemma, this report recommends the immediate creation of Metropolitan Planning and Development Authorities

(MPDAs) in accordance to the procedures outlined previously in this research. These MPDAs are viewed as a necessary interim measure that would eventually serve as the forum for the adoption of general-purpose areawide governments. They are not intended to be substitutes, however, for broadly based metropolitan governments which are needed to permit, in accordance with the dictates of our democratic political system, the integration of all urban services into an efficient, equitable, accountable, and effective system of service allocations.

Additionally, the debate on what forms of metropolitan governance are needed should be continued, but more in line with those recommendations posed by this report as well as the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations contained in Appendix A. To that list, this report would only hasten to add the need for mechanisms such as the MPDA to afford metropolises with the capability to speak to state legislatures with one voice in spurring them to the completion of their responsibilities as regards the immediacy of metropolitan reform.

Because MPDAs would be charged with the responsibilities of planning and managing for those problems, issues, and participants involved with the development of a metropolis, this report recommends that these Authorities adopt, upon their creation, the normative framework proposed herein as their conceptual and operational basis for metropolitan planning. By so doing, the MPDAs would be centrally involved with the political processes of metropolitan decision making and policies formulation and implementation. By adhering to the normative metropolitan planning framework, MPDAs would broaden the scope of their planning responsibilities and as such would find themselves in a better position to analyze the implications of proposed policies and their accompanying actions on the social, economic, and physical development schemes deemed necessary by both the politicians and planners. In essence, normative metropolitan planning

is properly the responsibility of the MPDA and would result in a political interaction view of policies planning that would define the MPDA's role to be that of a central authority charged with the formulation of strategies, plans, and policies for the improved management of metropolitan change.

In summary, then, this report has surfaced and analyzed several points critical to the improvement of metropolitan governance and its related activities of planning and functional assignment procedures. In capsule, the highlights of the findings of this research, based on a careful examination of a preponderance of evidence, are as follows:

1. Traditional comprehensive planning is unsuited for the proper management of urban change. The resolution of metropolitan planning issues into planning policies is a politically-charged and conflict-laden endeavor involving highly fragmented and multinucleated structures of semi-independent groups and organizations composed from both the private and public sectors of metropolis.

2. To correct for the many problems associated with the conventional planning approach, a normative framework for metropolitan planning is posited as one meaningful solution that would broaden the scope of planning in a manner consistent with the identified roles and responsibilities of the profession. It would enable planners and public officials to work together in developing viable strategies to combat the disparities of metropolitanization and to search for more effective and systematic assignment policies that would permit a more manageable apportionment of service responsibilities among State, areawide, and local governments.

3. Two factors — metropolitan government reorganization and metropolitics — were found to be determinants central to the formulation of a normative approach to metropolitan planning. However, both factors are inextricably related to an even larger set of issues concerning metropolitan

reform. Unfortunately, the arguments and theoretical and empirical dictates surrounding these issues prevents a clear delineation of those strategies of reform that should be pursued. As a result, the form and type of government for a metropolitan area remains purely a matter of preference and voter acceptance rather than a clearly established set of guidelines and procedures. Further, even if metropolitan areas were to adopt reorganized forms of areawide government, the performance of conventional planning would not be materially improved; i.e., governmental reorganization is a necessary but not a sufficient basis for reforming the theory and practice of metropolitan planning.

4. In recognition of the above findings, which must be tempered with the realities of political and professional ideologies concerning drastic changes in the status quo, and from the evidence gathered with regard to the immediacy of the "metropolitan problem", it is recommended that State legislatures (or the Federal government in the cases of those States which procrastinate) create and legislate Metropolitan Planning and Development Authorities using those specifications regarding structure and scope of authority as contained in Chapter V of this research.

5. It is further recommended that these Authorities utilize the normative framework of metropolitan planning as their conceptual and operational basis. These two strategies when linked together in the manner described herein would afford students, planners, political scientists, and administrators with additional time to debate and re-examine the issues of a national strategy for metropolitan reform.

6. This report finally recommends that any future considerations regarding either metropolitan government reform or functional assignment policies and procedures be in support of or directly related to those recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations

as documented in their recent report on Substate Regionalism and the Federal System and contained in this report. (See Appendices A and C). Their findings are fully supported herein and are indicative of the type of revitalized and broadened perspective needed to begin anew the reexamination of metropolitan reform.

Lastly, this research has pinpointed two additional avenues of future investigation as regards the subject matter of governmental reorganization schemes, functional assignment procedures, and improved approaches to the art of metropolitan planning. The first concerns the need for a more adequate data base of quantitative information on the actual performance of newly created governmental reorganization schemes and corresponding strategies of functional assignment in relation to those institutional arrangements which they replaced. Perhaps this report and the many others referred to herein would have been more willing to take a stand on the question of which intergovernmental strategy best accommodates the issues central to the realignment of local governments in metropolitan areas and systematically reapportions the service responsibilities of State, area-wide, and local governments, if more and better empirical evidence were available for an exhaustive analysis. Unfortunately, the present lack of this information precludes any pragmatic research into strategy selection and may even be preventing analysts from obtaining a clear view of all the parameters involved in the search for reform programs. Until this situation is remedied, it can be expected that most comprehensive efforts to reshape our metropolitan institutions will be confined to extensions of theoretical dictates rather than to practical solutions of a perpetuating problem.

The second avenue for future research concerns the organizational intricacies of adopted areawide governance mechanisms. Very little has been written by the reformers

on what the proper line and staff relationships would be in, for example, a federated system of government. While this report cannot speak with authority on the matter, it is suspected on the basis of the research included here and several conversations with professionals working in these new environments, that the transformation of systems of governance does not imply a direct transition of roles and responsibilities as regards the expanded scope and duties of these newly formed institutions. In essence, research is needed to clarify the proper relationships between re-shaped structures of government and the organizational parameters that define how efficiently and effectively these structures will operate on a daily basis.

Ultimately, men, not governmental machinery, will determine the fate of our metropolises. Leadership, foresight, technical and political skill, inventiveness, and a commitment to change are the prerequisites of fashioning an urban environment that is to be satisfactory to its inhabitants and conducive to economic and social growth. A normative perspective on metropolitics and regional planning, then, must necessarily be concerned with improving our understanding of how governmental machinery can maximize opportunities for these human attributes to flourish.

Notes

1. See for example, John Friedmann, Retracking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973), pp. 49-84; International City Managers' Association (ICMA), Principles and Practice of Urban Planning (Washington: The Association, 1968), pp. 349-377; and Thomas Dames, The Urban Planning Process (W. Lafayette, Ind: Joint Highway Research Program, 1972), pp. 38-50.
2. International City Management Association (ICMA), Managing The Modern City (Washington: The Association, 1971), pp. 238-253.

3. Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City: The Nature and the Future of Our Urban Crisis (Boston: Little & Brown, 1970), pp. 34-156, passim.
4. For precious cites referring to this assessment see the Notes section of Chapter III, nn. 139, 142, 144.
5. Dennis Rondinelli, "Urban Planning As Policy Analysis: Management of Urban Change", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 39, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 13-22; and Stefania Denbow and Thomas Nutt, "Research Report: The Current State of Planning Education", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 39, no. 3 (May 1973), pp. 203-209.
6. Charles Perin, "The Noiseless Secession from the Comprehensive Plan", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 33, no. 5 (September 1967), pp. 336-346.
7. Richard Bolan, "Emerging Views of Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 33, no. 4 (July 1967), p. 233-245.
8. Herbert Gans, "From Urbanism to Policy Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 36, no. 4 (July 1970), pp. 223-226.
9. John Friedmann, "Notes on Societal Action", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 35, no. 5 (September 1969), pp. 311-318.
10. Richard Bolan, "Community Decision Behavior: The Culture of Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 35, no. 5 (September 1969), pp. 301-310.
11. Alan Altshuler, "Decision-Making and the Trend Toward Pluralistic Planning", in Urban Planning in Transition, ed. E. Erber (New York: Grossman Publ. Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 183-186.
12. For example, see Frederick Aschman, "The Policy Plan in the Planning Program", Planning 1963 (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1963), pp. 105-111; Martin Meyerson, "Building the Middle Range Bridge for Comprehensive Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 22, no. 2 (Spring 1956), pp. 58-64; and F. Stuart Chapin, "Taking Stock of Techniques for Shaping Urban Growth", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1963), pp. 213-222. The list could be expanded considerably, for there are many examples of articles and planning documents which have adopted the phrase, policies planning.

13. One interesting divergence is contained in Friedmann, Retracking America, pp. 171-193.
14. F. Stuart Chapin, Urban Land Use Planning (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1965), p. 349.
15. Anthony J. Catanese, Scientific Methods of Urban Analysis (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972), pp. 6-7.
16. Edward Banfield, Political Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 10-32; and R. Bauer and K. Gergen, The Study of Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 134-143.
17. Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 17-38.
18. Dennis Rondinelli, "Adjunctive Planning and Urban Development Policy," Urban Affairs Quarterly, vol. 7 (September 1971), pp. 13-19.
19. The history of the Model Cities program, and antipover-ty legislation as contained in J. C. Donovan, The Politics of Poverty (New York: Western Publ. Co., 1967) when read with the history of the Appalachian Regional Development program and the Federal Highway assistance programs found in M. Levin and N. Abend, Bureaucrats in Collision: Case Studies in Area Transportation (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971) and T. A. Morehouse, "The 1962 Highway Act: A Study in Artful Interpretation", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 35, no. 3 (May 1969), pp. 160-168, document the complex interaction of groups at all stages of policy formulation.
20. Morton Grodzins, The American System (Chicago: Rand McNally Publ. Co., Inc., 1966), passim.
21. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate Districts, vol. I, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 4-15. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Regional Decision Making.)
22. Rondinelli, "Urban Change", p. 16.
23. Thirty years were required to recognize publicly the failure of New Deal social welfare policies. See Rondinelli, "Adjunctive Planning", pp. 23-25.

24. Yehezkel Dror, Public Policymaking Peexamined (San Francisco: Chandler Publ. Co., 1968), pp. 45-73.
25. Ruth P. Mack, Planning On Uncertainty (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1971), pp. 6-15.
26. Ibid., pp. 86-95.
27. A favorite tactic of congressional committee members themselves is to invite policy analysts and experts who will present evidence favorable to their own pre-disposition toward a policy proposal.
28. Gans, "Policy Planning", p. 223.
29. Acceptance of one alternative — optimal to one set of interests — need not result in the rejection of others. Mutual adjustments result in creation of new courses of action from combinations of existing alternatives. P. Diesing, "Noneconomic Decision-Making", Ethics, vol. 46 (October 1955), pp. 18-35.
30. Lawrence Mann, "Studies in Community Decision-Making", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 30, no. 1 (February 1964), pp. 13-23.
31. Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior (2nd ed.; New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 134-152.
32. David Braybrooke and Charles Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 45-48.
33. Supra, n. 19, p. 166.
34. Levin and Abend, Bureaucrats, pp. 303-318.
35. Fred Jordan, "The Confessions of a Former Grantsman", City (Summer 1971), p. 46.
36. Melville C. Branch, Planning: Aspects and Applications (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966), pp. 3-18.
37. John W. Reps, The Making of Urban America, A History of City Planning in the United States (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 224-276.
38. Melvin Webber, "The Roles of Intelligence Systems in Urban-Systems Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 31, no. 4 (November 1965), p. 291.

39. Dames, Planning Process, pp. 40-43.
40. Charles C. Schimpeler, "A Decision-Theoretic Approach To Weighting Community Development Criteria and Evaluating Alternative Plans", an unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Purdue University, August 1967, pp. 12-28.
41. Dames, Planning Process, p. 65.
42. Urban Land Institute, The Community Builders Handbook (Washington: The Institute, 1968), pp. 86-186, 211-262.
43. Henry Fagin, "Planning For Future Urban Growth, " Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 30 (Winter 1965), pp. 12-14; and Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, Mass: The Technology Press & Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. 91-139.
44. Bolan, "Culture of Planning", pp. 307-309; Terry Clark, Community Structure and Decision Making, (San Francisco: Chandler Publ. Co., 1968), pp. 222-234; and Wilbur Steger and T. R. Lakshmann, "Plan Evaluation Methodologies: Some Aspects of Decision Requirements and Analytical Response", Highway Research Board Special Report 77 (Washington: The Board, 1968), pp. 43-75.
45. ICMA, Principles and Practice, p. 329.
46. This point was amplified on considerably in Chapters II and IV. See, also, Robert Levine, Public Planning, Failure & Redirection (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972), pp. 162-167.
47. Thad Beyle and George Lathrop, "Planning and Politics: On Grounds of Incompatibility?" in Planning and Politics: Uneasy Partnership, eds. Thad Beyle and George Lathrop (New York: The Odyssey Press, 1970), pp. 1-12.
48. James Clapp, New Towns and Urban Policy (New York: Dunellen Publ. Co., Inc., 1971), pp. 41-65.
49. David C. Ranney, Planning and Politics in the Metropolis (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co., 1969), pp. 19-43.
50. Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 31, no. 4 (November 1965), pp. 331-337; Paul Davidoff and Thomas Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 28, no. 2

(May 1962), pp. 103-115; John Friedmann, "Planning as a Vocation", PLAN, The Canadian Journal of Planning, Part I, in vol. 6, no. 3 (April 1966), pp. 99-124, and Part II in vol. 7, no. 1 (July 1966), pp. 8-25; Melvin Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility: Toward an AIP Consensus on the Profession's Roles and Purposes", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1963), pp. 232-241; Paul Davidoff, "Normative Planning", in Planning For Diversity and Choice, ed. Stanford Anderson (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1968), pp. 132-171; and, *supra* nn. 1, 7, 18.

51. ICMA, Principles and Practice, pp. 564-582.
52. Davidoff, "Normative Planning", p. 134.
53. The basis of this statement rests within the material as presented in Chapter II. Chapter IV presents some hypotheses regarding the continued ineffectiveness of planning.
54. This paragraph essentially summarizes the findings of Chapter IV as regards the meshing of planning, values and conflict within a metropolitan setting.
55. Henry Fagin, "Planning Organization and Activities Within the Framework of Urban Government", in Planning and the Urban Community, ed. Harvey Perloff (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1961), p. 111.
56. The components (perhaps it would be better to refer to them as functions) will be related to these activities in the section titled "Elements of a Normative Framework".
57. The Comprehensive Plan and official map is usually submitted to the governing body of the municipality which customarily holds a public hearing, after which the plan is adopted in whole or in part, sometimes with modifications based on the hearing. Copies of the official map are then placed not only in the city council records, but in the appropriate office where deeds and similar public property records are maintained. The ordinance or other instrument of adoption generally prohibits any development within the areas defined in the official map until notice has been served on the city. For a good discussion concerning the arguments for and against the adoption of a plan document, see Alan Altshuler, The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 285-296.

58. Rondinelli, "Urban Change", p. 19.
59. Rondinelli, "Urban Development Policy", p. 38.
60. Recent writings in the planning literature cover a wealth of information as regards the most recent thinkings within the profession on the subject of citizen participation in the planning process. See, for example, John Friedmann, "The Public Interest and Community Participation: Toward a Reconstruction of Public Philosophy", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 39, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 2-12; Sheldon Plager, "Judicial Review: Policy, Planning, and The Courts", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 37, no. 3 (May 1971), pp. 174-191; Donald Hagman, "The Greater London Development Plan Inquiry", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 37, no. 5 (September 1971), pp. 290-296; and Shirley Passow, "Stockholm's Planners Discover 'People Power'", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 39, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 23-34.
61. Kenneth Clark and Jeanette Hopkins, A Relevant War Against Poverty (New York: Harper & Row Publ., Inc., 1968), pp. 71-90.
62. Anthony Downs, "Getting People Into the Act", Planning, vol. 41, no. 1 (January 1975), pp. 12-14.
63. Warren Jones, "Why Planning Commissions Need a Shot In the Arm", Planning, vol. 40, no. 7 (August 1974), pp. 19-21.
64. John Parker, "Decisions, Data Needs, and Rationality", Threshold of Planning Information Systems (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1967), pp. 34-39; and International City Management Association and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Applying Systems Analysis in Urban Government: Three Case Studies, Report prepared by ICMA for HUD (Washington: The Association, 1972), pp. 1-8.
65. Barrie Greenbie, "Social Territory, Community Health and Urban Planning", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 40, no. 2 (March 1974), pp. 74-82.
66. Webber, "Urban-Systems Planning", p. 289; and, Steven Lipner, "Requirements for the Development of Computer Based Urban Information Systems", in An Introduction to Computer Systems, ed. Edward Joslin (Arlington, VA: College Readings, Inc., 1969), pp. 133-142.

67. ICMA, Principles and Practice, pp. 334-336.
68. John Costonis, "Whichever Way You Slice It, DRT Is Here To Stay", Planning, vol. 40, no. 6 (July 1974), pp. 10-15.
69. Charles Lindblom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1965), pp. 132-141.
70. William Wheaton, "Public and Private Agents of Change in Urban Expansion", in Explorations Into Urban Structure, ed. Melvin Webber, et. al. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 189.
71. Scott Greer, "The Metropolis and Its Future," in Exploring Urban Problems, ed. Melvin Levin (Boston: The Urban Press, Inc., 1971), pp. 575-589.
72. Perhaps the most important value to be derived from viewing policies in this manner is that it helps to illustrate the danger of adopting policies out of sequence. If the lower levels are adopted first, and many times they are in response to the immediacy of a problem, there is no opportunity to consider properly all the higher levels of policy. For example, if one decides to take a trip by train he immediately limits his choice of usable alternative routes and, consequently, his choice of destinations.
73. Adapted by the author from a more complete set of policies contained in, The New York City Planning Commission, Plan For New York City, (New York: The Commission, 1969), passim.
74. See, for example, Charles Haar, "The Content of the General Plan: A Glance at History", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 21 (Spring/Summer 1955), pp. 66-70; Robert Hoover, "On Master Plans and Constitutions", Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 26, no. 1 (February 1960), pp. 5-24; T. J. Kent, The Urban General Plan (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 27-184; and Alan Black, "The Comprehensive Plan" in Principles and Practice of Urban Planning, eds. William Goodman and Eric Freund (Washington: International City Managers' Association, 1968), pp. 349-377.
75. Table V-2 is modified from the concept in Kent, The Urban General Plan, pp. 92-93.
76. American Institute of Planners, Report of the Planning-Policy Committee on Financing the Plan (Washington:

- The Institute, 1963); and Edmund Bacon, "Capital Programming and Public Policy," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 22, no. 1 (Winter 1956), pp. 35-38.
77. Friedmann, "Societal Action," p. 312.
 78. Bolan, "Emerging Views," p. 235; and Frank S. So, "Metropolitan Planning Policy Implementation," Planning Advisory Service Report 262 (Chicago: American Society of Planning Officials, 1970), pp. 3-4.
 79. Each of the seven categories of persuasive strategies are described in detail in the following works. Each work cited refers to the strategy in the order in which they are both listed respectively: So, "Policy Implementation," pp. 4-5; ICMA, Managing the Modern City, pp. 312-316; Webber, "Urban-Systems Planning," pp. 292-295; Annmarie Walsh, The Urban Challenge to Government (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), pp. 58-61; Charles Haar, "Budgeting for Metropolitan Development: A Step Toward Creative Federalism," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 34, no. 2 (March 1968), pp. 102-104; Braybrooke and Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision, pp. 45-48; and Melvin Levin, "Planners and Metropolitan Planning," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 33, no. 2 (March 1967), pp. 78-90.
 80. American Society of Planning Officials, "Increasing State and Regional Power in the Development Process," Planning Advisory Service Report 255 (Chicago: The Society, 1970), pp. 1-35.
 81. So, "Policy Implementation," pp. 11-16; and American Society of Planning Officials, New Directions in Connecticut Planning Legislation (Chicago: The Society, 1967), pp. 143-161.
 82. Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities Area, Referral Manual (St. Paul, Minn.: The Council, 1968), pp. 18-23.
 83. U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Regional Planning Issues, Part 2, paper prepared for the Subcommittee on Urban Affairs, by Ted Kolderie, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 245-249.
 84. U.S., Congress, Senate, Toward a National Growth Policy: Federal and State Developments in 1972, prepared by the Congressional Research Service for the Library of Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 85-104.

85. International City Management Association (ICMA), Municipal Yearbook, 1974, eds. Richard Hofrichter and Emily Evershed (Washington: The Association, 1974), p. 13.
86. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), 13th Annual Report. Federalism in 1971: The Crisis Continues (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 19.
87. For a discussion of this point, see Steven Erie, John Kirlin, and Francine Rabinovitz, "Can Something be Done? Propositions on the Performance of Metropolitan Institutions," in Reform of Metropolitan Governments, ed. Lowdon Wingo (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1972), pp. 33-35.
88. For a formal treatment of this question, see Paul Ylvisaker, "Some Criteria for a Proper Areal Division of Governmental Powers," in Area and Power, ed. Arthur Maas (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969), pp. 28-37.
89. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Governmental Functions and Processes: Local and Area-wide, vol. IV, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 80-81. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, Governmental Functions.)
90. Ylvisaker, "Some Criteria," p. 32.
91. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Public Opinion and Taxes (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 5-7.
92. Council on Environmental Quality, The Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 15-32.
93. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Special Revenue Sharing: An Analysis of the Administration's Grant Consolidation Proposals (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 18.
94. ACIR, Governmental Functions, p. 108.
95. Rufus Davis, "The Federal Principle Reconsidered", in American Federalism in Perspective, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little-Brown and Co., 1970), p. 7.

96. This usually occurs in a legal context between State and Federal governments and in operational form between State and local governments and Federal and local governments.
97. See, for example Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 6-115, passim; and ACIR, Governmental Functions, pp. 2-11.
98. ACIR, Governmental Functions, pp. 98-99.
99. Ibid., p. 8.
100. This discussion of alternative governmental structures borrows heavily from the research done by ACIR. For more detailed and complete documentation on the subject, see Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, The Challenge of Local Governmental Reorganization, vol. III, Substate Regionalism and the Federal System (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 127-143. (Hereafter referred to as ACIR, The Challenge.)
101. Robert Bish, The Public Economy of Metropolitan Areas (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 35-62; Vincent Ostrom, et. al., "The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry," American Political Science Review, vol. LV, no. 4 (December 1961), pp. 831-842; and Robert Warren, "A Municipal Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, vol. 30, no. 3 (August 1964), pp. 193-204.
102. ACIR, Governmental Functions, p. 110.
103. Charles Tiebout, "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, vol. LXIV, no. 5 (October 1956), pp. 416-424.
104. ACIR, Performance of Urban Functions, p. 49.
105. Ostrom, et. al., "Theoretical Inquiry," p. 839.
106. Ibid., pp. 839-840.
107. ACIR, Governmental Functions, p. 113.
108. Luther Gulick, The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1962), p. 24.
109. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

110. Committee for Economic Development (CED), Modernizing Local Government (New York: The Committee, 1966), pp. 11-13.
111. Victor Jones, Metropolitan Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), Chapter VIII.
112. Jones, Metropolitan Government, pp. 49-60; and Gulick, American Ideas, p. 123.
113. Federation is not used in the classical sense in this discussion; hence, the discussion encompasses a treatment of those metropolitan governance schemes which involve two tiers (areawide and local) of general-purpose government, not just those where the lower tier is represented in the upper tier. See, Committee for Economic Development (CED), Reshaping Government in Metropolitan Areas (New York: The Committee, 1970); ACIR, The Challenge, pp. 95-109; and Robert Wood, Metropolis Against Itself (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1959), pp. 33-79.
114. ACIR, Governmental Functions, p. 110.
115. Wood, Metropolis, p. 39.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TO DEVISE STRATEGIES
FOR LOCAL AND AREAWIDE GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATION

RECOMMENDATIONS

With the following recommendations, the Commission seeks to chart a sensible course toward local and areawide governmental reorganization in light of the continuing inter-governmental challenge at the substate regional level. The focus here is chiefly on the States and localities, given the former's prime constitutional role and responsibilities *vis-a-vis* local governments and the latter's vital concern with actions that are taken on this front. The Federal government's assignment is largely a complementary one.

Over the past dozen years in eight different reports, this Commission has urged State adoption of more than 25 separate non-fiscal recommendations relating to the strengthening and restructuring of the nation's counties and cities. The proposals advanced here build on this foundation.

In urging this agenda for reform, the Commission is fully cognizant of the wide variations in local governmental forms, functions, and finances within and among the States. The Commission also recognizes that no single reform option could possibly apply to all substate regions and all local governments, that effective umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations may be the most suitable and feasible option in many instances, that local reorganization efforts may be as crucial as areawide ones, that the timing of implementation of reform options will vary, and that no across-the-board formula can or should be devised to cover all the ways the States can assume a positive role in this vital process. Hence, this agenda incorporates considerable flexibility while providing a clear direction and consistent basic purposes. Specific proposals will require State-by-State adaptations. But the prime goal of a more responsive system of local and areawide governance should not be lost sight of in this adaptive process.

THE STATE ROLE

The Commission concludes that the time has come for all States to adopt a comprehensive, long range policy with respect to the structure and functions of their local governments and the relationships of such governments to one another, the State, and official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations established pursuant to substate districting statutes. It notes that existing State policies in this pivotal area for the most part have been piecemeal, partial, and out-dated. It finds that continuing urbanization and technological change have strained the capacity of most local governments within substate regions to effectively plan, administer, and finance needed public services.

At this point then, the Commission believes that the States in conjunction with their localities must devise a strategy designed to help local governments meet the structural, functional, and fiscal challenges of substate regionalism. This policy should be developed in a systematic, comprehensive fashion, considering distinctive State, non-metropolitan, and metropolitan jurisdictional problems. Hence...

The Commission recommends that States through statutory, and where necessary, constitutional action adopt a comprehensive local government structure and functions policy involving immediate goals as well as an on-going process for their implementation and updating. This policy should be geared (a) to structuring the system of local governments so as to make it more responsive and adaptable to the areawide as well as local needs of individual communities, (b) to interrelating substate regional districting and related activities with local governmental reform efforts, and (c) to striking a balance between State initiative and local as well as areawide self-determination in achieving the above two goals.

The Commission recommends that, at a minimum, such State legislation and, where necessary, constitutional enactments should...

A. Set specific standards for—

(1) assessing the structural, functional, fiscal, and geographic viability of all existing and proposed local governments—special districts and school districts as well as units of general government—using such factors as (a) their capacity to raise revenues adequately and equitably, (b) their mix of residential, industrial or other tax base components, (c) their population and geographic size, and socio-economic and racial composition, and (d) the assignment of areawide and local governmental functions, including components thereof, to appropriate and accountable units of government.

(2) governing the orderly and equitable extension of municipal boundaries to embrace unincorporated territory, including procedures for—(a) assignment of initiating authority to municipal governing bodies as well as to residents in an unincorporated area seeking to be annexed; and (b) elimination of any absolute power on the part of inhabitants of outlying unincorporated areas, which are proposed to be annexed, to veto a proposed annexation meeting statutory standards, including the provision of urban services.

B. Establish a broadly representative local government boundary commission at the State and/or local level(s). In addition to exercising those powers regulating municipal incorporations, non-viable units of general local government, special districts, and interlocal servicing agreements that were recommended in previous Commission reports, the

boundary commission(s) should be authorized to...

(1) oversee the implementation of the statutory standards, cited above, and apply them, where pertinent, to individual boundary decision cases that come before it:

(2) recommend modification of substate district boundaries, subject to action by the appropriate State authority:

(3) recommend modification of individual county boundaries in light of changing settlement and servicing patterns:

(4) monitor, recommend, and, where appropriate, facilitate municipal annexations of adjacent unincorporated areas:

(5) develop in conjunction with affected local jurisdictions, including counties, "spheres of influence" or "staged expansion limits" that delimit the ultimate boundaries of existing individual municipalities and help identify areas of potential municipal incorporation:

(6) make annual reports with recommendations to the governor and legislature on efforts to strengthen the basic pattern of local government.

C. Provide for a complete package of county structural reform options and initiatives that, in addition to an optional forms authorization, includes at a minimum:

(1) the requirement that any county embracing the predominant portion of a metropolitan area's population shall have a full-time executive officer, either appointed by the county board or popularly elected;

(2) placing county officers on a statutory rather than a constitutional basis;

(3) empowering the governing bodies of contiguous counties within substate regions to consolidate identical or comparable county offices and functions;

(4) authorizing the governing bodies of contiguous counties within substate regions to execute a multicounty consolidation, subject to a simple concurrent majority of the votes in a referendum in each of the counties encompassed in the proposed merger.

D. Clarify and systematize the functional responsibilities and relationships of counties and municipalities, by establishing the county as the basic service provider for its unincorporated areas, in addition to performing basic county functions, and by ...

(1) authorizing counties to perform urban functions in order to eliminate situations where they are barred from providing such services when (a) the service is being provided by a countywide or less than countywide special district, (b) a constituent municipality requests the county to perform the service, or (c) the public expresses through a popular referendum a preference for the county to perform the service on a countywide basis, and requiring that such functions when undertaken in incorporated areas meet performance standards developed by the county and affected municipalities and be set forth in a county ordinance;

(2) requiring that in instances where counties undertake to perform functions already provided by their constituent municipalities, such counties either enhance the quality or scope of such services or make proportionate payments to their municipalities in lieu thereof pursuant to a joint agreement;

(3) delineating uniform procedures for transferring functions between and among municipalities, counties, and multi-county regional bodies including officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations; at a minimum, such procedures should (a) involve the repeal of State constitutional and statutory provisions requiring voter approval of proposed transfers, (b) authorize revocation of a transfer when its performance falls below standards initially agreed to in the transfer, and (c) empower a jointly agreed upon body to determine whether a transferred function has not met such performance standards.

E. Strengthen the State's supportive role in the functional assignment area by:

(1) requiring counties having unincorporated territory or municipalities contiguous to such areas to develop within a specified period effective planning, zoning, and subdivision regulations for such areas, where such do not now exist, provided that where such regulations have not been adopted within the time span stipulated an appropriate State agency would assume the responsibility; and

(2) establishing a program of State technical and fiscal assistance to counties and municipalities for (a) management feasibility studies on transferring and consolidating functions and (b) extraordinary initial costs incurred in actual transfers or consolidations.

F. Permit, where the electorate by referendum chooses, the establishment of governmental units capable of providing areawide services. The Commission does not necessarily recommend affirmative action with respect to any of the following options in any specific situation, but believes the

people should have available to them a range of choices, which would include:

- (1) Multi-county consolidation and assignment to it of all areawide functions and--where its geographic scope is adequate--of all umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization functions;
- (2) City-county consolidation wherein all areawide and local functions are assigned to the new government and special districts are either merged with or are subordinated to it;
- (3) The modernized county, possessing all of the structural, functional, and fiscal powers detailed in Components C and D, with such powers embodied in a new county charter;
- (4) The possibility of converting a substate region's officially designated umbrella multi-jurisdictional organization into a general purpose government with a directly elected council or a bicameral council, one chamber popularly elected and the other composed of representatives of constituent units of general government;
- (5) The right to create a regional service corporation (a) subsuming all existing and proposed areawide special districts, (b) having responsibility for certain areawide functions including, but not limited to, areawide comprehensive planning and land use, transportation, waste disposal, and water supply, which heretofore may or may not have been performed on a regional basis, and (c) with popular election of its policy body.

Such enabling legislation should require that all of the above options would involve approval in a popular referendum by simple concurrent majorities in the central city or cities and in the outlying area or areas in metropolitan areas, by a simple

concurrent majority in each of the counties involved in non-metropolitan areas or districts, or by a simple areawide majority.

Such legislation also should stipulate that such referenda could be initiated by any of the following within a substate region:

- (1) a single or concurrent resolution of one or more units of general local government comprising a certain percentage of the region's population;
- (2) petition of a certain percentage of the eligible voters in the area proposed for inclusion within a new regional unit; or
- (3) direct action by the State legislature.

G. Provide for a broadly representative, permanent Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations to be constituted with adequate staff and funding and charged with studying and reporting on:

- (1) the current pattern of local governmental structure and substate regional organization and their viability;
- (2) the powers and functions of local governments and substate regional bodies, including their fiscal powers;
- (3) the existing, necessary, and desirable relationships between and among local governments and substate regional organizations, including official umbrella multi-jurisdictional organizations;
- (4) the existing, necessary, and desirable allocation of State-local fiscal resources;
- (5) the existing, necessary, and desirable roles of the State as the creator of the local governmental and substate regional governance systems;
- (6) the special problems in interstate areas facing their general local governments, intrastate regional units, and areawide bodies, such studies where

possible to be conducted in conjunction with those of a pertinent sister State commission(s); and (7) any constitutional amendments and statutory enactments required to implement appropriate commission recommendations.

Such commission shall render separate reports on individual topics covered under one or more of these broad subject areas, including whatever recommendations might be agreed upon, with specific bills and proposed constitutional amendments, where needed, being appended to them; in addition, it shall submit an annual report to the governor, legislature, local governments, substate regional units, and the citizenry.

This omnibus State recommendation, with its seven major components and nearly two dozen significant subcomponents, is designed to achieve five broad and interrelated objectives.

First, it seeks to place the full force of State statutory authority behind a set of enforceable standards relating to new incorporations, local governmental viability, and municipal annexation.

Second, it urges establishment by the States of local governmental boundary commissions to apply these standards in specific cases and to assume an on-going responsibility with reference to such other matters as the dissolution or consolidation of special districts and non-viable general governmental units, adjustments of county and substate regional boundaries, and annexation developments.

Third, it provides a packet of nine reform proposals designed to revitalize the structure of counties, to reconcile and rationalize county and municipal functional responsibilities, and to carve out a supportive State role in some of these undertakings.

Fourth, it sets forth a range of five basic area-wide governmental reorganization options—each with special features and suitable for specific regional circumstances—with a variety of initiating moves provided, but popular approval required in all cases.

Finally, this multi-faceted, State-oriented recommendation calls for the formation, where lacking, of broadly representative State advisory commissions on intergovernmental relations to probe on a continuing basis the structure, functions, finances, and relationships of lower-tier, middle-tier, and State governments. These commissions would publish reports on specific topics, make recommendations for solving interlevel problems, and submit an annual report to their respective governors, legislatures, local and regional units, and electorates.

THE FEDERAL ROLE

The Commission notes that actions of the Federal government directly affect local governmental institutions and the development of effective substate regional systems. Hence, *the Commission recommends that the Executive Branch of the Federal government and the Congress adopt policies which accommodate State and local actions to reorganize governments at the substate regional and local levels.*

For a number of political, legal, and common sense reasons, the Commission believes that it is inappropriate at this time for the Federal government to assume a lead role in efforts to achieve local governmental modernization and areawide reorganization. Yet, other reasons dictate that the Federal government cannot assume a hands-off policy in this matter. Too many existing Federal programs and policies affect the pattern of local government and of substate regional governance systems. Too many federally encouraged programs and too many Federal categorical, block

grant, and revenue sharing dollars one way or another already are involved. Too many national purposes ultimately are involved to sanction such a laissez faire course.

The underlying thrust of this final recommendation is to put the Federal government into a positive accommodating role with respect to State and local efforts geared to local and areawide governmental reform. Some of the possible approaches to fleshing out this Federal role include certain changes in administrative rules, specialized research, technical assistance, and a built-in awareness of institutional changes at the State, substate, regional and local levels. All are modest. But they could begin the carving out of a Federal role in this vital inter-governmental area which is complementary, not in conflict, with State and local efforts.

APPENDIX B

A summary of a discussion on
Definitional Problems with the SMSA.

Source: John H. Baker, Urban Politics In America (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 81-86, passim.

Problems With Definitions of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area

Although the Census Bureau has provided us with a clear and understandable, if not always simple, definition of the metropolitan area, some of the characteristics of this definition detract from its utility. The use of the county as a basic definitional unit makes particularly good sense to the federal government whose many agencies frequently use the administrative apparatus of the county and report their data in these terms. However, metropolitan development does not respect arbitrarily drawn lines separating civil subdivisions. In most cases, the county is either too small or too large a unit to use to define the metropolitan area. It is too small when the area has outgrown the confines of a single county but has not grown large enough to effect a change in character of entire contiguous counties or to affect the integration of these counties. It is too large when the inclusion of all of the territory within the county or counties of the central city or cities results in obvious definitional absurdities. The outstanding case in point is that of the largest geographic SMSA, San Bernardino-Riverside-Ontario, which includes thousands of square miles of uninhabited desert because of the unusual size of San Bernardino and Riverside counties. It may make sense someday to talk about the metropolitan problems of the Mojave Desert, but that day has not yet arrived.

The minimum population figure of 50,000 for central cities also creates problems. The metropolis of 50,000 to 75,000 is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different from the metropolis of eight to ten million. In fact, the differences may be so great as to suggest that it makes no sense whatever to refer to a free-standing city of 50,000 and its environs as a metropolis. This problem is significant enough to lead many scholars to ignore the less-populated SMSA's and to consider only the top hundred or so when conducting metropolitan research.

The SMSA also tends to be a less useful definition as metropolitan areas in the more densely populated regions of the country begin to merge with one another. The data on social and economic integration tell us that when SMSA's grow this close together they probably constitute one metropolitan area rather than several. This tendency is illustrated particularly well by developments on the Northeastern seaboard, around Chicago, and in Southern California. In recognition of this problem, the Census Bureau has developed a larger unit, the Standard Consolidated Area, which it applies in order to report data for certain large clusters of SMSA's. At present, the bureau uses this unit only in the New York-Northeastern New Jersey and the Chicago-Northwestern Indiana areas. In the case of New York, even the Standard Consolidated Area appears to be too small a definitional unit to comprehend the full area of social and economic integration; and, unless the bureau alters its definitional standards, this appears likely to become a problem with respect to other larger, expanding metropolitan aggregations.

The Megalopolis. In order to meet this final problem with the SMSA as a metropolitan definition, the French geographer Jean Cottmann developed a new concept—the megalopolis. Cottmann has applied the term to the unique cluster of metropolitan areas of the Northeastern seaboard of the United States.¹ Unlike the Standard Consolidated Areas, the megalopolis includes population classed as rural but which is in close proximity to urban areas and is closely tied to the city or cities by interests and work. The megalopolis stresses the time factor as well as spatial propinquity, and this permits the inclusion of areas which are physically separated when developments in transportation and communications forge social and economic links. While this concept avoids some of the more serious conceptual pitfalls of the Census Bureau definition, it suffers somewhat from serious

limitations of its own. The criteria utilized to determine the degree of social and economic integration within the larger community are understandably somewhat more vague than those used in the SMSA. In the second place, it is quite possible that those areas still classified as rural but within the megalopolis are no more oriented toward the cities than are other rural areas throughout the country. Certainly some of the political viewpoints expressed in these areas indicate that this is the case. In spite of its limitations, the megalopolis does emphasize the uncomfortable fact that our urbanized areas are quite probably outgrowing our definitional ability.

The Ecumenopolis. Although we tend to find the megalopolis a concept difficult enough to grasp in our attempt to define the broader context of urbanization, particularly visionary students of urban development have predicted even more difficult concepts for the future. Perhaps the most startling of these is the ecumenopolis or universal city of the Greek planner C. A. Doxiadis. This convincing prognosticator describes the ecumenopolis as a state of development in which "all settlements...(are) interconnected into a continuous network that will cover the entire earth."² The idea depends heavily upon many of the factors which Gottmann observed in the megalopolis and projects them to their logical conclusion. The conclusion assumes a continued rapid population expansion as well as the continued development of technological advances which will permit proximity in time rather than space to create social and economic integration over even larger areas. If the political problems of the interstate SMSA and the multistate megalopolis seem perplexing to those who attempt to deal with the metropolitan environment of today, the problems of the multinational ecumenopolis appear to be infinitely more troublesome.

Another Vague Definition. What we end up with after considering many definitions of the larger urban environment is less than satisfactory. It seems little more definite for most of us than a sweep of the arm indicating "something out there." Bollens and Schmandt come close to capturing it in its most limited sense:³

The metropolis, as is well recognized, does not designate a legally definable entity as a municipality or county does, although metropolitan boundaries might conceivably be coterminous with the territory of a governmental unit. When people speak of Philadelphia, Chicago, or Seattle, they often mean the sociological or economic city, the larger community that extends out beyond the legal limits of the major municipality and embraces the adjacent population and governments.

We must be content with such a broad statement, for any attempt to form a more specific definition admits to so many exceptions as to render the attempt useless.

References

1. Jean Gottmann, Megalopolis (New York, 1961), pp. 4-5.
2. C. A. Doxiadis, Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City (Chicago, 1966), p. 75.
3. John Bollens and Henry Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life (New York, 1965), p. 34.

APPENDIX C

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS TO DEVISE A MORE SYSTEMATIC
DISTRIBUTION OF FUNCTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES

FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

Diverse political forces at all levels of government contribute to the ad hoc nature of service allocations at the State-local level. Local fiscal crises, historical State controls over local government, political traditions affecting the structure and powers of State government, and national program initiatives are but a few of the political influences that now produce an unduly divergent pattern of State-regional-local functional assignments. A more systematic and ordered distribution of functional responsibilities between and among these levels and units of government would produce more manageable and effective service delivery systems in almost any substate region.

Federal, State and local governments all must bear some share of the responsibility for reordering service responsibilities. Consequently, the Commission makes the following recommendations;

RECOMMENDATION 1: STATE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS POLICY AND PROCESS

The Commission finds that certain governmental functions and component activities are most appropriately performed on a statewide basis, others as areawide responsibilities, still others as local duties and some as shared tasks of both levels of government. Yet present functional assignment patterns are often haphazardly determined on the basis of fiscal pressures on State or local government, the historical and legal status of different types of local governments, and numerous Federal and State program initiatives, all of which often result in inappropriate and conflicting patterns of functional assignment among State, regional, and local governments. The Commission therefore recognizes the need for more consistent and logical assignment of responsibilities. The Commission is convinced that a State Advisory Commission

on Intergovernmental Relations or some other suitable State-local instrumentality should be charged with the responsibility of reassessing continually the allocation of functional assignments in the State-local service delivery system. The Commission, however, realizes that there is no single appropriate formula for the allocation of functions among all State, areawide, and local units given the diverse geographic, cultural, social, economic, and political conditions that exist in the country. In light of these findings...

The Commission recommends that States enact legislation which establishes an on-going assignment of functions policy and process which will result in a more reasoned and systematic assignment of functions between and among State, local and areawide units of government. Such legislation should, at a minimum, authorize the State Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations or a similar agency, when no such commission exists, to:

- A. formulate general criteria for assigning new public services and reassigning established or expanded ones, taking into account the desirability of reconciling economic efficiency, fiscal equity, political accountability, and administrative effectiveness in the provision of a public service.*
- B. develop on a case-by-case basis specific functional classification standards based on the above criteria for determining the State, areawide or local nature of a function or components thereof, with emphasis on (1) local assignment of functions and activities that have a minimal impact on neighboring jurisdictions or would benefit from service competition, or do not require uniform levels of service, or do require a high degree of political accountability for satisfactory performance, (2) areawide assignment of functions and activities that are primarily redistributive or require a high degree of technical efficiency, or would benefit from regional economies of scale, or would necessitate a large*

geographic area for uniform or satisfactory implementation, (3) joint or shared regional-local assignment of functions having both areawide and local dimensions and requiring substantial interlevel cooperation for satisfactory performance, and (4) State assignment of functions and activities that require direct Statewide administration or that are beyond the capacity of local or areawide units to perform.

C. seek the assistance of affected local government representatives, associations of local officials, and relevant line agencies of State government in developing functional classification standards pursuant to (B) above.

D. prepare an intergovernmental impact statement concerning any State or locally developed assignment or reassignment proposal or Federal action or proposal affecting State-local service delivery systems. Such statement should evaluate these assignment or reassignment proposals or actions according to the general criteria and functional classifications developed in (A) and (B) above.

E. recommend State constitutional, legislative, or, where appropriate, local referendum action for the assignment of new and the reassignment of established or expanded functions according to the classification standards developed in (B) above. All such functional assignments or reassignments should protect the pertinent employment and pension rights of affected governmental employees and the relevant financial obligations of affected jurisdictions.

This recommendation calls for a jointly developed State-local assignment of functions policy and process. The Commission urges a three stage process for this policy. In the first step, an appropriate State-local instrumentality such as the State ACIR proposed in Recommendation 1G of Volume III would develop general assignment criteria pursuant to legislative authorization. Such criteria would focus on the need to consider and reconcile economic efficiency, fiscal equity, administrative effectiveness, and

political accountability in any specific apportionment of State, areawide, and local functional responsibilities. After developing these basic criteria, the State ACIR or other similar State-local instrumentality, with the assistance of State line agencies, local government representatives, and associations of local officials, would proceed to formulate detailed functional classifications that would be the basis for specific service allocation proposals.

After developing these guidelines, the joint State-local agency would implement its assignment policies in two ways. First, it would be authorized to develop an intergovernmental impact statement detailing the functional assignment ramifications of any Federally, State, or locally developed policy that affected markedly the State-local service delivery system. Secondly the agency would be empowered to recommend specific assignment proposals and submit them to the appropriate decision-making body. Some proposals might require State legislative action; others, a constitutional amendment; while still others might be handled via local referenda. State legislation or constitutional action would occur when the assignment proposal involved State assumption, State mandating, or transfer involving local and/or areawide units on a Statewide basis, or the assignment of a new function to such units. Local referenda might be used where the emphasis is on revising functional assignments only within a particular substate region.

RECOMMENDATION 2: COMPLEMENTARY FEDERAL ACTIONS

The Commission finds that the planning and districting requirements, administrative regulations, and grant-in-aid policies of various Federal programs have not helped States develop a flexible yet balanced functional assignment policy. Some Federally encouraged substate districts can serve as implementation mechanisms while others are confined to being planning and grant management instrumentalities. Some

districts have been encouraged to combine with generalist, locally controlled regional councils while others have remained separate, adding a confusing element to substate functional assignments. Federal aid programs often rigidify functional assignments by their funding eligibility requirements. Witness the independent institutional strength that various regional water pollution control districts have gained from receiving substantial Federal aid. Moreover, Federal legislation and regulations often promote functional assignments—through eligibility and pass-through provisions—that neither reflect existing State and local governments' responsibilities nor a well developed assignment of functions rationale. Only through selected provisions of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and OMB Circular A-95 has the national government sought to pursue a uniform policy of disbursing technical and financial assistance to governments designated as service providers by State and general purpose local governments. The Commission believes, therefore, that the Federal government should respect the systematic functional assignment policies developed by State and local governments. In light of these findings.

The Commission recommends that State, areawide, joint (regional-local) or local providers of governmental services designated pursuant to recommendation 1, component E should be recognized as the preferred recipients of all pertinent Federal technical, planning and financial assistance by appropriate amendment of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. The Commission further recommends that OMB modify the A-95 circular to require Federal agencies to take into account intergovernmental impact statements rendered pursuant to recommendation 1, component D in the disbursements of pertinent Federal assistance programs.

This recommendation calls for amendment of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 and OMB Circular A-95 to allow channeling of all pertinent Federal technical,

planning, and financial assistance to duly designated State, regional, joint (regional-local), or local providers of governmental services. This policy is analogous to the Federal aid preference given general-purpose local governments by Section 402 of that Act. This policy would help insure that Federal assistance programs would not conflict or confound functional assignment decisions that have been made systematically at the State-local level.

The Commission makes this recommendation because it believes that the Federal government through its assistance programs should really assist State and local jurisdictions in carrying out their various assignment policies. The Commission notes that numerous features of these programs—eligibility, Federally encouraged substate districts, and regulations requiring areawide administration of different services to mention the more obvious—have exerted a pronounced impact on existing State, regional and local service assignments. While the national government plays a rightful role in seeking to raise the level and quality of various State and substate services by these policies, it should leave to State and local governments decisions about the actual apportionment of service responsibilities. These questions, after all, are basically jurisdictional ones that fall well within the purview of State and local discretion.

VITA

Woodrow Lindsay Moore, Jr. was born February 12, 1945, in Louisville, Kentucky. He received his primary education in O'Bannon, Kentucky and his secondary education in Middletown, Kentucky, where he was graduated from Eastern High School in 1963.

He received the Bachelor of Civil Engineering Degree from the University of Louisville in 1968. Upon graduation, he simultaneously enrolled in graduate school at the University to pursue the Degree of Master of Science in Civil Engineering and joined the civil engineering consulting firm of Schimpeler-Schuetz Associates in Louisville as an Associate of the firm.

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